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In this thesis, I explore how accounting is used by the British state in order to govern its 
citizens. Specifically, I investigate the emergence of ‘the transparent state’, the state that 
claims to make its inner workings visible to its citizens through the publication of vast 
arrays of online, financial and non-financial information, audit and performance 
measures, ranking, ratings and statistics. The state claims that the visibility produced by 
‘transparency’ is democratising and empowering for its citizens. I consider how this form 
of visibility compares to the ways in which the state has appeared to and/or concealed 
itself from its citizens throughout history. Focusing on suicides in prisons in England and 
Wales as the empirical context for this study, I theorise the relations that are established 
between the state and the citizen through transparency by drawing on the interrelated 
notions of ideology and spectacle. In doing so, I make three key contributions. First, I 
contribute to the literature on transparency in accounting by demonstrating that part of 
the power and allure of transparency does not derive from its numerical content, but its 
particular aesthetic form as a pristine and glossy digital representation of complex and 
messy realities. Second, I develop the literature on transparency by focusing not on the 
internal organisational effects of demands to be transparent to external others, but on the 
external users of transparency, proposing that transparency addresses these users as 
individualised, isolated and passive spectators. Third, I contribute to the literature on 
accounting and governing in democracy, proposing that in transparency we find not an 
empowering and democratising practice, but a ‘spectacle’ in which the state produces a 
democratic appearance, an idealised ‘self-portrait’ of a social order that cannot be touched, 
changed or argued with. Thought of as such, transparency is an object of ideology par 
excellence as it deepens the subservience of citizens to the state whilst promising to do 







Today, states across the world provide their citizens with more information than ever 
before about their inner workings. In so doing, states claim to be ‘transparent’. This 
‘transparency’ consists of vast online networks of data on government functions and 
public services, presented in the form of reports, databases, ‘dashboards’ and ‘data-hubs’. 
It is argued that citizens are informed and empowered by transparency, which is in turn 
said to deepen and enrich the workings of democracy. But is this true? In this thesis, I 
investigate how the British state makes itself transparent to its citizens, conducting a study 
of transparency on suicides in prisons in England and Wales. Contrary to the idea of 
transparency as revealing the inner workings of the state and deepening and enriching 
democracy, I argue that transparency makes citizens more passive and subservient to the 
rule and authority of the state. I argue that transparency produces a glossy, sanitised and 
idealised appearance of the state: I call this ‘the spectacle of transparency’. I propose that 
this spectacle – a collection of glossy and visually appealing reports, data-hubs and 
dashboards – reduces citizens to passive, isolated and hypnotised spectators of 
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The fact is, living permanently in a well-ordered State has an out-and-out spectral 
aspect: one cannot step into the street or drink a glass of water or get into a tram 
without touching the perfectly balanced levers of a gigantic apparatus of laws and 
relations, setting them in motion or letting them maintain one in the peace and quiet 
of one’s existence. One knows hardly any of these levers, which extend deep into the 
inner workings and on the other side are lost in a network the entire constitution of 
which has never been disentangled by any living being. 
(Musil, 1953, p. 182) 
GOVERNMENT TRANSPARENCY 
The Government believes that we need to throw open the doors of public bodies, to 
enable the public to hold politicians and public bodies to account. 
(The Coalition: our programme for government, 2010, p. 20) 
To study the state is to step into a theatre of scholarship that has played host to the most 
radical and brilliant minds in the history of revolutionary and critical theory, sociology, 
political economy, philosophy and literature. In the brushstrokes of Marx and Lenin, 
Weber and Nietzsche, Althusser and Gramsci, Bourdieu and Brown, Musil and Kafka, we 
find the state painted in various postures, ranging from its portrayal as a monstrous beast, 
as a repressive machine and domineering violent authority, a decentralised and diffuse 
network of disembodied, normalising order, a field traversed by struggles and particular 
interests, a ‘wide’ and ‘narrow’ hegemon, or as a spectral, mysterious power, a haunting 
yet strictly governing absence. 
A common thread that we might weave through these diverse works is the notion of the 
state as an entity the internal workings of which are strictly closed off from vision or 
access to those over whom its power is exerted. Setting aside for the moment the question 
of the character of the state (whether it has an ‘essence’ and whether that essence is 
regarded as malevolent, or otherwise) and how the power of the state is exerted (materially 
or symbolically, destructively or creatively), as a space or site for the exertion of power, 
the state is known and accessed by the few and is unknown and inaccessible to the many. 
Although the state may at times appear in bright, violent and spectacular flourishes of its 
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might, the intricate details of its inner workings are kept well out of sight. Put differently, 
although over history the machinery of the state has produced magnificent and barbarous 
effects, the turnings of its great cogs and gears have remained concealed, hidden behind 
closed doors. All of this is to say that throughout history the state has had an interest in 
maintaining equal measures of opacity and secrecy in the governing of its citizens (Scott, 
1998; Bourdieu, 2014a). 
Today, any study of the state must do two things. First, it must free itself from the outset 
of any traces of the harmful illusion that our present neoliberal era is the one in which the 
state form has retreated or receded, has withered away or has been indiscriminately ‘rolled-
back’; on the contrary, the state is a central pillar in the neoliberal formation (Brown, 2019; 
Peck, 2013; Wacquant, 2012). Second, and at the very heart of this thesis, any study of the state 
must today confront the historical emergence and global zeitgeist of the transparent state, 
the state that purports to ‘throw open its doors’ to its citizens. In this inheres a peculiar 
historical development in the terms of the relation between state and citizen, where the 
former declares itself open, subjecting itself to the gaze and scrutiny of the latter. 
In the critical and interpretive accounting literature (Burchell, Clubb, Hopwood, Hughes, 
& Nahapiet, 1980; Hopwood, 1983; Miller & O’Leary, 1987; Roberts, 1991), as in the 
realms of social, political and critical theory (especially, Foucault, 1977), the relation 
between visibility and power has been understood such that those whose conduct is made 
visible for surveillance and scrutiny are the subjects of a ruling power, are subordinate to 
a dominant other in a hierarchy of authority that produces a panoply of disciplining, 
normalising and controlling effects. Thus, if realised, the resetting of the relation between 
state and citizen in contemporary transparency programmes promises a truly radical 
reversal in the political economy of struggle between the ruler and the ruled. In principle, 
transparency should act to deliver accountability, furnishing the population of a state with 
the necessary means to hold that state ‘to account’, and thus to have a greater say in 
determining the terms under which they are ruled. As Roberts (2009, p. 958) puts it, 
transparency contains “dual and contrasting potentials”. As such, whilst transparency is 
indeed implicated in disciplinary regimes of order and control, it is not surprising that we 
also find transparency closely bound up with the ideals of democracy, empowerment, 
emancipation, honesty, and truth (Arnold, 2009a; Gallhofer, Haslam, & van der Walt, 
2011; Power, 1994). 
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How, then, does the state make itself ‘transparent’? How, in practice, does the state 
“throw open its doors”? It certainly does not “throw open its doors” in a material sense, 
but rather constructs a representational framework of visibility through the mediating 
instrument of accounting technologies. State transparency consists of an online, 
interconnected digital network of dashboards, data-hubs, and reports that display financial 
information, audit and performance rankings, ratings and scores that record and make 
visible the activities of the state. In the UK, transparency makes visible the activities and 
performance of the state across the entirety of its functions, at national and local level, 
monitoring and recording the actions of the state in transport, health and social care, 
justice, education, defence, housing, and so on. And if accounting is indeed central to the 
constitution of a digital network of state transparency, then what new knowledge might 
be learned about accounting and transparency from study in this arena? In this thesis, I 
propose to investigate transparency along three lines: in its relation to democracy, in its 
constitution of subjects, and in its particular aesthetic form. 
With regard to the first of these lines of enquiry, I engage with and question the nature of 
the link between transparency, the state and democracy. Extant accounting literature, 
whilst problematizing the social and organisational effects and practical and theoretical 
limitations of transparency (Macintosh & Quattrone, 2010; Quattrone, 2016a; Roberts, 
2009, 2018), has also cast transparency as a force with “democratising” (Power, 1994) or 
“emancipatory” (Gallhofer et al., 2011) potential. Related to this is the posing of 
transparency as an archetypal neoliberal programme and technology of governmentality 
(Mehrpouya & Salles-Djelic, 2019) in which the ‘democratic power’ of the state is 
exercised in a ‘calculated and calculating’ mode over a body of citizens who ‘calculate 
about’ that power. I am here positioning transparency in relation to the seminal piece 
authored by Nikolas Rose and published in Accounting, Organizations and Society, ‘Governing 
by Numbers: Figuring out Democracy’ (1991). As a publicly accessible network of 
financial, numerical, statistical and audit information, state transparency appears to 
epitomise the “public habitat of numbers” that Rose (1991, p. 690) argues neoliberalism 
is reliant upon “to utilize the calculative capacities of individuals and firms, who, in 
calculating to serve their own best interests, will cumulatively serve all our best interests.” 
In the accounting literature, the democratic character of transparency is under-
investigated and is too often assumed rather than demonstrated, questioned or doubted 
4 
 
(Macintosh & Quattrone, 2010). Read through the prism of Rose’s analysis, transparency 
appears as a democratic instrument par excellence. However, the idealist cast of this 
formulation, in which the neoliberal notion of entrepreneurial, rational, calculating, self-
interested agents who compete against one another is posed as a model of democracy, 
indulges the fictions of neoliberalism and glosses a wealth of literature and theory on 
liberalism and neoliberalism, the state and liberal democracy, in which citizens are shown 
not to be ‘free’, ‘equal’, ‘calculating’ and ‘rational’ ‘agents’, but subjects who live in a class-
ridden, undemocratic, unequal and fractured society governed by capitalism and a 
dominant, ruling state (Brown, 1995; Marcuse, 1972; Mouffe, 2000; Žižek, 2002). Seen in 
this way, the question that must be posed of transparency is this: why should it be in the 
interest of the ruling, dominant state – historically a secretive, clandestine entity – to make 
itself transparent, subjecting itself to the gaze and scrutiny of its citizens? 
This question leads on to the second line of my enquiry in this thesis, in which I investigate 
the nature of the subjects and subjectivities constituted by state transparency. Specifically, 
I question the nature of the social relations created in state transparency and how these 
contribute to the construction of subjectivities. Hitherto, the accounting literature has 
focused much of its attention on the subjects and subjectivities produced by having one’s 
internal organisational conduct made transparent to a distant (in time or place) and unseen 
observer, a process described by Power (2007, p. 34) as “turning organisations inside out.” 
In this relation, the subject of transparency – the one whose conduct is ‘rendered visible’ 
by accounting (Miller, 1990; Miller & O’Leary, 1987) – shapes and alters their conduct in 
response to having had that conduct ‘laid bare’ to the surveillance or scrutiny of the distant 
other (Roberts, 2009). In other words, the visibilities established by accounting systems 
are typically “asymmetric”, whereby the “powerful are helped to observe the less 
powerful, but not vice versa” (Burchell et al., 1980, p. 17, emphasis added).1 In transparency, 
we find accounting technologies deployed in a supposed attempt to address this vice versa, 
‘to help the less powerful observe the powerful’. What remains underexplored in the 
literature is how this contributes to the construction of the subjectivity (how I think of 
myself) of the ‘distant other’ of transparency, the ‘observer’, particularly where this 
observer is not a manager or a director, but is outside of the organisation or entity in 
 
1 Unless indicated as above, all emphasis in citations are present in the original texts. 
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question. If unseen, internal organisational conduct made transparent in arrays of audit 
and financial reports, rankings, ratings, indicators, and scores are capable of constituting 
narcissistic, ‘functionally-stupid’, disciplined, normalised, and paranoid subjectivities 
within organisations (Roberts, 2018), what affect, if any, does transparency have on those 
outside of organisations who read, access or experience it? And if we direct our theoretical 
and empirical focus towards the ‘liberal democratic’ state rather than upon capitalist 
organisations – which, unlike the state, have no democratic claim or identity to preserve 
(Wolin, 2001) – what kind of social relations do we find established by transparency? Is 
transparency empowering? Is it emancipatory? Is it democratising? 
My third line of enquiry is concerned with the aesthetic of state transparency, the way in 
which state transparency appears in a distinct visual form. Given the recent uptake in and 
call for more research on the significance of the visual form in accounting (Davison, 2015) 
and in sociological studies of quantification (Mennicken & Espeland, 2019), it is perhaps 
surprising that there has not been a ‘visual’ analysis of transparency, it being of course a 
metaphor of the visible (Tsoukas, 1997). In the accounting literature, Strathern’s (2000, 
p. 309) assertion that “there is nothing innocent about making the invisible visible” has 
sparked reflection over what transparency conceals, what is left out in the act of making 
something visible (Quattrone, 2016a), and how transparency can obscure imperfections 
and inadequacies or mask a darker, messier reality by giving light to a cleaner, more 
desirable appearance (Roberts, 2009). As such, stated in epistemological terms, 
transparency poses a distinctly ideological problem (Arnold, 2009a) insofar as ‘making 
something transparent’ implies revealing ‘the way things really are’, showing things in ‘the 
cold light of day’, stripping back appearances to reveal ‘the ugly truth’, and so on. In this 
sense, transparency also poses a distinctly representational problem. Still, the question of 
what transparency ‘looks like’ has yet to be examined. 
In this thesis, I do not wish to be caught up in a representational critique or investigation 
of transparency, reproaching transparency either for ‘not representing’ or for 
‘misrepresenting’ social reality. To do so would be simply to rehearse well-established 
mediations in the accounting literature over the ability (inability) of accounting to 
represent (misrepresent) and construct social reality (Hines, 1988; Robson, 1992; Tinker, 
1991; Tinker, Merino, & Neimark, 1982). Taking as my point of departure the inevitable 
partiality and incompleteness of representations, I am instead interested in reflecting not 
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on the social reality ‘behind the mask’, but the very nature of the mask of transparency 
itself. The question is then posed not in terms of ‘What does transparency hide?’ or ‘What 
is not shown in transparency?’, but rather ‘What view of the state does the particular 
aesthetic of transparency contribute to constructing?’ When it comes to the state, a form 
described by Nietzsche (1969, p. 75) as the “coldest of all cold monsters” and by Marx as 
“an organ of class domination, an organ of oppression of one class by another” (see Lenin, 
1932, p. 9), there is much that can be learned from the appearance of the mask it chooses 
to hold up in transparency: how, indeed, might this ‘coldest of all cold monsters’ wish us 
to see it? 
A product of my methodological grounding in critical theory, in the sense associated with 
the works of the Frankfurt School, the theoretical lens that frames my enquiry along the 
three lines proposed above is a reading of transparency as a particular form of ideology – 
of transparency as spectacle. The traditional, representational understanding of ideology, 
developed out of The German Ideology (Marx & Engels, 1970), is of ideology as 
misrepresentation: ideology misrepresents or distorts ‘the way things really are’. As a claim 
to lay bare ‘the ugly truth’, to show reality ‘in the cold light of day’, transparency is, in a 
fundamental epistemological sense, a claim to put an end to misrepresentation, 
obfuscation and illusion: transparency promises to put an end to ideology. And yet it is 
precisely because of this claim to put an end to ideology that transparency is itself what we 
might call a sublime object of ideology; as Slavoj Žižek (1989, p. xxiv) puts it, the notion of 
putting an end to ideology ‘once and for all’ is itself “an ideological idea par excellence!” 
Taking as my lens Žižek’s (1989, 1994b, 1997, 2016) post-representational reading of 
ideology as a generative, world-making force that actively constructs the way we see social 
reality – not misrepresenting or obscuring the way that social reality ‘really is’ – affords 
me with the necessary theoretical apparatus to think of transparency not in terms of what 
is hidden, but in terms of how what is shown plays a powerful force in structuring our 
view of the state. In theorising transparency as a form of ideology, I make the case for the 
potential of a contemporary understanding of ideology, one that addresses the 
representationalist problematic of a traditional understanding of ideology and accounting 
(see McKernan, 2007), to inform developments in accounting scholarship, particularly in 
a so-called ‘post-ideological’ society (Žižek, 1994b). 
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In order to bring out the specific character of state transparency, I supplement my general 
theoretical foundation built upon Žižek’s reading of the character of ideology with a 
particular reading of state transparency informed by Guy Debord’s notion of spectacle 
(Debord, 1967a, 1973, 1988). Like Žižek’s interpretation of ideology, Debord’s major 
work – The Society of the Spectacle – is rooted in a re-interpretation and development of 
Marx’s notion of ‘commodity fetishism’. In The Society of the Spectacle, Debord theorises a 
society in which appearance and visual forms tyrannise over people, a society ruled by 
images and representations. Debord’s work is therefore ideally suited to our present 
historical moment, our ‘society of the screen’ (Knorr Cetina & Bruegger, 2002b) in which 
digital representations, visualisations and images play an ever-increasing and taken-for-
granted role in structuring and determining the shape of our everyday lives. Indeed, as 
Agamben (2000b, p. 79) puts it, “Probably the most disquieting aspect of Debord’s books 
is the fact that history seems to have committed itself to relentlessly confirm their 
analyses.” Thus, while Žižek’s reading of ideology establishes a platform from which I 
can appreciate the general character of state transparency, Debord’s theorisation of the 
ideology of appearances, of spectacle, enables the development of a deeper appreciation 
of the particular effects of the aesthetic form of transparency. 
To investigate my central research interests, I designed an archival study of how a 
particular state ‘field’ makes itself transparent to the citizen, focusing on how a specific 
event within that field is constituted in transparency. As such, I gathered a sample of 
‘transparency data’ produced by the state, publicly available through the ‘GOV.UK’ 
website (https://www.gov.uk/). The decision to design an archival study is inextricably 
intertwined with the specific epistemological underpinnings of the theoretical lens 
adopted in this study, which will be discussed in greater depth later in this thesis (see 
chapter 5, ‘Methodology’). If I were to study transparency as ideology theorised in the 
traditional, representational sense, either an ethnographic or case study research design 
would have represented sound methodological choices through which I would have been 
able to reveal or bring to light the ‘dark’, ‘messy’ reality that lies behind the reductive veil 
of transparency. However, as set out above, it is not my intention to pursue such a line of 
enquiry in this thesis. Rather, my concern lies with studying the visual or aesthetic form 
of transparency and theorising the nature of the social and democratic relations 
established by that transparency. In this sense, my research design is driven by a 
fundamental epistemological question about the state: what is it possible to know about 
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the state as seen through transparency? Put differently, in occupying the same position as 
a citizen, what is it possible for me to learn about the state through transparency? 
In line with a central driving force at the heart of critical theory, of identifying contradictions 
in society (Adorno, 1966; Horkheimer, 1972), in this thesis I investigate state transparency 
in the UK in a space purposefully designed as opaque, a space whose central feature is 
the empirical fact of being closed-off from society: prison. Focusing on prisons in 
England and Wales, I explore transparency of the suicide in prison, surely the darkest of 
events in an already dark place. I compare and contrast two forms of transparency on the 
suicide in prison: the first, quantified, visualised statistical renderings of suicide; the 
second, detailed narratives in the form of written investigation reports. The first, ‘Prisons 
data’ (https://data.justice.gov.uk/prisons), is a digital ‘data-hub’ produced by the HM 
Prison and Probation Service populated with a range of audit and performance rankings, 
ratings, scores, and statistics on prisons in England and Wales. The second, ‘Fatal Incident 
reports’ (https://www.ppo.gov.uk/document/fii-report/), is a digital archive produced 
by the Prisons and Probation Ombudsman in which reports detailing the results of 
investigations into all deaths in prisons in England and Wales are held. Focusing my 
analysis at first on the contrasting content of these examples of transparency (quantification 
vs. literary narrative), I move on to analyse their common aesthetic form (as digital, 
mediated, single-sense representations), proposing that we might theorise the social 
relations constituted by their form through the lenses of ideology and spectacle, as 
introduced above. My paying attention to the visual, aesthetic form of transparency builds 
on calls in the literature, both past and present, for research directed towards generating 
a greater understanding and appreciation of how the aesthetic form of accounting is 
implicated in the very power and effects of accounting and quantification more broadly 
in organisations and society (Davison, 2015; Espeland & Stevens, 2008; Gallhofer & 
Haslam, 1996; Mennicken & Espeland, 2019). As such, although in this thesis I focus on 
the particular question of state transparency, I expect my enquiry to also generate 
knowledge and understanding of transparency beyond the realm of the state. 
1.2. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
My research questions are directly related to the three lines of enquiry I posed earlier in 
this introduction. As such, they are formulated in order to animate my exploration of the 
aesthetic form of state transparency, the way state transparency addresses its subjects, and 
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how state transparency relates to democracy. I therefore propose the following three 
research questions: 
(i) What role is played by the particular aesthetic form of state transparency? 
This question is formulated in order to stimulate investigation of the very particular 
aesthetic form of state transparency, insofar as the myriad dashboards, data-hubs and 
online archives of transparency are overwhelmingly presented in carefully designed, 
stylised, colourful, visually appealing forms. Following on from this, a second research 
question is posed: 
(ii) How does state transparency shape the way that citizens think of themselves in relation to the state? 
Building on the first, this question directs attention towards the ‘users’ of state 
transparency, provoking consideration of the relations established between state and 
citizen by transparency. The state and much of the literature proposes transparency as 
democratising, empowering and emancipatory. This question is designed to explore 
whether such claims are justifiable, sparking reflection over the practical effects and 
consequences of transparency and how transparency influences the way citizens think of 
themselves in relation to the state (how transparency affects the formation and 
development of subjectivities). Finally, drawing together the first two research questions, 
my third questions is as follows: 
(iii) What interest does the state have in transparency? 
Here, I aim to establish an understanding of the reasoning and motivations that the state 
might have in transparency, especially where the state, over the course of history, has 
maintained a strict secrecy over its internal workings. In other words, I investigate why 
the state would make itself the subject of inspection of the citizen, claiming to reverse the 
relation between visibility and power as we commonly understand it. 
1.3. THESIS STRUCTURE 
The structure of this thesis is as follows: this introductory chapter is followed by the 
literature review, two theory chapters, methodology, analysis, discussion and conclusion. 
I begin the literature review by positioning this thesis in relation to the field of critical and 
interdisciplinary accounting research and reflecting on the study of accounting today. 
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Next, I discuss the literature in accounting on neoliberalism, the state and transparency. I 
conclude by proposing how I plan to contribute to the extant literature. 
The first of my two theory chapters is split into three sections. In the first two sections, I 
set out a theory of neoliberalism and of the state. In the final section of the first theory 
chapter, I theorise the historical development of state transparency. The second theory 
chapter is split into two sections in which I set out theorisations of ideology and spectacle, 
informed by the scholarship of Slavoj Žižek and Guy Debord, respectively. 
In the methodology chapter, I set out my positions on ontology, epistemology and 
practice: together, these form my research methodology. Next, I set out the empirical 
context for this research, explaining why it was selected, how it has been approached in 
scholarship on accounting and neoliberalism and addressing context-specific 
methodological challenges I faced. Finally, I describe my archival research method, 
detailing the data collection and analysis processes I followed. 
The analysis chapter is split into two sections in which I first analyse the data collected 
from the ‘Prisons data’ data-hub before moving on to analyse data collected from the 
‘Fatal Incident reports’ digital archive. 
In the discussion chapter, I begin by explaining my departure from a representational 
critique of transparency before proposing a theorisation of state transparency as spectacle. 
In the concluding chapter, I crystallise the three key contributions of this thesis before 
setting out the limitations of this study, its practical implications, future research 
potentialities and my final concluding remarks.
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The structure of this literature review is as follows. I begin by contextualising the study 
of accounting as an evolving, social, subjective and political craft (2.1). I then work 
through a review of extant literature on accounting and neoliberalism (2.2), accounting 
and the state (2.3), and accounting and transparency (2.4). I conclude by briefly 
summarising my theoretical positioning and proposed contributions to the accounting 
literature (2.5). 
2.1. STUDYING ACCOUNTING 
2.1.1. ACCOUNTING AS AN EVOLVING, SOCIAL, SUBJECTIVE AND POLITICAL CRAFT 
It is testament to the depth and quality of literature in critical and interdisciplinary research 
on accounting developed since the inception of this field in the late 1960s and early 1970s 
that, when writing today, much of what would not so long ago have been a truly radical 
contribution to our understanding of accounting can now be treated as foundational, 
taken-for-granted, a priori knowledge. Works approaching the study of accounting from a 
range of philosophical, theoretical and methodological perspectives have quashed the 
myth that accounting is an objective, neutral, apolitical and technical practice: “Nothing 
could be further from the truth”, says Hopwood (1976, p. 1). Accounting, we now know, 
is a subjective, partisan, political and social craft (Tinker, 1991; Tinker et al., 1982). 
Accounting is not a mute, inert, total representation of organisations, institutions and 
society, but is partial, incomplete and deeply implicated in their workings (Hopwood, 
1983). Accounting is shaped by and shapes a range of social, political and economic 
relations, interests, networks, actions and forces (Burchell et al., 1980; Lehman & Tinker, 
1987). Accounting is an authoritative quantitative regime of knowledge, making it a central 
feature in the workings of capitalist political economy (Tinker, 1980), the state (Tinker, 
1984), government (Rose & Miller, 1992) and democracy (Rose, 1991). Accounting is an 
assemblage of calculative practices and mediating instruments that can be used to create 
‘visibilities’ in order to control and discipline (Miller, 1990; Miller & O’Leary, 1987), to 
establish networks of actors and actions (Robson, 1992), to create compliance (Power, 
1999) and to render people ‘accountable’ (Hoskin & Macve, 1988; Roberts & Scapens, 
1985). Above all, accounting does not merely act as a technical, numerical reflection of an 
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existing, ‘out there’ social reality (cf. Solomons, 1991), but is actively involved in its 
construction (Hines, 1988, 1991a). 
But what is this powerful force that we call accounting? Do we know what accounting is? 
Perhaps, we do not. Or, more precisely, perhaps we cannot establish a final, fixed 
definition of accounting, nailing it down, declaring that, ‘This and only this is accounting!’ 
Of course, to eschew a rigid definition of accounting is not the same as descending into 
an absurdly relativistic spiral of saying everything – or indeed, nothing – is accounting (Gray, 
2002, 2008). Rather, to eschew a rigid, reductive definition is to insist on regarding 
accounting as multiple, as fluid, it is to remain open to the emergence of new accountings 
and the changing and fading of older ones (Quattrone, 2016a). As Anthony Hopwood 
explained in his address to the Annual Meeting of the American Accounting Association, 
reflecting on the emergence of interdisciplinary field in accounting research in the late 
1960s: 
There were then, there have been in the intervening period, and there are now people 
who think that they know what accounting – and auditing for that matter – is. How 
wrong these people are. They are the ones who list the attributes of the status quo, 
seemingly wanting to confine the new to being within the boundaries of the old. They 
have no conception that accounting and accounting research have repeatedly changed 
across time, and when things change they become what they were not, at least in part. 
Accounting has been a craft that has had no essence. It has changed significantly 
across time, adopting new forms, methods and roles. 
(Hopwood, 2007, p. 1367) 
Accounting is neither stable nor static: it evolves in time with developments in the 
economy, society, politics and technology, morphing into new forms and shifting into 
new spaces (Chapman, Cooper, & Miller, 2009). Therefore, as well as developing our 
understanding of how accounting operates in its traditionally recognised forms – in the 
organisation, as the accountant, a profession, double-entry bookkeeping, budgeting, cost 
and control systems, statutory financial statements, ‘triple-bottom line’ reporting, audit, 
accounting regulations and standards – research in the critical and interdisciplinary 
traditions has taught us to seek out the roles and influence of accounting beyond the 
bounds of these traditional forms and sites. We now appreciate that accounting is 
intersected by and interwoven with relations of domination and exploitation in: capitalist 
class rule (Hopper, Storey, & Willmott, 1987); the masculine gendering of society in 
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relations of power (Lehman, 1992) and sexuality (Cooper, 1992); in the destruction of the 
natural environment (Hines, 1991b); institutionalised racism (Hammond & Streeter, 
1994); slavery (Oldroyd, Fleischman, & Tyson, 2008); colonialism (Neu, 2000); 
imperialism (Annisette, 2000); and fascism (Funnell, 1998). 
Accounting is not, it must be said, an exclusively malevolent, sinister or constraining force 
(Gallhofer & Haslam, 2003). Accounting is not, in and of itself, essentially purposeful, but 
can be made so and can therefore be associated – or rather, be made to associate with – 
a range of social, political, economic ends of drastically varying moral and ethical 
substance (Hopwood, 1992). Thus, just as it is implicated in sustaining relations of 
domination and exploitation, of class and conflict, we must also acknowledge, or at the 
very least entertain the possibility, that the representations of accounting – in all their 
partiality, ambiguity, and incompleteness (Quattrone & Hopper, 2005) – are also forces 
capable of organising and enabling in ways that are more socially valuable than those to 
which accounting is now applied and bound up with (Busco & Quattrone, 2018b). And 
perhaps too the capacity of accounting to (not) represent ‘faithfully’ or ‘completely’ is 
something that we must be less fixated with; that is, if we open ourselves to the notion 
that representation is an impossible ideal, we might be more open to studying aspects of 
accounting that escape our attention if we remain bound to representationalist 
philosophies (McKernan, 2007). 
Whilst at present accounting, in so many of its guises, is steeped in capitalist values and 
assumptions (Cooper, 1980) and is bound up with the maintenance and operation of 
capitalist relations of production (Cooper, 1995), we can perhaps envisage a world in 
which this would not be so. Moreover, we need to be able to do so, insofar as any 
alternative visions of social, political, environmental and economic order must have a 
means through which they can organise an economic system capable of providing for the 
needs of populations. It is rather tempting to think we could simply dispense with 
accounting, cast it aside and label it as an insidious, capitalist force of instrumental 
rationality. However, if accounting is as powerful as the works above assert, not only is it 
imperative that its operations are understood and critiqued, but also that we consider the 
potential for accounting to contribute to the construction of other worlds. 
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2.1.2. THE CRAFT OF ACCOUNTING IN THE AGE OF DIGITAL REPRODUCTION 
If accounting has “a tendency to become what it was not”, as Hopwood (1987, p. 207) 
taught us, then what is it becoming today? What mutations in the accounting craft should 
we be concerned with at this moment in history? Given that I have praised the literature 
for its sophisticated, breadth and scope, what remains to be investigated in terms of the 
operations of accounting in organisations, institutions and society? In this text, I want to 
probe the extent to which changes in the technological form of accounting – as increasingly 
constituted in the realm of the digital – as opposed to changes in its substantive content, 
have changed the nature of the accounting craft and how accounting is experienced. In 
this short section, I want to focus on two aspects of change to accounting that relate to 
its digital form: firstly, what this digital form makes possible in terms of the potentiality 
of the accounting craft and, secondly, how the aesthetic of the digital contributes to the 
power of accounting. 
Mirroring broader social and technological developments in how we communicate, 
interact or engage with other people, literature, information and data, accounting is today 
constituted almost exclusively in digital forms. If we examine its history in the Middle-
Ages and the development of double-entry book-keeping systems (Carruthers & 
Espeland, 1991), as a practice, accounting has been almost exclusively constituted via 
analogue, non-electronic modes of record keeping and communication. Today, in 
contrast, accounting is increasingly a digital phenomenon (Quattrone, 2016b), where 
interactions with accounts are mediated by a screen on a myriad of electronic devices. 
Accordingly, what accounting is capable of and what it claims to show or report has 
evolved: constituted in digital media, accounting now claims new capacities, most notably 
in terms of the temporal and spatial qualities of accounting (Quattrone & Hopper, 2005). 
In particular, this technological development has had profound implications in respect of 
the capacities of management control technologies. 
The form of traditional accounting statements, written ‘for the year ended’ or ‘as at’ a 
particular point in time attests to the bounded epistemological character of accounting 
knowledge as essentially static and historical, asserting its accuracy as at a certain temporal 
moment in the past. Whilst such accountings persist, and will continue to do so in digital 
form, accounting is today frequently associated with a rendering of the present, the now. 
New forms of accounting – particularly in the shape of management control systems – 
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purport to show ‘live’, ‘interactive’ and ‘dynamic’ representations of reality. The new-
found immanence of accounting fundamentally challenges what we think accounting is 
for and what we believe it shows. An accounting capable of extraordinary feats of ordering 
and control is now a distinct possibility – a dream-like or dystopian prospect depending 
on ones’ perspective. 
However, as Quattrone (2016b) points out, irrespective of the ends to which a digital 
accounting is put to or is associated with, the pressing threat is that where accounting 
numbers are already endowed with a “magic persuasive power” and are, as with numbers 
more widely, innately appealing as truthful, objective and trustful (Espeland & Stevens, 
2008; Porter, 1995), the digitalization of accounting numbers will perhaps see them become 
even more convincing than before, both in their form as control systems and reporting 
instruments. This makes more challenging the prospect of retaining the place for doubt, 
mystery and ambiguity in the design and use of accounting systems (Quattrone, 2015, 
2017). Of course, this being despite the extent to which we now know, as earlier discussed, 
that accounting numbers are far from value-free, neutral, truthful, objective, and so on. 
This is indeed a disturbing prospect when we consider that the hierarchical, controlling 
and disciplining apparatuses theorised by the likes of Armstrong (1987), Cooper and 
Taylor (2000) Hoskin and Macve (1986) and Miller and O’Leary (1987), were all 
constituted on paper. This raises a pressing question of the scale and magnitude of 
apparatuses of order and control that could be erected in digital form. To be sure, a digital 
accounting is a potentially vastly more powerful accounting. However, as yet, but for a 
few exceptions, the digitalization of accounting has been afforded little attention in the 
accounting literature (Davison, 2015, p. 147). And given the extent to which accounting 
has to date been a powerful force in shaping the course of dark historical episodes 
(Fleischman, Funnell, & Walker, 2013), this warrants our full, and critical, attention, 
particularly in understanding the likely effects of a more powerful accounting on the 
everyday lives of human beings, rather than simply focusing on how such changes will 
influence the operations of organisations or institutions (Cooper, 2015b). 
But if the digitalization of accounting entails a range of potentialities in terms of the 
functionality and capability of accounting technologies, these potentialities are inseparable 
from a distinct change in the aesthetic of accounting that is also brought about by its 
digitalization. In its new sphere of constitution, accounting all the more stimulates and 
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appeals to us in categories of the visual (Davison, 2015). Of course, accounting was not 
invisible before it was constituted in a digital form, but it is certainly the case that the 
glossy appearance of accounting systems is today a striking feature in their visual evolution 
from a series of variations on the ‘T-account’ or the pro-forma of the statement of 
financial position. Making their appeal to the user in an array of bright colours, charts, 
graphs and interactive features, forms of accounting today are far removed from the 
monochromatic, austere, ascetic appearance of traditional accounting practices. To be 
sure, this is certainly not to imply that a traditional financial account is devoid of visual 
cues and signs; such a form is categorically not visually ‘neutral’ (Quattrone, 2009) or 
aesthetically ‘mute’. Rather, traditional accounting forms have an ‘aura’ that serve to 
authenticate and legitimate their status as rationalising practices capable of representing 
reality (Gallhofer & Haslam, 1991, 1996). The very aesthetic frugality of the traditional 
accounting form imbues accounts with a certain sense of neutrality, restraint, and 
objectivity that is not afforded, say, to a particularly colourful or lavish work of art, which 
is regarded as political and subjective. In other words, the precise aesthetic form of 
accounting has contributed to the construction of the ideological power of accounting 
(Cooper, Pheby, Pheby, & Puxty, 1994). 
As such, when the mode of appearance of accounts is changed in a truly radical way – as 
has undoubtedly been the case with the ‘digital revolution’ and the emergence of the 
‘screen society’ (Knorr Cetina, 2009; Knorr Cetina & Bruegger, 2002a) – the aesthetic 
experience of accounting, the aura of accounting and thus the power of accounting, is 
altered. Put differently: insofar as there has in recent years been a radical change in the 
aesthetic of accounting, and insofar as perception is implicated in the constitution of 
knowledge and thus the shaping of society and of history (Benjamin, 2007),2 we must be 
attentive to the drastic change in the way that accounting appears to us and how this 
change influences what we think accounting is capable of, and what it shows. And it is 
indeed imperative that this change in the form of accounting is studied at this precise 
 
2 Though this theme was developed most comprehensively by Benjamin, Horkheimer (1972, p. 200, 
emphasis added) also writes on the connection between perception and the movements of history: “The 
world which is given to the individual and which he must accept and take into account is, in its present and 
continuing form, a product of the activity of society as a whole. The objects we perceive in our surroundings 
– cities, villages, fields, and woods – bear the mark of having been worked on by man. It is not only in 
clothing and appearance, in outward form and emotional make-up that men are the product of history. Even 
the way they see and hear is inseparable from the social life-process as it has evolved over the millennia.” 
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historical moment. As Žižek (1997, p. 166) argues, it is in moments of transition, those 
fleeting stages in which we do not “feel fully at home” in new technologies, that we are 
most capable of discerning what is gained and what is lost in technological development. 
Though important, change in the form of accounting cannot – indeed, must not – be 
considered in isolation from the immanent social, political and economic context of the 
operations of accounting (Burchell, Clubb, & Hopwood, 1985; Cooper & Sherer, 1984; 
Hopwood, 1983). In whatever form it is presented to us, we experience accounting in 
society and as such an understanding of the political and economic conditions of that 
society are absolutely essential to a deeper understanding of accounting: 
Feudal societies are seen to require feudal accounting systems; capitalist societies, 
capitalist modes of accounting (Rose, 1977) and the era of the post-industrial society 
necessitates a new framework for the accounting craft (Gandhi, 1976). 
(Burchell et al., 1980, p. 10) 
What are our immanent political economic surroundings today? In the UK, to refer to 
contemporary society as ‘post-industrial’ is not necessarily false, but it unhelpfully glosses 
the extent to which we still live in a capitalist society. And yet capitalism, like the 
accounting that contributes to sustaining its hegemony, changes. So, do we live in a 
‘simple’ capitalist era, one comparable to that theorised by Marx? To be sure, basic 
components and imperatives of capitalist political economy – private property, will-to-
profit, drive to capital accumulation and wage labour – remain in place. But, to say only 
that we still live under capitalism is to ignore the extent to which capitalist relations in the 
economy, politics and society have been transformed, have penetrated hitherto non-
economic spaces and spheres, and have accordingly brought into being new relations of 
power and new categories of subjects. Whilst we live in a society that rests on capitalist 
foundations, I argue that designating our immanent historical era as neoliberal serves to 
more faithfully capture the nature of the profound social, political and economic 
upheavals of the last fifty years. Building on the formulation of Burchell et al. (1980), we 
might then ask, ‘If feudal, capitalist and post-industrial societies all required specific 
accountings, does neoliberal society also require a specifically neoliberal accounting?’ In the 
next section, I turn to the task of discussing the accounting literature on neoliberalism. 
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2.2. ACCOUNTING AND NEOLIBERALISM 
To utter the word ‘neoliberalism’ or ‘neoliberal’ sees us immediately confronting the 
question of a definition: ‘What is neoliberalism?’ ‘What does it mean to be a neoliberal?’ 
The more pressing questions for many are, ‘Does neoliberalism even exist? Why should 
we care about studying it?’ Indeed, there are many who would scoff or roll their eyes at 
the mere mention of the word ‘neoliberal’ or ‘neoliberalism’, who cackle with laughter at 
those who ‘believe in neoliberalism’, arguing that they are little better than conspiracy 
theorists (see Mirowski, 2014). Then there are those who would refute the existence of 
neoliberalism, doing so out of a kind of ‘post-structuralist’ allergic reaction to any word, 
name, concept, or label that ends in ‘ism’. Curiously, though such critics of the term 
‘neoliberalism’ frequently assert that it ‘does not exist’, rarely – if ever – is the same 
argument mobilised with regards to socialism, Marxism or communism. Those ‘isms’ are 
regarded as existing in an ontologically given, unproblematic manner.3 Perhaps, then, as 
with those they criticise, those ‘who just blame everything wrong with the world on 
neoliberalism’, those who would say ‘neoliberalism doesn’t exist’, only assert the non-
existence of ‘isms’ if they are opposed to the ideas that coalesce around these (supposedly) 
‘non-existent’ entities. Furthermore, there are others who have tired of neoliberalism as a 
concept, who are “against neoliberalism as a concept” (Dunn, 2017, p. 435, emphasis 
added), arguing that it should be “abandoned”, that it is unhelpful, bloated and that it 
clouds, not sharpens, understandings of contemporary social, political and economic 
conditions (Rodgers, 2018). 
Though critics have a tendency to vilify and demonise the study of neoliberalism in 
somewhat moralising, sanctimonious terms, this does not mean that criticism of the field 
of scholarship on neoliberalism is unwarranted in its entirety. If we are to continue to 
wrestle with the concept of neoliberalism, and if we see it as a useful one with which to 
analyse immanent realities, then we must work hard to be precise and rigorous in our study 
of it, not mobilising it as “a kind of all-determining mega-cause, bluntly attributed” (Peck, 
 
3 Wendy Brown makes a similar point in an interview published by Tocqueville 21: “[Neoliberalism is] a loose 
and adaptable term, but I don’t think this means we should abandon it, any more than we should abandon 




2013, p. 140).4 In other words, we can accept the critique that the term ‘neoliberalism’ is 
imperfect whilst continuing to work at refining what we mean by it (Peck & Theodore, 
2019). As Stuart Hall so eloquently puts it: 
The term ‘neoliberal’ is not a satisfactory one. Its reference to the shaping influence 
of capitalism on modern life sounds recidivist to contemporary ears. Intellectual critics 
say the term lumps together too many things to merit a single identity; it is reductive, 
sacrificing attention to internal complexities and geohistorical specificity. I sympathise 
with this critique. However, I think there are enough common features to warrant 
giving it a provisional conceptual identity, provided this is understood as a first 
approximation. Even Marx argued that analysis yields understanding at different levels 
of abstraction, and critical thought often begins with a ‘chaotic’ abstraction – though 
we then need to add ‘further determinations’ in order to ‘reproduce the concrete in 
thought’. I would also argue that naming neoliberalism is politically necessary, to give 
resistance content, focus and a cutting edge. 
(Hall, 2011, p. 10) 
In the accounting literature, the study of neoliberalism has, according to Chiapello (2017, 
p. 47), fractured along three lines, with neoliberalism being conceptualised as “as a phase 
of capitalism, as a discourse and as governmentality” and with accounting, in relation to 
neoliberalism, being studied as “ an instrument, a project or an object”. In this respect, 
division in accounting over the question of what neoliberalism is and how (indeed, if) we 
should study it reflects the bitterly divided state of scholarship outside accounting 
academia on this question. 
Whilst I find much to agree with in the schema of the accounting literature on 
neoliberalism proposed by Chiapello – particularly in her noting that Accounting, 
Organizations and Society (AOS) and Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal (AAAJ) 
have been a “nerve centre of the Foucauldian approach” (2017, p. 48) – I consider the 
field of (accounting) scholarship on neoliberalism as essentially polarised between 
perspectives on neoliberalism that conceptualise it as a “hegemonic economic model 
anchored by variants of market rule” and “an insurgent approach fuelled by derivations of 
 
4 Right-wing commentators have picked up on a tendency for crude and unsophisticated Left-wing critiques 
of contemporary issues to be indiscriminately attributed to neoliberalism. An article on the Guido Fawkes 
blog – covering the Adam Smith Institute’s “rebrand” as “Out and proud neoliberals!” (Laven-Morris, 2016) 
– declares that neoliberalism has become a ‘pejorative term’ used “by teenage lefties to save them having to 
think matters through. They view neo-liberalism as akin to the political economy of Satanism.” (Neo-liberal 
rebrand by wonks, 2016). 
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the Foucaultian notion of governmentality” (Wacquant, 2012, p. 66). Indeed, Chiapello 
herself remarks that whilst the ‘discourse’ approach to the study of neoliberalism could 
be articulated with an approach to neoliberalism as a phase of capitalism and as a 
governmentality, it is particularly harmoniously aligned with the (neo-) Foucauldian, 
‘governmentality’ approach (Chiapello, 2017, p. 53). Later in the thesis, I discuss these 
two approaches in detail, before proceeding to set out my own approach to neoliberalism 
(see section 3.1., ‘Theorising neoliberalism’). Here, I work through a discussion of the 
literatures in accounting that take a ‘hegemonic market rule’ approach (2.2.1) and a 
‘governmentality’ approach (2.2.2) to neoliberalism. 
2.2.1. NEOLIBERALISM AS HEGEMONIC MARKET RULE 
In the accounting literature, market rule perspectives on neoliberalism treat accounting – 
where accounting is considered in a broad sense as a series of technologies, institutions, 
regulations, and as a profession – as an essential feature in the maintenance and 
reproduction of neoliberalism, which is theorised as a historically specific phase in the 
development and evolution of capitalism (Arnold & Cooper, 1999; Williams, 2017). In 
this respect, research in the accounting literature on neoliberalism adopting a perspective 
on neoliberalism as a hegemonic mode of capitalist market rule continues the established 
tradition of research on the relations between accounting and the capitalist mode of 
political economy (Catchpowle, Cooper, & Wright, 2004; Cooper, 1995; Laughlin, 1987; 
Puxty, Willmott, Cooper, & Lowe, 1987; Tinker et al., 1982). As such, those who theorise 
neoliberalism as a phase of capitalism take as their task the critique of the role played by 
accounting in the management, legitimation and operation of neoliberalism as an 
oppressive and exploitative political economic system (Cooper, 2015a). Therefore, 
implicit in studies of neoliberalism as market rule is a critical perspective on the role of 
accounting in organisations and society. Indeed, where Chiapello notes that AOS and 
AAAJ are ‘nerve centres’ of the Foucauldian approach to neoliberalism, we might say 
that Critical Perspectives on Accounting is particularly committed to a critique of neoliberalism 
that illuminates its deleterious and repressive effects on working people, the poor, and the 
vulnerable. In this sense, study of accounting could, notes Cooper (1995, p. 205), 
contribute to liberation from capitalist hegemony: 
The value of the study of accounting is that it can give us a unique view of the 
ideological underpinnings of the workings of the capitalist system in which we live. 
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An understanding of the practical workings of capitalist ideology contains the potential 
for a contribution to our liberation. 
From this critical perspective, accounting technologies – contrary to their socially 
established position as neutral, apolitical calculative practices that ‘faithfully represent’ the 
truth of an ‘out-there’ social, organisational and financial reality (Solomons, 1991; Watts 
& Zimmerman, 1979, 1986) – are regarded as inherently political and ideological practices 
that support and reproduce capitalist relations of production (Bryer, 1993, 1999; Tinker, 
1980; Tinker et al., 1982). Put differently, we might say that “the assumptions of capitalism 
overwhelm current accounting” (Cooper, 1980, p. 164). Accounting is thus considered as 
operating in a dual role in the service of capitalism. On the one hand, accounting is seen 
as functional and instrumental, as a technology capable of rationalising, codifying and 
controlling workers and the practices and processes of production – capable of rendering 
the capitalist mode of production more efficient and profitable, but also more exploitative 
and repressive (Armstrong, 1987; Bryer, 2006; Cooper & Taylor, 2000). On the other, 
accounting is treated as an ideological practice or apparatus, mystifying and obscuring, 
rendering that which is political and subjective as technical and objective through 
(mis)representation (Lehman & Tinker, 1987; Tinker, 1991).  
Market rule perspectives on neoliberalism have been applied in order to illuminate, 
understand and critique the roles played by accounting in orchestrating and sustaining the 
historical reconstitution of class power through the advancement of corporate, capitalist 
interests and destruction of post-war working class securities. Research has investigated 
the role of accounting in: opening up hitherto non-market spheres for privatisation by 
promoting a mythology of private sector ‘efficiency’ (and state, government or public 
sector ‘inefficiency’) (Andrew, 2010; Andrew & Cahill, 2009, 2017; Arnold & Cooper, 
1999; Cole & Cooper, 2006; Cooper & Taylor, 2005; Funnell, Jupe, & Andrew, 2009); 
reconfiguring international accounting regulation in the interests of investors and capital 
markets (Zhang & Andrew, 2014; Zhang, Andrew, & Rudkin, 2012); legitimating and 
operationalising speculative, parasitic investment practices productive of the global 
financial crisis (Cooper, 2015a); engineering tax regulation and policy to favour private 
(over social) interests (Cooper, Danson, Whittham, & Sheridan, 2010; Sikka & Willmott, 
2013); and eroding the social function and responsibility of the audit (Sikka, 2015). 
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In sum, the dominant theme present in the market rule approach to research on 
accounting and neoliberalism is to expose and critique the various roles played by 
accounting in securing and expanding the global hegemony of neoliberal political 
economy, which is theorised as a historically specific stage of capitalism. Accounting 
technologies, institutions, the accounting profession and accounting regulation are viewed 
as tools for the advancement of the interests of capital and as a means through which the 
dominant class legitimates, secures and exercises its domination. Above all, accounting – 
as an institution, profession, regulatory or technical practice – is regarded as serving the 
interests of capital in the central structural antagonism of capitalism: the exploitation of 
labour by capital. 
2.2.2. NEOLIBERALISM AS GOVERNMENTALITY 
Approached as governmentality, in the accounting literature, the study of neoliberalism is 
associated with tracing the development and effects of the operation of a new mode of 
power, “a shift in the rationalities and practices of Western processes of government” 
(Humphrey, Miller, & Scapens, 1993, p. 13). It must be noted that in relation to the body 
of scholarship on governmentality, a series of contributions made to the accounting 
literature – chiefly those made in Accounting, Organizations and Society by Peter Miller and 
Nikolas Rose – are considered as significant contributions to a theory of governmentality 
beyond the boundaries of the accounting academy (Humphrey et al., 1993; Miller, 1990; 
Miller & Napier, 1993; Miller & O’Leary, 1987; Rose, 1991). Particularly influential – and 
especially significant for our present cause of reviewing the study of neoliberalism as 
governmentality in accounting – is the suturing of Foucauldian theory with the Latourian 
notions of ‘translation’ and ‘inscription’ (Latour, 1987), with the union of these theoretical 
frameworks yielding an appreciation of the role played by (accounting) representations in 
enabling ‘action at a distance’ (Chua, 1995; Robson, 1992; Rose & Miller, 1992). 
Therefore, given the degree to which accounting research has been interwoven with the 
elaboration and development of a general theory and programme of research on 
neoliberalism as governmentality, this section draws less of a neat distinction between 
theory on neoliberalism and its application in the accounting literature when compared 
with the previous section – where various theoretical approaches or perspectives on 
neoliberalism as a phase of capitalism are applied to the study of accounting. By contrast, 
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the study of neoliberalism as governmentality is inseparable from the study of accounting, 
specifically in relation to the technologies of accounting (Miller, 1990, p. 316). 
Accounting, as an array or assemblage of calculative technologies, devices and apparatuses 
that produce visibilities and knowledges is considered a key constituent of the discursive 
apparatus of power and the channels through which that power flows and circulates in an 
understanding of neoliberalism as governmentality (Mennicken & Miller, 2012). This is in 
marked contrast with the ‘market rule’ approach to neoliberalism discussed in the 
previous section, where accounting acts on subjects in both functional and ideological 
modes – controlling them (Armstrong, 1987) and mystifying their domination (Tinker et 
al., 1982). In the market rule approach, ‘accounting language’ is seen as part of a repressive 
apparatus that serves the material interests of the state and capitalist enterprises – 
accounting is a tool or weapon of power that is wielded. In distinction to this, the approach 
to neoliberalism as governmentality recognises the extent to which accounting language 
constitutes competitive, entrepreneurialised, and responsibilised subjects who see their own 
interests defined by and captured in the quantified representation of the world produced 
by accounting (Kurunmäki & Miller, 2006). Accounting plays a vital role in producing 
new visibilities and knowledges through which power flows, not only in a material, ‘top-
down’, and centralised manner, but also in a diffuse, decentralised, fluid mode (Miller & 
O’Leary, 1987).5 
Therefore, for those in accounting who study neoliberalism as governmentality, the key 
novel feature of neoliberalism to be appreciated is the extent to which the calculative 
technologies of accounting are used to transpose a model of the market onto all spheres 
of life, where, through language, individuals are reconceived – and reconceive themselves 
– as “human capital”, as “entrepreneurs of the self” (Cooper, 2015b; Cooper, Graham, & 
Himick, 2016). In effect, this is a distinct break from a conceptualisation of the self as 
‘labour’, a feature common in the ‘market rule’ approach to the study of neoliberalism in 
accounting: entrepreneurialised selves, constituted in relation to an array of accounting 
representations, are at once individualised and responsibilised (Johansen, 2008; 
Mennicken, 2010; Power, 2013) and thus shorn from the protective frameworks offered 
 
5 Although, as Armstrong (2015, p. 38) sagely points out, second and third-hand readings of Foucault have 
“encouraged an unfortunate tendency in critical accounting to de-materialize disciplinary power” – 
something that Foucault would surely oppose. 
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by the (capitalist) organisational form of work,6 but also from the framework of social 
securities and welfare institutions that have been eroded by neoliberal administrations 
(Cooper, 2015b). A key concern is thus to understand the role played by accounting in 
‘economizing’ “the entire social field” (Mennicken & Miller, 2012, p. 7), a necessary 
predicate in the production of individuals who approach life itself as essentially a ‘market 
problem’. This implies that, under neoliberalism, social fields – relationships, education, 
environment, radical politics, and so on (Brown, 2015) – spheres hitherto regarded as 
‘non-economic’ are economized and opened up to market forces and discourses. And, in 
what is especially important for the themes that will be explored later in this text, this 
means that accounting is deeply implicated in the economization or marketization of the 
state, government, democracy and citizens (Mehrpouya & Salles-Djelic, 2019; Morales, 
Gendron, & Guénin-Paracini, 2014; Rose, 1991). 
Drawing to a close my consideration of the accounting literature that approaches 
neoliberalism as governmentality, I want now to summarise the major points discussed. 
Thus, where neoliberalism is theorised as governmentality, accounting technologies are 
regarded as essential in the construction of individualised, entrepreneurialised, 
responsibilised, neoliberal citizens whose subjectivity is constituted by competition, a 
desire for economic wealth-maximisation and pursuit of self-interest: the market becomes 
the model for life itself, and accounting, as a series of discursive technologies, is 
indispensable in the construction of the framework of knowledges and visibilities that 
makes this operable. Through ‘technologies of conduct’, the desires of the individual are 
aligned with the that of the capitalist state, which seeks to recoil from ‘direct’ intervention 
and to engineer the conditions in which (formally) free, autonomous, rational, self-
interested agents pursue their own interests. I now consider extant accounting literature 
on the state. 
2.3. ACCOUNTING AND THE STATE 
As with neoliberalism, study of the state is a complex theoretical matter, with varying 
perspectives adopted by scholars in the accounting academy. And, as with my discussion 
 
6 An organisational form which, it is recognised, is deeply problematic; the point here is that neoliberalism’s 
assault on social security and welfare makes even a ‘steady job’ in a capitalist enterprise – with guarantees 
around holidays, sick pay, maternity leave and so on – begin to look abnormal. 
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of the accounting literature on neoliberalism, here I divide my discussion of the 
accounting literature on the state into two sub-sections. In the first, I focus on the 
literature in accounting adopting Marxist or post-Marxist critical theoretical perspectives 
on the state as sustaining and reproducing the capitalist political economic system, class-
rule and relations of domination and exploitation in society (2.3.1). In the second, I 
consider the Foucauldian literature that seeks to move accounting scholarship ‘beyond’ 
study of the state (2.3.2). 
2.3.1. STUDYING THE STATE IN RELATION TO CAPITAL, CLASS AND INTERESTS 
There is a body of literature in accounting that addresses how accounting is both shaped 
by and put in the service of the state in protecting the interests of the powerful and 
dominant in society, sustaining the existing class structure in society by preserving the 
hegemonic, exploitative mode of capitalist political economy that is productive of that 
class structure. Primarily, though not exclusively, this work is written from Marxist (e.g. 
Catchpowle et al., 2004) and post-Marxist (e.g. Cooper, Puxty, Lowe, & Willmott, 1989) 
perspectives, where accounting is seen as operating in a “symbiotic” or “reciprocal” 
relationship with the development and maintenance of the power of the state and 
capitalism. Marxist and post-Marxist perspectives differ over the extent to which the state 
acts in defending the interests of one class over another, i.e. whether the state acts in a 
“class distorted fashion” (Marxist) or in “the common interest of all members of a 
capitalist class society” (post-Marxist) (see Catchpowle et al., 2004, p. 1044). 
The Marxist perspective, rather than regarding the state in ‘neutral’, ‘functionalist’ terms, 
as an entity whose ‘operations’ are to be refined, as “independent and well-meaning body” 
(Tinker et al., 1982, p. 192), or as a site in which ‘self-interested bureaucrats’ extort 
personal gain from public resources – as is argued by some who advocate for a ‘roll-back’ 
of the state (e.g. Jensen & Meckling, 1980) – critiques the relation between accounting 
and state, considering accounting as implicated in the sustenance of the domination of 
the capitalist ruling class through the machinery of the state (Cooper, 1997; Merino & 
Neimark, 1982). Much of the literature written from a post-Marxist perspective is 
concerned with the relation between the state and accounting as a profession. This 
literature is less trenchant in its critique of the relations between accounting and the state, 
in particular departing from the Marxist perspective over the question of the extent to 
which accounting can be said to be “tightly coupled” to the interests of the ruling classes 
26 
 
(Puxty et al., 1987), or whether accounting operates in the service of a capitalist state that 
is ‘self-consciously’ aware of its own interests and that it can organise itself in pursuit of 
those interests (Cooper et al., 1989). Such research, write Chua and Poullaos (1993, pp. 
693-694, emphasis added), “has focused more on the profession-state axis and usefully 
highlights the central role of the state”, departing from what Puxty et al. (1987, p. 281) 
describe as “‘crude Marxian’ formulations of profession-state relations”. 
Thus, for some contributors, accounting is seen as part of an essentially repressive state 
apparatus that perpetuates its domination over the citizenry both by coordinating the 
repressive material forces of the state and by mystifying the exploitative nature of capitalist 
political economy. As such, accounting is considered as both interwoven in the “coercive” 
(material) and “consensual” (ideological) aspects of state hegemony (Cooper, 1995; 
Tinker, 1984). For instance, accounting regulatory and professional bodies might, with 
the co-operation and support of the state, directly influence the material functioning of 
capitalist political economy by developing accounting standards amenable to the interests 
of capitalist enterprises – i.e. developing standards that stimulate the capital accumulation 
process of capitalist firms rather than acting as a check or control on that process (Arnold 
& Sikka, 2001; Sikka, 2015). Similarly, the literature shows that accounting technologies 
and accounting firms are implicated in massive wealth transfers through privatisation and 
outsourcing of formerly state-owned assets or state-run services (Arnold & Cooper, 1999; 
Cole & Cooper, 2006; Cooper & Taylor, 2005; Hopper, Lassou, & Soobaroyen, 2017; 
Uddin & Hopper, 2003). Or, accounting technologies, such as social and environmental 
reporting, may be deployed in an ideological capacity in order to reproduce and legitimise 
the dominant ideas of the ruling class (Cooper, 1997). In other words, accounting is 
mobilised by the state in order to represent sectional, particular interests and ideas as 
general, universal ones (see Gallhofer & Haslam, 1991) – for example, presenting economic 
growth as in ‘the national interest’, as a ‘panacea’ for society as a whole, rather than as 
enriching a particular class in society and reproducing greater social inequalities and 
divisions (Archel, Husillos, Larrinaga, & Spence, 2009). 
Other contributors to the literature investigate the nature of the relation between the state 
and accounting in terms of the professional and policy-making dynamics between the 
state and accounting regulatory bodies, firms, and individual accountants (Arnold & 
Cooper, 1999; Burchell et al., 1980), demonstrating that the interests of these groups 
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frequently conflict with or contradict those of the state, and that to see accounting as 
unproblematically serving the interests of the state is to over-simplify their relation 
(Cooper et al., 1989). Indeed, under neoliberalism, the scale and influence of global 
accounting firms has developed such that states are often uninterested, unwilling, or 
unable to challenge or discipline their activities (Arnold, 2009a; Sikka, 2009), preferring 
to leave these firms to ‘their own devices’ for fear of being seen as creating an ‘anti-market 
trading environment’ (Sikka & Willmott, 2013). 
Although capitalism features prominently in both the Marxist and post-Marxist analysis 
of the relations between accounting and the state, focus is not confined solely to studying 
accounting as it relates to the state-capitalism relationship. Though an appreciation of the 
structuring forces of capitalism is treated as a necessary feature of research within this 
tradition7, capitalism need not be the exclusive focus of such works. For instance, in the 
literature there are examples of research that tease out the relations between accounting 
and the state in relation to: the Holocaust (Funnell, 1998), colonialism and the slave trade 
(Annisette, 1999), imperialism (Annisette, 2000; Annisette & Neu, 2004), and racism 
(Arnold & Hammond, 1994; Catchpowle & Cooper, 1999; Hammond, Cooper, & Van 
Staden, 2017). Here, accounting is positioned as a powerful technical instrument of social 
control (Walker, 2016), with the capacity to be embroiled in the sinister regimes of great 
violence (Fleischman et al., 2013). 
2.3.2. GOING ‘BEYOND’ THE STUDY OF THE STATE 
Irrespective of the varying degrees to which capitalism forms a central core in the sample 
of literature on accounting and the state cited above, what is common to these works is: 
firstly, a critical perspective on the relation between accounting technologies, firms, 
regulatory and professional bodies and individual accountants and the state; and, 
secondly, a concern for the competing interests at play in society and the relation between 
accounting and the state in sustaining, reproducing or overthrowing those existing 
interests. 
However, study of the state in the accounting literature is not restricted to the critical, 
Marxist and post-Marxist traditions. Indeed, there exists a substantial body of literature 
 
7 As Cooper and Annisette (2017, p. 56) put it: “any research into the exercise of power from a critical 
perspective should take capitalism into account.” 
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that is formulated in strict opposition to such approaches to the state, regarding them as 
incapable of comprehending the precise modes in which power is exercised in (liberal) 
democratic societies. I am here referring to the Foucauldian literature on accounting, 
which seeks to move scholarship beyond the study of the state. Its leading proponents argue 
against what they perceive as an “overvaluation of the ‘problem of the State’ in political 
debate and social theory” (Rose & Miller, 1992, p. 173). As such, this literature reframes 
study of the state as a study of the ‘art of government’, seeking to go beyond a theory of 
the state as a ruling or dominating institution that exercises accounting as a ‘tool’ or 
‘weapon’ in power (Humphrey et al., 1993; Miller, 1986; Miller & Rose, 1990; Rose, 1990, 
1991; Rose & Miller, 1992). At this point, it must also be acknowledged that many of the 
works cited as part of this ‘Foucauldian’ literature also draw heavily on the scholarship of 
Bruno Latour, and are notable examples of the introduction of the concepts of 
‘translation’ and ‘inscription’ into the accounting literature. Here, however, I focus on the 
application of the work of Foucault in the study of the state in the accounting literature, 
insofar as Foucault himself deals with the question of the study of the state in explicit 
terms. In fact, Foucault positions his work in relation to the state in a ‘negative’ sense, 
recoiling from and reacting to the dominance of the Marxist and sociological theorisations 
of the state that characterised scholarship in his intellectual epoch (see Foucault, 2008, 
pp. 2-5, 75-78). 
In moving study of the state ‘beyond’ theorisation of the state as a pre-given, centralised 
ruling force in society, the Foucauldian literature on accounting directs its attention 
toward the question of means rather than ends, which is to say that its primary concern lies 
with investigating questions of how power operates in society as opposed to investigating 
why and in whose interests that power is wielded. As Miller (1990, p. 316) puts it in his seminal 
article in Accounting, Organizations and Society: 
The argument of this paper is that the interrelations of accounting and the state are 
such that we have to do something rather different than trace the causal influences 
considered to flow between two given and discrete entities. The linkages between 
accounting and the state are viewed here as reciprocal relationships between and 
within two loosely assembled sets of practices. It is the practices and rationales out of 
which “accounting” and “the state” were formed, and the relays established between 
them that is of concern here. For “accounting” on the one hand and “the state” on 
the other have not always had the self-evident distinctiveness we associate with them 
today. Rather, they emerged as distinct entities out of a variety of processes that 
constructed them qua discrete. 
29 
 
Therefore, the Foucauldian literature does not approach the state as an a priori category, 
historical or empirical object, but rather studies ‘the state’ as “a composite reality whose 
materiality and effects arise out of a network of practices and rationales that seek to 
programme and intervene in economic and social life” (Miller, 1990, p. 317). In other 
words, what is studied in the Foucauldian literature on accounting and the state is not 
how ‘accounting’ relates to ‘the State’ as a pre-given entity that has a particular interest, 
character or essence, but rather the particular forms of power that are associated with “an 
assemblage of practices, techniques, programmes, knowledges, rationales and 
interventions” that together constitute the state “in a nominalist sense” (Miller, 1990, p. 317, 
emphasis added). As Miller (1986, p. 101) puts it in his review essay of Francois Fourquet’s 
A History of National Accounting and Planning: 
It is not that accounting serves the interests of the state. It is that the very notion of 
the state as we know it today is dependent on the elaboration of national accounting. 
In adopting such a perspective on the state, where accounting is itself interwoven into the 
very fabric of what it is that we today recognise and understand as the state, this literature 
demonstrates the way in which the calculative practices of accounting play a central role in 
the governing of populations in contemporary (liberal) democratic regimes (Miller, 2008; 
Miller & Rose, 1990; Rose, 1991). Interventions administered through accounting 
technologies allows populations to be governed ‘at a distance’ (Rose & Miller, 1992), 
constituting a mode of governing that marks a distinct break from the idea of the violent, 
coercive state that is physically present in order to govern and impose order and control 
‘corporeally’. Instead, the deployment of accounting technologies enables regimes of 
governing to indirectly target individuals, separating them out of a mass in order to subject 
them to subtle, yet immensely powerful forms of monitoring, surveillance and 
normalising judgement (Rose, 1991). Such is the apparently ‘mundane’ nature of the 
indirect interventions ‘at a distance’ through accounting technologies, the individuals who 
are the targets of such regimes of governing appear to ‘govern themselves’. Or, as Miller 
and Rose (1990, p. 18) put it, “‘free’ individuals and ‘private’ spaces can be ‘ruled’ without 
breaching their formal autonomy.” This understanding of the way in which accounting 
technologies are used to operationalise and administer powerful and controlling 
programmes of government over individuals and society whilst appearing – crucially – 
not to impinge on ‘the freedom of the individual’ is perhaps the central defining feature 
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and contribution of the Foucauldian approach to (or rather, departure from) the study of 
‘the state’ in accounting. 
There can be no doubt of the extent to which the application and development of 
Foucault’s radical break in the study of the state has profoundly enriched our knowledge 
and understanding of accounting and its relation to the practices and programmes of 
governing by the state. Nonetheless, the question must be posed as to what is lost when 
we regard the state in the way proposed by Foucault and those who took up and 
developed his ideas in the accounting literature. For example, if regarding the state as an 
instrument of capitalist class rule prevents us from appreciating the multi-faceted 
character and non-unity of identity and interest of the state – as critics of Marxist 
perspectives on the relation between accounting and the state would argue – what does 
adopting the nominalist, Foucauldian position on the state prevent us from seeing? What 
is lost if we apply Foucault’s (1977, pp. 26-29; 1990a, pp. 92-95) propositions for the study 
of power and of the state? That power is “not the ‘privilege’, acquired or preserved, of 
the dominant class”, that we should dispose of the notion of what is “‘interested’ and 
what is ‘disinterested’”, that we should set aside notions of a “binary opposition between 
rulers and ruled”, that we should discard the notion of power as a means of ensuring “the 
subservience of the citizens of a given state”, that we should regard power as diffuse, 
without author, and cease to “look for the headquarters” or “the groups which control 
the state apparatus”. In taking up these propositions, what aspects of power do we fail to 
appreciate? What aspects of the relation between accounting and the state escape our 
attention when we deliberately darken our lenses to these features of the world? 
It is precisely in response to such concerns that Marilyn Neimark published her polemic 
essay in Critical Perspectives on Accounting – ‘The king is dead. Long live the king!’ (1990) – in 
which she delivered an acerbic critique of what she saw as the emergence of a new 
orthodoxy (of ‘postmodern’ thought, for her, embodied in Foucault’s work) in the act of 
denouncing an old one (Marxist and post-Marxist thought). It is Neimark’s charge that in 
dispensing with the radical and emancipatory critique offered by Marxist theory, the new 
orthodoxy of Foucauldian research in accounting yields a view of power that is at root 
conservative and reactionary: 
Like Foucault, these accounting researchers take a “curiously passive and sterile view 
not so much of the uses of power, but of how and why power is gained, used, and 
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held onto” (Said, 1983, p. 221). And they do not see accounting’s links with, and 
allegiances to the major sites of power/knowledge in capitalist society, and its 
complicity in specific intra- and inter-class conflicts. This myopia permits them to 
maintain the fiction of being non-partisans in the social conflicts in which accounting 
discourses and practices are enmeshed. 
(Neimark, 1990, p. 110) 
To this day, Neimark’s powerfully articulated concerns warrant sincere consideration 
from those who take up Foucauldian or ‘postmodern’ perspectives on accounting. As 
others have commented on in relation to accounting more generally (Busco & Quattrone, 
2018b), and as I consider here specifically in relation to the study of the state, it is an 
ongoing challenge for critical accounting researchers to balance elegant and enticing 
theoretical developments in our understanding of the operation and complexity of 
accounting with a sustained commitment to shedding light on the ways in which 
accounting maintains and reproduces social and political relations marked by domination, 
exploitation and inequality. 
Having now reflected on a range of perspectives on accounting and the state, I turn my 
attention to a consideration of the mobilisation of the technologies and practices of 
accounting in the name of ‘transparency’. In recent times, transparency has emerged as a 
fixed constituent of public discourse. Calls for the most powerful individuals and 
organisations in society to be ‘more transparent’ about their workings and conduct are 
now ubiquitous. As with capitalist organisations, states now produce vast quantities of 
‘transparency’ information and data, the majority of which is produced and presented 
using accounting technologies. An understanding of the link between accounting and 
transparency is therefore crucial in the study of the state as an accounting scholar today. 
As such, and in line with the key concerns of this thesis, in the next section I consider the 
body of extant accounting literature on the subject of transparency. 
2.4. ACCOUNTING AND TRANSPARENCY 
Research in a wide range of academic disciplines foregrounds the study of transparency 
as it relates to the sociology of organisations and institutions, information and 
communication technologies, public administration and administrative science, business 
and corporate ethics, governance, government and anthropology. Much of this literature 
approaches the study of transparency from an instrumental, functionalist perspective, 
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where transparency is regarded as a panacea, something to be sought after and refined, 
something that will ‘improve’ the functioning of organisations and institutions (Hood & 
Heald, 2006). 
In the accounting literature, transparency is studied from a variety of methodological and 
theoretical perspectives. In this section, I give an overview of this literature, first briefly 
outlining ‘mainstream’ approaches to the study of transparency in accounting (2.4.1) then 
moving on to consider the critical and interdisciplinary literature (2.4.2) and concluding 
by discussing the relation between accountability and transparency (2.4.3). 
2.4.1. THE MAINSTREAM APPROACH 
The functionalist approach to the study of transparency is certainly evidenced in 
mainstream approaches to accounting research. In mainstream approaches, transparency 
is considered in relation to calls for greater disclosure of financial accounting and 
corporate governance information, calls that intensified in the aftermath of corporate 
scandals, such as that of Enron (Stein, Salterio, & Shearer, 2017), and in relation to the 
global financial crisis of 2008 (Arnold, 2009a). As Macintosh and Quattrone (2010) point 
out, in this approach, there is a “strong belief” that greater transparency will contribute 
to the efficient functioning of capital markets. 
Transparency is therefore studied as an object, x, to be related to another object (or 
objects), y. Questions are stated in terms such as, ‘How does transparency affect y?’ or 
hypotheses are posed and investigated, such as, ‘The impact of x on y’. The effects of 
transparency disclosures – considered wholly in relation to capital markets and firms – 
are ‘tested’ in relation to firm performance, investor confidence, earnings quality, earnings 
management, pricing of stocks and bonds, market liquidity, tax avoidance, accounting 
standards and regulations and so on (for examples, see: Balakrishnan, Blouin, & Guay, 
2019; Barth, Konchitchki, & Landsman, 2013; Bhat, Hope, & Kang, 2006; Bleck & Liu, 
2007; Hunton, Libby, & Mazza, 2006). Such studies are rooted in a series of 
methodological assumptions about humans and their behaviour (Chua, 1986), drawn 
from agency and neoclassical economic theories (see Jensen & Meckling, 1976). It is 
assumed that the efficient functioning of capital markets (Fama, 1970; Malkiel, 2003) is, 
if not realisable in practice, at the very least a desirable ideal to be pursued in the 
construction of a fair and equitable society and economy. As a major source of 
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information on firms and capital markets, it is argued that accounting plays a crucial role 
in contributing to this efficiency (Ball & Brown, 1968). In this paradigm of accounting 
research, the broad, over-arching objective is to ascertain the degree to which 
transparency contributes to or impinges on this efficiency (Jensen, 1976).  
2.4.2. CRITICAL AND INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACHES 
As Arnold (2009a, p. 805) explains, 
Conventional accounting research remains bound to neoclassical economic theory 
and the narrow view of accounting as a neutral technology whose function is to reduce 
information asymmetry and provide the transparency needed for capital markets to 
function efficiently. 
How, then, is transparency approached in critical and interdisciplinary accounting 
research? A first, crucial distinction between this approach and the former is the wider 
scope of what is considered as ‘transparency’. Transparency is studied not only in the 
form of the disclosure of financial accounting information, but also in respect to audits, 
performance indicators, ratings, and rankings. Transparency is then conceptualised as a 
technology of neoliberal governmentality (Mehrpouya & Salles-Djelic, 2014, 2019), as a 
potentially emancipatory practice (Gallhofer et al., 2011), as a discourse (Nielsen & 
Madsen, 2009), a means of organisational control and as a veneer (Roberts, 2018), as a 
chimera, a (mischievous) utopian project (Macintosh & Quattrone, 2010) and as an 
impossible fantasy, a force active in the interpellation of subjects, implicated in the 
construction and shaping of their subjectivity (Roberts, 2009). In other words, as we 
would expect, in the critical and interdisciplinary literature we find a broader 
methodological array of perspectives mobilised in the study of transparency. 
As earlier discussed, from a critical or interdisciplinary perspective, accounting is an 
inherently political, subjective and partisan technology (Tinker et al., 1982) – a technology 
that creates, rather than reflects, social, organisational and institutional visibilities (Hines, 
1988). What is made visible, to whom, and when, are considerations that are inseparable 
from and interwoven with the workings of power and the establishment of regimes of 
order and control; as a technology that creates visibilities regarded as trustworthy, neutral, 
truthful and objective, accounting is positioned within this nexus of power (Hoskin & 
Macve, 1988; Roberts, 1991, 2001). Applying this insight to the study of transparency, 
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critical and interdisciplinary researchers have sought to question the “ideological roots of 
transparency” (Arnold, 2009a) and have positioned transparency within the political 
economy of accounting and accountability (Cooper & Sherer, 1984; Mehrpouya & Salles-
Djelic, 2019). In so doing, we have come to understand that transparency is particularly 
alluring insofar as it promises to eradicate mystery, the unknown and problems of trust: 
The widespread allure of transparency as an instrument of control can be traced to its 
visual metaphor of casting light onto what would otherwise be invisible. Transparency 
promises to obviate the need for trust in others, or furnish distant others with the 
basis for such trust, through the simple device of making conduct visible. 
Transparency thereby becomes the obvious and necessary remedy to all organisational 
failures, with its enhancement serving as the remedy to problems diagnosed in terms 
of its absence. 
(Roberts, 2018, p. 54) 
However, though lauded by advocates as a radical, progressive means for eliminating 
corruption (Johnston, 2015) and securing greater accountability from the most powerful 
organisations and institutions in society, transparency cannot – indeed, must not – be seen 
as a disinterested practice: 
Institutionally, we should abandon the idea that independent bodies, external 
nonexecutive members of boards of directors, controllers and various kinds of 
emerging agencies created to act in the name of some transparency are independent. 
Independence, as much as representation, transparency, accountability and the like, is 
another utopian project. Better to assume that it is not possible and seek to discover 
why certain bodies are not independent and to whom these are linked rather than 
assuming that they are. This assumption would paralyze our critical action. 
(Macintosh & Quattrone, 2010, p. 333) 
Today, this means retaining an awareness that transparency, reliant as it is on the partisan 
technologies of accounting and promoted by an array of powerful, pro-corporate, 
capitalist, global institutions (e.g. The International Monetary Fund and The World Bank) 
(Mehrpouya & Salles-Djelic, 2019) is by no means a neutral, apolitical, technical function, 
but that it is a “tool of governing” in a neoliberal society (Mehrpouya & Salles-Djelic, 
2014). Such an awareness should lead us to question the extent to which organisations 
and institutions are sincere in their production of ‘transparency’, to consider, as do 
Girdhar and Jeppesen (2018), that transparency has become a globally institutionalised 
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norm such that organisations are subject to isomorphic pressures to ‘look transparent’ in 
order to maintain legitimacy in society. 
Now, for the remainder of this section I want to focus on the power of transparency as a 
force that shapes the conduct of individuals and the workings of organisations. The 
demands and pressures on organisations, institutions and individuals to maintain an 
appearance of transparency, or – more precisely – to become preoccupied with the 
maintenance of an external appearance of perfection, leads Roberts (2009, 2018) to 
question the organisational and personal effects which a preoccupation with transparency 
encourages and mobilises. As Roberts (2018, p. 58) explains, whilst it is well understood 
that “as abstractions from context” forms of transparency “mask as much as they reveal 
of operational realities” (e.g. Strathern, 2000; Tsoukas, 1997), what is less appreciated is 
the degree to which demands for external transparency interfere in the internal workings of 
organisations: 
Whilst the metaphor of transparency suggests the capacity to see within or behind 
closed doors – to abolish such private and confidential space – in practical terms the 
effects of transparency depend upon how it changes conduct behind closed doors. 
(Roberts, 2009, p. 958) 
In other words, and breaking with an understandable concern with examining what 
transparency shows and what it hides, Roberts is concerned with investigating the way in 
which demands for external transparency produce a range of internal organisational and 
personal effects. 
At an organisational level, and drawing on the works of Power (1999) and Tsoukas (1997), 
Roberts (2009) argues that transparency comes to be decoupled from the day-to-day 
practices of organisational realities, whilst also colonizing those practices, such that the 
organisational practices of employees come to be devoted to the management of 
appearances, rather than of immediate organisational challenges. Managers are given 
powerful incentives – in the form of financial rewards and in terms of career progression 
– to manage “only what is transparent”, and in so doing shift the responsibility and 
pressure of operational matters on to employees who are themselves also the subjects of 
technologies of transparency (Roberts, 2018). Projecting an appearance, or ‘spectacle’, of 
transparency thus becomes more important than attending to the everyday workings of 
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the organisation and the activities of management (Flyverbom & Reinecke, 2017).8 This, 
says Roberts, may result in the emergence of “functional stupidity” in organisations 
(Alvesson & Spicer, 2012), whereby processes of organisational learning and development 
are deliberately attenuated by employees and managers, insofar as they know that they are 
held accountable or assessed through a view of their performance detached from 
substantive organisational matters. As Roberts (2018, p. 56) explains, in such a context, 
“intelligence and reflection are self-censored out of organisational processes, and 
ignorance knowingly and actively cultivated”. 
At a personal level, Roberts contends that in having their conduct made visible in relation 
to crude, instrumental abstractions, employees and managers alike are subordinated to 
individualising, hierarchical systems of organisational control that encourage and mobilise 
a “narcissistic preoccupation with either the defence or advancement of the self” 
(Roberts, 2018, p. 53). What is particularly sinister and destructive about the ‘ethic of 
narcissus’ engendered by organisational representations of selves made transparent is the 
extent to which it contributes to its own reproduction as individuals misrecognise their own 
self-worth as reflected in accounting representations. For example, when I know my 
annual performance rating is lower than that of my colleague, I internalise a feeling that 
somehow they are ‘better’ than I am. I then come to see the advancement of myself as 
achievable through ‘improving’ the image of myself that I find in transparency (‘I really 
want to get a four next time’) (Roberts, 2009). Regardless of the extent to which we might 
know that we are not a ‘four’ or a ‘one’, we are nonetheless forced to ‘play the game’ that 
transparency creates. This is a further source of the power of transparency: even those 
who are deeply critical of it are subordinated to its rules, are forced to conform if they are 
to maintain a legitimate platform from which to profess their criticism or merely to remain 
in employment. 
Furthermore, what is also troubling about the preoccupation with the appearance of the 
self that we see constituted in transparency is that the drive to ‘self-improvement’ or 
‘personal development’ that is stimulated by such representations is shorn from a firm 
basis in organisational practices, substantive meaning, morality or ethics (Roberts, 2009). 
 
8 The notion of spectacle, developed by Guy Debord (1967b, 1973, 1988), is central to this thesis. I set out 
a theory of spectacle in section 4.2, ‘Theorising Spectacle’. 
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This is typified in the academic world (Cooper, 2015b; Mehrpouya & Willmott, 2018), 
where it is common practice to appraise the quality of scholarship solely by reference to 
the ranking or rating of the journal in which that individual has published their research: 
‘She’s good – she has a couple of four stars this year’; ‘He’s a good guy, he has a four star 
already’; ‘He only publishes in two and three stars’; ‘She can’t be that smart, she still hasn’t 
published a four star’. These specific illustrations are, of course, fictions, but one cannot 
expect to attend an academic conference without encountering discourse of this sort on 
a regular basis. These illustrative fictions show us how crude, ‘transparent’ abstractions – 
which we know eclipse realities and obscure precious context and nuance in meaning – are 
powerful tools with which we map and codify our organisational and social realities. The 
crucial point to be highlighted here is that this process of social stratification by journal 
ranking is frequently devoid of any reference to the substantive content of the work in 
question – judgements are made without any attempt being made to read the work of the 
individual in question. In this respect, the appearance of reality manufactured in 
technologies of transparency is elevated in importance above substantive, material 
concerns. 
Whilst it is the case that much of the critical and interdisciplinary literature in accounting 
is made up of research that criticises transparency – as deceptive, a false promise, 
unattainable, as individualising and as producing a narcissistic preoccupation with the self 
– it is certainly not the case that this body of work should be classified as anti-transparency. 
To be clear, what is criticised is the extent to which transparency – in a narrow, 
instrumentalised, marketised, shallow form – has developed into a hollow institutionalised 
norm, devoid of meaningful, radical and substantive content (Macintosh & Quattrone, 
2010; Mehrpouya & Salles-Djelic, 2014, 2019). The critical and interdisciplinary literature 
on transparency acts as a counterweight to sensationalising claims made about the 
capacities of transparency to solve all manner of ills, whether they be social, political, 
economic and environmental (Arnold, 2012). Pleas are made to recognise that 
transparency will always be incomplete and partial, but that this incompleteness and 
partiality should not be considered as a weakness, but as a virtue, a productive force 
stimulating further enquiry (Macintosh & Quattrone, 2010). Calls are made to rethink 
what is meant by ‘transparency’ in accounting (Quattrone, 2016a) and for the 
development of more ‘intelligent’ modes of transparency, where we do not manage 
without transparency, but neither do we manage only with transparency (Roberts, 2009, 
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2018). For instance, in their consideration of transparency and human rights, Gallhofer 
et al. (2011, p. 771) write that: 
We are not taking a naïve view on transparency here but a pragmatic one. 
Transparency in practice may translate into the worst kind of public relations 
whitewashing. Also any disclosure (especially with the stamp of professional expertise) 
might re-assure and displace attention from something in significant ways. And some 
forced transparencies (and their auditing) may impact badly on potentially valuable 
trust. Yet, the absence of transparency is arguably the worst case in this context; so 
long as there is awareness of the less than pristine potentials of transparency in 
practice, it can play a role that is more positive than negative (Gallhofer & Haslam, 
2003). 
In sum, whilst the ‘less than pristine’ form of contemporary transparency is 
acknowledged, and the limits, dangers and perils of transparency demonstrated, the 
critical and interdisciplinary literature on transparency in accounting also prompts 
reflection on the possibilities and potentials of transparency to be other than what it is 
today, for transparency ‘to become what it was not’ (Hopwood, 1987; Quattrone, 2016a). 
At this stage, before proceeding to conduct a brief examination of the relation between 
accountability and transparency, it is important to acknowledge that a rich and varied 
literature on transparency has also been developed by social, cultural and organisational 
scholars. Transparency has been studied in relation to: (epistemological) tyranny 
(Strathern, 2000; Tsoukas, 1997), power and control (Flyverbom, 2015; Flyverbom, 
Christensen, & Hansen, 2015), privacy (Bernstein, 2012), opacity (Birchall, 2011; Thomä, 
2018), secrecy (Ringel, 2018, 2019), politics (Birchall, 2015), professions (Levay & Waks, 
2009), numbers and quantification (Hansen, 2015) and its digital form (Hansen & 
Flyverbom, 2015). Whilst much of this research is rooted in subjective, interpretive or 
constructivist epistemological traditions, critique is also directed towards transparency as 
reductive, as a hollow vehicle and support for neoliberal ideology (Birchall, 2014; 
Valdovinos, 2018), as a utopian dream (Schneider, 2018), a ‘magic concept’ of modernity 
(Alloa, 2018), and as ‘myth and metaphor’ (Christensen & Cornelissen, 2015). Whilst the 
wealth of recent literature in organisational studies of transparency offers rich and varied 
insight – some of which feature in the extant accounting literature and on which I will 
draw at various points in the thesis hereafter – there is much that can be contributed to 
the understanding of transparency by studying it specifically through an accounting lens, 
especially given the extent to which a major part of the material that is presented by 
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organisations and institutions as ‘transparency’ draws on technologies and practices of 
accounting. 
2.4.3. ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY 
The relation between accountability and transparency is of central concern in this thesis. 
Specifically, I am concerned with the extent to which greater transparency is 
unproblematically bound up with greater accountability, with the next step being the 
suggestion that with the greater accountability that comes from greater transparency we 
find a ‘deepening’ or ‘enrichment’ of democracy. Thus, the equation might be posed 
(somewhat crudely) as this: more transparency = more accountability = more democracy. 
Though transparency has been a subject of interest for accounting scholars, by and large 
it is the case that transparency appears as the lesser-studied figure in an oft-seen 
conceptual duo of ‘accountability and transparency’. Whilst transparency has received 
considerable attention in critical and interdisciplinary accounting research, the body of 
literature specifically concerned with accountability is substantially larger. Irrespective of 
the degree to which they are studied in the literature, the simple point to note is that 
accountability and transparency are distinct in a meaningful way. Nonetheless, as Power 
(1994, p. 18) writes: 
Accountability is so closely associated with ideas of transparency that the two concepts 
are often used interchangeably. Audits are usually justified as enhancing the 
transparency of individual and corporate actions to those parties who have an interest 
in the nature and effect of those actions. In other words, they are thought to shift 
power; from professionals to the public, from experts to stakeholders. 
And yet to elide the distinction between accountability and transparency is, at best, 
conceptually clumsy, and at worst deliberately obfuscatory. Thus, Power (1994, p. 18) 
continues, warning that: 
if we look more closely at the nature of this transparency and its democratising 
potential we soon find problems. How exactly does audit make things transparent? 
What are the mechanics of transparency? 
The point to be underlined here is that to couple accountability and transparency without 
first considering what each in itself entails is to proceed all too quickly in establishing a 
conceptual union that hides rather than reveals more about the individual concepts in 
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question. This is by no means to deny that accountability and transparency are, or may 
be, related, but it is to warn that their coupling is to be approached with caution (Hood, 
2010). Accountability and transparency should certainly not be regarded as mere 
synonyms (see Messner, 2009, p. 919). For instance, we might well ask if it is possible to 
‘be transparent’ and yet to remain ‘unaccountable’? I would argue that it is, insofar as 
transparency without an associated forum or mechanism of inspection and interrogation 
with the possibility of consequences for my actions has little to do with a relation of 
accountability. A similar question could be posed in reverse: is it possible to be 
accountable without ‘being transparent’? This is perhaps the more difficult question to 
answer, but at the very least we can say that this is dependent on what is meant by 
transparency – certainly, though, I can be held accountable without being able to give a 
fully transparent account of myself (Roberts, 2009). Therefore, where Roberts (2010) 
develops a discussion around the premise of “Why Accounting is not Accountability: and 
why we keep imagining that it is”, I assert that the same should be said of transparency: 
transparency is not accountability, though we keep imagining that it is. 
2.5. CONTRIBUTING TO THE STUDY OF ACCOUNTING 
2.5.1. AESTHETICS, SUBJECTS, AND DEMOCRACY 
In this final section of my literature review, I set out how I propose to contribute to the 
development of extant accounting literature. I plan to do so in three ways, by considering: 
the aesthetics of state transparency, the subjects that are addressed and produced by state 
transparency, and how state transparency relates to democracy in a neoliberal society. In 
what follows, I develop an outline of each of these proposed contributions. 
(i) Aesthetics. 
The first of my three proposed contributions relates to exploring the extent to which the 
power of transparency relates to the cultivation of a glossy, pristine digital aesthetic. 
Transparency is, of course, a visual metaphor, and yet, perhaps surprisingly, no attention 
has been afforded in the accounting literature to appreciating the way in which the 
particular aesthetic of transparency is implicated in the establishment of its authority. As 
could be said with respect to accounting at large, “replete” as it is with visual metaphors 
(Davison & Warren, 2009), I regard an appreciation of the aesthetics of transparency as 
an essential part in how we come to understand its workings. Given that we understand 
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that the visibilities produced by accounting representations are not neutral or apolitical, 
should this not be the same for the visible form in which we see those numbers? Is this 
form not also political, implicated in the workings of power? Put differently, if it is 
important that we consider the way accounting content makes things visible, it is also 
important that we consider the way accounting form does so (Gallhofer & Haslam, 1996), 
particularly given that accounting representations, like transparency, do not materialise 
spontaneously of their own accord, but are the products of a deliberate process of design 
and construction (Pollock & D’Adderio, 2012; Quattrone, 2017; Ronzani & Gatzweiler, 
2019). 
In this respect, my work is articulated with the “visual turn” in accounting research 
(Davison, 2015). Research on the visual in accounting has sought to examine the relation 
between accounting and appearance: how the way accounting looks contributes to its 
power and appeal as an authoritative, objective, truthful organisational practice (Busco & 
Quattrone, 2015, 2018a; Quattrone, 2009, 2017); how images are used as devices to frame 
accounting information in relation to social and cultural norms and expectations 
(Davison, 2007; Davison & Skerratt, 2007; Preston, Wright, & Young, 1996); and how 
the specific form of accounting visualisations shape and construct organisational practices 
(Justesen & Mouritsen, 2009; Ronzani & Gatzweiler, 2019). 
To be specific, I position my work within the critical visual literature (Cooper et al., 1994; 
Gallhofer & Haslam, 1991, 1996), with critical here being a referent to the Frankfurt 
School tradition in critical theory. In particular, I align my work with that of Cooper et al. 
(1994), insofar as they consider the visual aspects of accounting as part of a broader notion 
of the aesthetic. This is an important distinction: I do not interchange the word ‘aesthetic’ 
for ‘visual’, as if these are mere synonyms for one another. My emphasis on the notion of 
the aesthetic is deliberate, insofar as invoking ‘aesthetic’ appeals to the broader notion of 
holistic sensory experience as related to visual form, particularly as related to visual forms 
that are appealing because they can be perceived as portraying ‘aesthetically pleasing’ 
features such as beauty, balance, organisation, harmony, elegance, simplicity or control 
(Strati, 1992; Taylor & Hansen, 2005; Warren, 2008). As I touched upon earlier, my 
invocation of the aesthetic also relates to my concern that the move to study ‘accounting 
visualizations’, such as the ‘dashboard’, can imply that accounting was invisible before the 
advent of contemporary digital technologies. Accounting was always visible – though it 
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has also had close ties with the aural (Quattrone, 2009, 2016b) – and the aesthetic appeal 
or power of accounting is not something that should be confined to modern 
manifestations of accounting. 
Beyond this, my invocation of the notion of the aesthetic seeks to further unpack how 
the way in which we experience transparency impacts upon how we react to it and what 
we think it is for (Quattrone, 2016a). Is transparency a radical and democratic practice, or 
a conservative, reformist, neoliberal one? Certainly, what today is paraded as transparency 
is rather different, as I discuss in the next section, to what would in history have 
constituted transparency, inasmuch as contemporary transparency is digital, represented 
and mediated, not directly lived, corporeal and situated (Meijer, 2009). However, to say 
that transparency today is not ‘experienced’ would be false: it is that the corporeal, visceral 
experience of transparency today is radically different – in a material as well as a symbolic 
sense – from experiences of transparency in history. Hence, my insistence on the notion 
of aesthetic, which, though deeply sensitive to the category of the visual is attendant to a 
broader notion of sensory experience as a whole (Csíkszentmiháyli & Robinson, 1990). 
A brief final point on this is needed in relation to the methodological implications and 
limitations of studying the aesthetic dimension of accounting (Davison, 2015). To be sure, 
when one engages in the domain of aesthetics and thus the visual and visceral, problems 
of interpretation and relativism are immediately faced: ‘Do you and I see the same thing?’ 
‘How can we ever know if we do if I can never see as you see?’ (see Nagel, 1974, 1986). I 
will confront these methodological challenges in more detail later in the thesis, but for 
now I want to insist that methodological challenges should absolutely not deter or detract 
from an attempt to study the aesthetic, or indeed the visual, qualities of accounting 
(Davison & Warren, 2009; Greenwood, Jack, & Haylock, 2019). If an object, subject, 
entity or event defies research, should we not strive to understand why this is the case? 
Indeed, is this not a part of the very workings of power, that it is capable of resisting 
critique? Here, I am encouraged by words of Cooper et al. (1994, p. 37), who state that, 
Just as it is difficult to critique fascist writings because they are almost empty of 
verifiable claims, making instead appeals to myths such as race, blood, soil and nation, 




This seems an appropriate point at which to move on to discuss the second of my 
proposed contributions to the accounting literature, relating to the subjects of 
transparency. In this thesis, I examine transparency in relation to the state, where 
transparency is manifested in various financial and non-financial, quantitative and 
qualitative forms, as: annual reports and accounts, audit and performance measures, 
ratings, rankings and in accounting visualisations. I consider how this transparency could 
be used and experienced by the citizenry. In this sense, I invert Roberts’ (2009, 2018) 
concern for investigating the way in which demands for (external) transparency affect 
(internal) workings ‘behind closed doors’. Here, I propose to look in the other direction, 
at how the production of (external) transparency affects those to whom transparency is, 
at least ostensibly, addressed – its subjects. The subject is, in effect, a bridge between the 
first and the third areas of my contribution to the literature, insofar as I look to examine 
how the aesthetic of transparency contributes to the formation of the subjectivities of 
citizens. In this respect, my research is also aligned with recent moves to introduce the 
reader or user of accounts into our study of accounting (Bay, 2018; Bay, Catasús, & Johed, 
2014). 
Therefore, the question is: what sort of subjects does digital, mediated transparency 
produce? If making my own conduct visible to distant others produces subjectivities infected 
by anxiety, a narcissistic preoccupation with self-image, pressured into ‘functionally 
stupid’ organisational behaviours, and detached from matters of moral or ethical 
substance, what sort of relations are created when I am the one looking at the conduct of 
others made visible? Put differently, how does transparency interpellate those it addresses? 
Specifically in relation to this thesis, how does the aesthetic of transparency structure the 
way that citizens see the state? Does transparency reach out and grab me, shake me and 
make me indignant, stirring up a radical democratic energy? Does it educate and inform, 
or does it do something else altogether? My concern here is to reflect on how transparency 
is involved in the formation and development of the subjectivities of citizens in relation 
to the state. Does transparency make me think of myself as an empowered citizen, as an 
educated and informed member of democratic society? If so, how does this ‘democratic 
subjectivity’ interfere with and stultify my sense of self as a subject of and subject to the 
rule of the state? 
 (iii) Democracy. 
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The last of my proposed contributions to the literature is to study the relationship between 
transparency, constituted in accounting technologies, and the art of governing in liberal 
democracy. The “democratising” potential of transparency is oft-remarked (Power, 1994) 
and shares a logic with the rationality of transparency in financial markets: if in capital 
markets it is assumed that greater transparency will lead to more efficient and effective 
markets (Macintosh & Quattrone, 2010), it is the same with respect to democracy, where 
it is assumed that more transparency will lead to a healthier, more just and equitable 
democracy (Mehrpouya & Salles-Djelic, 2014). And yet, at the level of practices of 
transparency – how we interact with transparency in the realm of everyday material 
practice – the link between democracy and transparency is seldom investigated. Rather, 
transparency, fallaciously equated to democratic accountability, is often investigated in 
theory, as an ideal, a concept or as a rationality. It is my aim to address this, especially 
insofar as the transparency that is presented to the citizenry – unlike the way in which, in 
an organisation, my own conduct is made visible to another who has the power to judge 
and act in relation to it – is shorn from an immediate outlet or channel through which I 
may judge and act upon the conduct of the state made visible. 
In doing so, I reflect, in a wider sense, on the fate of democracy under neoliberalism 
(Brown, 2015, 2019), but I also talk directly to a seminal paper in the accounting literature, 
Nikolas Rose’s Governing by Numbers: Figuring Out Democracy (1991). I set out to challenge 
and critique the theorisation of the operation of democracy that is proposed by Rose. Of 
course, much of the contemporary accounting literature in critical and interdisciplinary 
research draws its theoretical basis from this and similar works – why, then, am I setting 
out to criticise it? 
My critique of Rose is founded in a scepticism of the extent to which ‘calculation’ is an 
appropriate descriptor for the subjectivity of the individuals who together make up the 
demos on society. Calculation is, for Rose, central to the operation of liberal democracies: 
Democracy, if it be taken seriously as an art of government rather than as philosophy 
or rhetoric, depends upon the delicate composition of relations of number and 
numeracy enabling a calculated and calculating government to be exercised over the 
persons and events to be governed. Democracy in its modern, mass, liberal forms 
requires a pedagogy of numeracy to keep citizens numerate and calculating, requires 
experts to inculcate calculative techniques into politicians and entrepreneurs, requires 
a public habitat of numbers. Democratic mentalities of government prioritize and seek 
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to produce a relationship between numerate citizens, numericized civic discourse, and 
numerical evaluations of government. 
(Rose, 1991, p. 691) 
Recalling my earlier remarks on the state, I contend that expressing the relation between 
democracy, citizen and state (or, for Rose, government) as one in which individual citizens 
are inculcated in a public habitat of numbers, as one that requires “citizens who calculate 
about power” (Rose, 1991, p. 675), glosses the material and symbolic power of the state, as 
ruler, over its citizens. But my central quarrel with Rose’s theorisation of the subjectivity 
of citizens relates to the extent to which he posits a democratic subject whose relation to 
power is one that can be codified within a pedagogy of numeracy and a rubric of rational 
calculation – or, put differently, of citizens as ‘calculating selves’ (Miller & O’Leary, 1987; 
Miller & Power, 2013). Such a theorisation, to my mind, reproduces the fiction inherent in 
the abstract citizen of liberalism who is free, equal, autonomous, rational, and self-
interested. Such a freedom is little more than an appearance, “a seeming freedom” 
(Horkheimer, 1972), one that glosses social and material inequalities and vanquishes these 
into the murky idealistic realm of ‘equal rights’ (Brown, 1995, pp. 96-134). As I earlier 
remarked, and in line with my theorisation of the state and its basis of authority, I contend 
that the relation of the citizen to democracy and the state is one best explained not by 
abstract imageries of freedom and autonomy and practices and processes of calculation, 
but by categories of domination, (mis)recognition and unquestioning belief. In this sense, I 
write within the tradition of Left-critique of liberal democracy as a husk for capitalist 
exploitation and domination, and of liberal, parliamentary democracy as capitalist (Brown, 
2005; Dean, 2012; Žižek, 2002). 
2.5.2. CONCLUDING SUMMARY 
In this literature review, I began by positioning accounting as an evolving, social, 
subjective and political craft. I then sketched out the state of extant literature in 
accounting on neoliberalism, the state and transparency. In the section prior to this, I 
proposed three contributions to the accounting literature related to my research questions 
and informed by the positions outlined in the preceding sections. I proposed to contribute 
to the literature by examining the relations between transparency – as it is constituted 
through an array of accounting technologies – and aesthetics, subjects and democracy. 
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The thread running between these proposed contributions relates to how the appearance 
of power, the way power is made visible, is implicated in its exercise and preservation. 
The relation between visibility and power is a classic theme of Western philosophy, critical 
theory and in the accounting literature, and I have proposed that this is also central to 
how we understand transparency. In my reading of power, specifically concerning the 
domination of the state over its subjects, I regard contemporary practices of transparency 
as interested, that the production of transparency has developed into something that is in 
the interests of the sustenance of domination. This, however, has not always been the 
case. As I now move on to discuss, historical practices of transparency, where 
transparency was experienced in its purest form – in the laying bare of social, political and 
economic conditions – was productive of radical, revolutionary energies. In the next 
chapter, I contrast the historical practices of transparency with contemporary ones, 
creating a tension between directly lived, or visceral, corporeal transparency with 
represented, or visual and digital transparency; whilst the former laid bare the violence of 
the state in barbarity and brutality, the latter mystifies this in pixels and bytes.
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3. THEORISING NEOLIBERALISM, THE STATE, AND STATE 
TRANSPARENCY 
In this thesis, I engage with a series of subjects that require clear and detailed theorisation. 
I am here referring to my engagement with neoliberalism, the state, and state transparency. 
Similarly, the theoretical lens I use to interrogate these subjects – a particular reading of 
ideology as spectacle – is itself one that requires careful and precise development. As such, 
in this chapter I set out my theoretical positioning on neoliberalism (3.1), the state (3.2), 
and state transparency (3.3), before proceeding in the following chapter to lay out my 
theoretical understanding of ideology and spectacle (see chapter 4., ‘Theorising 
transparency as ideology and spectacle’). 
3.1. THEORISING NEOLIBERALISM 
As earlier noted (see section 2.2), scholarship on neoliberalism in accounting and in the 
wider academy is fractured over the question of if and how to study neoliberalism (for 
particularly empassioned moves against the study of neoliberalism, see Dunn, 2017; 
Rodgers, 2018). In this section, I set out my theoretical position on the study of 
neoliberalism, answering the simple question – ‘What do you mean by neoliberalism?’ My 
answer to this is informed by aspects of the two ‘poles’ of scholarship on neoliberalism 
as proposed by Loïc Wacquant (2012) in his influential essay Three steps to a historical 
anthropology of actually existing neoliberalism. I begin by discussing the theoretical foundations 
and weaknesses of the two poles (3.1.1), moving next to make a case for a union of these 
perspectives (3.1.2), concluding this section by setting out my own theoretical perspective 
(3.1.3). 
3.1.1. TWO POLES: NEOLIBERALISM AS ‘MARKET RULE’ AND ‘GOVERNMENTALITY’ 
(i) As hegemonic market rule. 
To begin, I consider those conceptualising neoliberalism as a hegemonic mode of political 
economy of market rule, who draw their theoretical framings from works by David 
Harvey (2003, 2005, 2007), Daniel Stedman Jones (2012), Gérard Duménil and 
Dominique Lévy (2011), Noam Chomsky (1999) and Philip Mirowski (2013; Mirowski & 
Plehwe, 2009). What unites these scholars is the centrality afforded to capitalist relations 
of production – the capitalist mode of political economy – as the dominant force in 
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society, constituting and reproducing repressive and exploitative class divisions and social, 
economic and political inequalities. It is worth noting at this stage that I have not 
designated this group as ‘Marxist’, which could be considered somewhat surprising given 
the extent to which they emphasise the centrality of a hegemonic mode of capitalism as 
the distinctive feature of neoliberalism. Indeed, though David Harvey is avowedly a 
Marxist scholar (see in particular: Harvey, 2010, 2018), the others, whilst expressing 
sympathies for or affinities with Marxist categories of analysis (class war, labour, 
exploitation, struggle, ideology, and so on), are not ‘Marxist’ per se. 
Each of these scholars is concerned with, albeit in different ways, the relation between 
material economic conditions and the movements of history. As such, neoliberal 
capitalism is broadly theorised as a global historical project for the “reconstitution of 
naked class power” (Harvey, 2005), class power that was threatened and weakened in the 
post-war period (1945-1970) by: Keynesian political economy, victories made by the 
working classes in securing progressive modes of wealth redistribution (through the 
historical establishment of various sources of material security, primarily in the 
establishment of welfare states and powerful trade unions) and in the election of anti-
capitalist, socialist administrations in Latin America, Africa, Asia and the Caribbean 
(Chomsky, 1999). In an understanding of neoliberalism as a historically specific, 
hegemonic mode of market rule, the mode of capitalism that emerges once democratically 
elected socialist regimes are deposed and material forms of social security eviscerated is 
regarded as a particularly nasty, ascetic, cruel version of capitalism (Giroux, 2005). The 
material conditions of this form of capitalism, in terms of the absence or severely depleted 
state of the social welfare ‘safety-net’ and gross levels of social and economic inequality 
generated, could been likened to the form of capitalism theorised by Max Weber in The 
Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1930). As McChesney (1998, pp. 8-9, emphasis 
added) writes: 
Earlier in the twentieth century some critics called fascism “capitalism with the gloves 
off,” meaning that fascism was pure capitalism without democratic rights and 
organizations. In fact, we know that fascism is vastly more complex than that. 
Neoliberalism, on the other hand, is indeed “capitalism with the gloves off.” It represents an era 
in which business forces are stronger and more aggressive, and face less organized 
opposition than ever before. In this political climate they attempt to codify their 
political power on every possible front, and as a result, make it increasingly difficult 
to challenge business – and next to impossible – for non-market, non-commercial, 
and democratic forces to exist at all. 
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If neoliberalism as a hegemonic political economy of market rule is primarily theorised in 
terms of material capitalist forces and relations of production and their attendant class 
relations, antagonisms and inequalities, it is also, as evidenced in Harvey’s remarks, about 
ideology: 
It has been part of the genius of neoliberal theory to provide a benevolent mask full 
of wonderful-sounding words like freedom, liberty, choice, and rights, to hide the grim 
realities of the restoration or reconstitution of naked class power, locally as well as 
transnationally, but most particularly in the main financial centres of global capitalism. 
(Harvey, 2005, p. 119) 
Therefore, whilst maintaining the centrality of the material and the historical in the study 
of neoliberalism, attention is also devoted to tracing the individual intellectual and 
institutional origins of neoliberalism. These origins are traced first to the Mont Pèlerin 
Society and the Chicago School and in the diffusion of neoliberal ideas by leading figures 
Friedrich von Hayek and Milton Friedman. Thereafter, neoliberal ideas have been traced 
to a multitude of national and international institutions and ‘think-tanks’, such as the 
World Trade Organization, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the 
Institute for Economic Affairs and the Adam Smith Institute (Harvey, 2007; Miller, 2010; 
Mirowski & Plehwe, 2009). In other words, whilst those who theorise neoliberalism as a 
mode of hegemonic market rule are focused on the interplay of material conditions and 
history, they are also concerned with the spread of neoliberalism as a ‘doctrine’, a 
mythology of prosperity that valorises neoclassical economic tropes, as a utopian ideology 
that: demonises ‘big government’ (Friedman, 1993); assaults bureaucracy as an 
impediment to the entrepreneurial spirit (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992; Osborne & Plastrik, 
1997); and asserts that the unimpeded operations of ‘free’ and ‘deregulated’ markets is the 
route to human and social progress (Friedman, 1962; Friedman & Friedman, 1980; Hayek, 
1944). 
This concern for the ideological formations and effects of neoliberalism is an important 
point to note, for at times those adopting a market rule approach are reproached for 
circulating a crude, ‘economistic’ understanding of neoliberalism, in effect reducing 
neoliberalism to a ‘bundle of economic policies’ (Brown, 2018b; Peck, 2013; Wacquant, 
2012). Indeed, particularly crude approaches operate on a strict basis of ‘neoliberalism = 
privatisation + deregulation’, and vice versa. Hostility towards simplistic and reductive 
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theorising of neoliberalism – where neoliberalism is theorised only as a historically specific 
form of capitalism and studied only in relation to regulatory manoeuvrings, privatisations, 
pro-corporate tax policies, trading agreements and economic statistics – is certainly 
justified, as such a narrow approach obscures or ignores altogether the effects of 
neoliberalism on subjectivities. 
Whilst the role of ideology is certainly not afforded the same prominence as material and 
economic forces, the market rule approach still, in places, maintains a need for 
investigating and critiquing the ideological, as well as the material, features of 
neoliberalism as a global political-economic orthodoxy (e.g. Harvey, 2005, esp. pp. 39-
63). Some efforts to delve into the theory and ideas of neoliberalism manifest in works 
that flicker with conspiratorial sentiment (Peck, 2013, p. 134). In this regard, it is 
interesting to note that the covers of David Harvey’s A Brief History of Neoliberalism (2005), 
Daniel Stedman Jones’ Masters of the Universe (2012) and Philip Mirowski and Dieter 
Plehwe’s The Road from Mont Pèlerin (2009) are all adorned with images of neoliberal 
‘villains’ or ‘figureheads’: for Harvey (Reagan, Xiaoping, Pinochet, and Thatcher); for 
Stedman Jones (Hayek, Friedman, Thatcher, and Reagan) and for Mirowski and Plehwe 
(a photo of a group of members of the Mont Pèlerin Society). What makes this especially 
revealing is that those who theorise neoliberalism as ‘governmentality’ attribute relatively 
little or no such ‘intellectual agency’ to individuals or institutions in the same way as do 
those who theorise neoliberalism as a hegemonic political economy of market rule. This 
is reflected, in an admittedly small way, in the corresponding absence of any ‘neoliberal 
founders’ on the covers of the works of the leading proponents of treatments of 
neoliberalism as governmentality (Michel Foucault and laterally, Collier, Miller, Ong and 
Rose). This is partly a methodological issue – to do with a specific Foucauldian 
theorisation of the operation of power that I will discuss later in this thesis – but it is also 
related to a sound, justifiable reluctance to sketch out neoliberalism as a kind of dastardly, 
malevolent master plan for the conquer of the globe (Stedman Jones’ 2012 book title, 
Masters of the Universe (2012), is telling in this regard): 
Neoliberalization cannot be reduced to a unidirectional process of enacting a master 
plan cooked up by Hayek and friends at their mountain resort in Mont Pelerin, 
deviations from which stand as variants or refutations of ‘neoliberal theory’. 
(Peck, 2013, p. 145) 
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The mistake made in ‘intellectual histories’ of neoliberalism – where neoliberal theory is 
conflated with neoliberal ideology – is to mischievously imply that Hayek, Friedman and 
their contemporaries would be satisfied with the “actually existing” social, political and 
economic conditions of today. Thus, Wendy Brown (2018b) writes: 
My argument is not that Hayek, Friedman, and the ordoliberals – the founding 
neoliberal intellectuals – were against democracy or wanted plutocrats to control 
society in order to enrich themselves. In many ways, what has unfolded in “actually 
existing neoliberalism” would be appalling to these founders. They did not want to 
see political life fused with economic life. They certainly did not want populist 
sentiments animating politics or legitimating governing. They did not want economic 
interests monopolizing policy either. They understood all of these things to be 
dangerous, as things that could lead to fascism. 
(Brown, 2018b)9 
Perhaps a more fruitful and substantive critique of the market rule approach can be 
directed towards the notion of ideology as it is conceived by those rooted in this approach 
who venture to engage with the study of neoliberalism beyond its material instantiations. 
By and large, this is a notion of ideology that remains rooted in a ‘classic’ Marxist 
understanding, where ideology is treated as an essentially deceiving, mystifying or 
obfuscating force (as in The German Ideology). In contrast, a more sophisticated and 
contemporary theorising of ideology, such as that advanced by members of the Frankfurt 
School (see Adorno & Horkheimer, 1969, particularly The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as 
Mass Deception, pp. 120-167) or by neo- or post-Marxist scholars (Althusser, 2008, 2014; 
Žižek, 1989, 1997), would insist upon treating ideology as a world-making, constitutive 
force, that ideology “interpellates” its subjects, “hailing” them. In other words, for those 
studying neoliberalism as a hegemonic mode of market rule, there is a propensity to treat 
neoliberal ideology as concealing or hiding ‘real’ social, political and economic relations, 
rather than seeing that ideology as a force that is productive of them (see Brown, 1995, p. 
142; also, Giddens, 1983). 
(ii) As governmentality. 
 
9 Brown explores this theme in more depth in her most recent work, In the Ruins of Neoliberalism: The Rise of 
Antidemocratic Politics in the West (2019). 
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Now, to the question of what neoliberalism ‘is’ in a governmentality approach. Perhaps 
the most immediately striking aspect that distinguishes study of neoliberalism as 
governmentality from an approach to neoliberalism as a hegemonic mode of market rule 
is the absence of a place for capitalism (Brown, 2015). As Chiapello (2017, p. 53) states, 
with respect to the study of neoliberalism as governmentality, “the association with 
capitalism is here largely non-existent”. Given that capitalism is installed as the central 
force in the market rule approach to neoliberalism, how is neoliberalism theorised by 
those who study it through the lens of governmentality? Put differently, if we were to 
amputate from the market rule approach its essential theoretical core, how would we then 
approach the theorisation of neoliberalism? 
To begin, it is necessary to note the extent to which the theoretical positioning and 
methodological foundations adopted in the study of neoliberalism as governmentality is 
absolutely indissociable from the methodological and theoretical basis of its central 
intellectual figure: Michel Foucault. Foucault – who openly and deliberately refrained 
from engaging with categories central to Marxist or post-Marxist research, such as 
domination, exploitation, class, capital, interest, and the state (Foucault, 1977, 1990a) – 
came to work on neoliberalism later in his life, with his work on the subject being set out 
in a lecture series entitled The Birth of Biopolitics (Foucault, 2008) given at the Collège de 
France between 1978-1979. The Birth of Biopolitics lectures, says Wacquant (2012, p. 69), 
“have inspired a general research programme on ‘governmentality’ as the art of shaping 
populations (subjection) and the self (subjectification).” As a research programme, the 
study of neoliberalism as governmentality has developed and expanded on the initial 
foundations laid by Foucault, with significant theoretical contributions being made in this 
area by Aihwa Ong (Collier & Ong, 2005; Ong, 2006), Nikolas Rose (Barry, Obsorne, & 
Rose, 1996; Rose, 1990, 1999; Rose & Miller, 1992), Peter Miller (Miller, 1987; Miller & 
O’Leary, 1987; Miller & Rose, 1990) and Stephen Collier (2005, 2009, 2011, 2012). Again, 
as earlier noted, accounting scholars have played a significant role in the advancement of 
this research programme. 
An important note must be entered now on the nature of governmentality as a technique 
of power: governmentality has no specifically neoliberal ‘essence’ as such (Hoskin & Macve, 
1988; Wacquant, 2012). Whilst we may study neoliberal governmentality, we may just as 
easily study liberal governmentality or socialist governmentality; in other words, 
53 
 
governmentality constitutes a specific mode of the exercise of power. Governmentality – 
without prefix – refers to the ‘conduct of conduct’ (Lemke, 2002). As Wendy Brown 
explains succinctly, governmentality is 
Foucault’s term for an important historical shift in the operation and orientation of 
the state and political power in modernity. This is a shift away from sovereignty and 
its signature – “do this or die” – to what Foucault calls governing through “the 
conduct of conduct” – “this is how you live.” Put differently, governmentality 
represents a shift away from the power of command and punishment targeting 
particular subjects and toward the power of conducting and compelling populations 
“at a distance”. 
(Brown, 2015, p. 117) 
What is particularly subtle and insidious about governmentality as a mode of power is the 
extent to which it contributes to the construction of the wants, needs, desires and 
thoughts of individuals who are subjected to it; that is, how they think of themselves, their 
‘subjectivity’. Just as we may speak of a person and their personality, or an individual and 
their identity, so too we may refer to a subject and their subjectivity. But what 
distinguishes ‘subject-subjectivity’ from ‘person-personality’ and ‘individual-identity’ is 
that the notion of subjectivity implies a concern for the way in which humans develop a 
conscious ‘sense of self’ or identity in relation to social, political and economic conditions, 
both in terms of their being shaped by these and their reacting against them. In constituting 
individual subjectivities, a regime of governmentality appears to “govern without 
governing” (Read, 2009, p. 29), i.e. its effects are immaterial and imperceptible, insofar as 
individuals ‘behave’ in a deeply structured and constructed manner, which, though 
perceived (by them) as ‘natural’, is the result of a series of non-invasive interventions 
(Brown, 2018b). In this respect, Foucault’s notion of governmentality is an appreciation 
of the sinister case of subjects who no longer desire their own freedom, because they do 
not consider themselves as subjugated (Brown, 2015, p. 111); this, among other things, is 
a key distinction in Foucault’s work from that of Marx or Weber.10 
 
10 Though not from the Frankfurt School, whom Foucault expresses great affinity with and respect for: 
 
“Now, obviously, if I had been familiar with the Frankfurt School, if I had been aware of it at the time, I 
would not have said a number of stupid things that I did say and I would have avoided many of the detours 




To understand neoliberal governmentality, it is necessary to place it in historical context in 
relation to alternative modes of government and exercise of political power. 
Neoliberalism, argues Foucault, constitutes a “new liberal art of government”, emerging 
in response to the “crisis of liberalism”. By crisis, Foucault here evokes a paradoxical 
relation in which the economic interventionary measures taken by capitalist, liberal-
democratic states – which he places circa 1925-1960 – to secure themselves against 
“communism, socialism, National Socialism, and fascism” constitute precisely the sort of 
intervention into ‘individual freedoms’ by government that ‘liberals’ set out to avoid 
(Foucault, 2008, p. 69). 
The ‘new art of government’ that emerges in response to the ‘crisis of liberalism’ eschews 
the essential dimension of classical liberalism, that of minimising state intervention to its 
absolute lowest level, in order to establish a mode of political power “modelled on the 
principles of a market economy” (Foucault, 2008, pp. 133, 131). However, Foucault 
(2008, p. 130) warns that the allusion made to the ‘market economy’ should not fool us 
into over-eager associations between neoliberalism and the critical and analytical 
frameworks that would approach neoliberalism as a problematic of: laissez-faire economics, 
capitalism as “denounced in Book I of Capital”, or as “a generalized administrative 
intervention by the state which is all the more profound for being insidious and hidden 
beneath the appearances of a neo-liberalism”. Put differently: 
Neo-liberalism is not Adam Smith; neo-liberalism is not market society; neo-liberalism 
is not the Gulag on the insidious scale of capitalism. 
(Foucault, 2008, p. 131) 
 
up by the Frankfurt School. It is a strange case of non-penetration between two very similar types of 
thinking which is explained, perhaps, by that very similarity. Nothing hides the fact of a problem in common 
better than two similar ways of approaching it” (Foucault, 1990b, p. 26). 
 
Indeed, in Dialectic of Enlightenment (first published in 1944), Adorno and Horkheimer (1969, p. 133) affirm 
de Tocqueville’s thesis on the nature of modern power, a thesis Foucault would surely accord with: 
“The analysis Tocqueville offered a century ago has in the meantime proved wholly accurate. Under the 
private culture monopoly it is a fact that ‘tyranny leaves the body free and directs its attack at the soul. The 
ruler no longer says: You must think as I do or die. He says: You are free not to think as I do; your life, 
your property, everything shall remain yours, but from this day on you are a stranger among us.’ Not to 
conform means to be rendered powerless, economically and therefore spiritually – to be ‘self-employed’.” 
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Foucault is determined to emphasise that neoliberalism is distinct from classical liberalism 
(Smith), rampant, ‘vampire-like’, advanced capitalism (Marx), and total administration or 
rationalisation of society (Weber). For Foucault, neoliberalism constitutes a distinct break 
or shift in the exercise of (political) power.11 Therefore, the question for Foucault, and for 
scholars of neoliberalism as governmentality more broadly, is not to establish ‘in whose 
interest’ or ‘to what end’ political power is exercised in neoliberalism, but to understand 
the way it operates, to understand how political power is exercised in neoliberalism. Thus, 
Foucault explains that for neoliberals the question is not ‘to intervene or not’ – again, the 
classic dilemma of liberalism as it relates to government and the state – but how to 
intervene: 
As you know, broadly speaking the problem of the liberalism of the eighteenth century 
and the start of the nineteenth century to distinguish between actions that must be 
taken and actions that must not be taken, between domains in which one can intervene 
and domains in which one cannot intervene. This was the distinction between the 
agenda and the non-agenda. This is a naïve position in the eyes of the neo-liberals, for 
whom the problem is not whether there are things that you cannot touch and others 
that you are entitled to touch. The problem is how you touch them. The problem is the way of 
doing things, the problem, if you like, of governmental style. 
(Foucault, 2008, p. 133, emphasis added) 
In this respect the works of Osborne and Gaebler (1992), Reinventing Government: How the 
Entrepreneurial Spirit is Transforming the Public Sector, and Osborne and Plastrik (1997) 
Banishing Bureaucracy: The Five Strategies for Reinventing Government are the archetype of the 
neoliberal approach to the question of government: government should be reformed, 
entrepreneurialised, marketised, de-bureaucratised, and so on – but it should not be 
destroyed. Government is to be preserved as a mechanism of rule, where the question is 
not ‘how much government is palatable’, but ‘what type of government do we want?’ 
What, then, distinguishes this new style, type, or art of government? In what constitutes 
a significant epistemological distinction between those who consider neoliberalism as 
market rule, neoliberalism as governmentality focuses on the discursive, rather than the 
 
11 An interest in the modes and effects of political power is a recurring theme in Foucault’s work, particularly 
so in Discipline and Punish (1977) and The History of Sexuality (1990a). 
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material, nature of power; that is, the extent to which power is exercised through language 
(Rose, 1999). 
But what of critique of this perspective? If the market rule approach is attacked for an 
‘economistic’ analysis, or an underdeveloped notion of ideology, in what form do we find 
opposition to the theorisation of neoliberalism as governmentality? Wacquant (2012), for 
example, expresses concern with the extent to which accounting technologies are 
regarded as productive of explicitly neoliberal relations of governmentality; he argues that 
it is unclear what makes a technology of conduct neoliberal: certainly, such 
bureaucratic techniques as the audit, performance indicators and benchmarks 
(favourites of the neo-Foucauldian anthropology of neoliberalism) can be used to 
bolster or foster other logics, as can actuarial techniques. Similarly, there is nothing 
about norms of transparency, accountability and efficiency that makes them necessary 
boosters to commodification: in China, for instance, they have been rolled out to 
pursue patrimonial goals and to reinscribe socialist ideals (Kipnis, 2008). 
(Wacquant, 2012, p. 70)12 
This, in fact, leads Wacquant to sound a second, methodological note of critique in relation 
to the study of neoliberalism as governmentality, one that he shares with Jamie Peck.13 
Wacquant (2012, p. 70) argues that 
as technologies of conduct ‘migrate’ and ‘mutate’, neoliberalism is found to be 
everywhere and nowhere at the same time. It becomes all process and no contents; it 
resides in flowing form without substance, pattern or direction. In the end, then, the 
governmentality school gives us a conception of neoliberalism just as thin as that 
propounded by the economic orthodoxy it wishes to overturn. 
And in a similar vein Peck (2013, p. 150, emphasis added) writes: 
The indiscriminate cry that ‘Neoliberalism did it’ belongs in the same family as the ‘I 
blame Thatcher’ denunciations of old; who did what, to whom, where, and how must be 
specified in social, economic, and institutional terms. 
 
12 Whilst I share in much of the spirit of Wacquant’s critique, his position on the notion of transparency 
simplifies what is, for me, a much more complicated question around the function and use of transparency 
as a contemporary tool of governance (Mehrpouya & Salles-Djelic, 2014, 2019). Part of my core argument 
is that institutions and organisations that make no claim to being democratic, or have no concern with or 
interest in establishing social and political legitimacy, need not project an image of transparency. 
13 This is related to a much broader critique of Foucault’s conception of power, associated with the infamous 
‘power is everywhere’ statement made in The History of Sexuality (Foucault, 1990a, p. 93). 
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Peck’s critique is echoed in the accounting literature, in which Cooper (2015b, p. 22) calls 
for more research on neoliberalism in the governmentality or (neo-) Foucauldian tradition 
that empathises with humans and gives consideration to the operations of neoliberalism at 
the level of practice (rather than tracing its rationalities), being mindful of how these differ 
across lines of class, gender, age, sexuality, and race. 
Finally, it is necessary to address what we could perhaps call ‘the absent Other’ in works 
on governmentality: capitalism. Given the extent to which neoliberalism as governmentality 
is based on a theory of applying ‘the market’ or ‘market-relations’ to all spheres of life, the 
omission of capitalism from these analyses introduces a serious theoretical deficiency 
insofar as ‘markets’ in society are today, almost without exception, operated in accordance 
with capitalist political economy. If conceived as governmentality, it is imperative that 
neoliberalism is also understood in its relation to capitalism, otherwise we will miss the 
extent to which it seeks to reorganise life itself around the processes and imperatives of 
capitalism: capital accumulation and the pursuit of profit (Brown, 2015, 2019). Without 
reference to its specifically capitalist imperatives and value structures, neoliberal 
governmentality – and, by implication, our study of it in the accounting literature – is 
insufficiently distinguished from other modern regimes of governmentality that seek to 
inscribe and inculcate ideals that are diametrically opposed or openly hostile to capitalism. 
It is worth quoting Brown at length here, such is the eloquence of her theoretical coupling 
of Marx and Foucault: 
Capital, and not only the articulation of it in economic reason and governance, 
dominates the human beings and human worlds it organizes. If this aspect is omitted 
in the theorization of neoliberalism, which is what occurs in these lectures (partly 
because Foucault is seeking to trace a political rationality and not aiming to describe a 
form of capitalism, but also because of his profound antagonism toward Marxism at 
this point in his life), we will not grasp the intricate dynamics between the political 
rationality and the economic constraints, and we will also not grasp the extent and 
depth of neoliberalism’s power in making this world and unfreedom within it. 
  (Brown, 2015, p. 76) 
Relating this to a more concrete context, it might be said, for example, that if we do not 
understand neoliberalism as it relates to capitalism we would miss appreciating the degree 
to which neoliberalism marketizes and profits from the very inequalities and ills generated 
by the capitalist system, most notably with the commercialisation of responses to 
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environmental destruction (‘capitalism may have been the problem, but it is also the 
solution’), of feminism (with the rise of neoliberal feminists adept at monetizing their 
‘brand’ of feminism through YouTube, packaging this as ‘empowerment’), and of 
homelessness (the privatisation of social housing schemes and securitization of homeless 
people). 
3.1.2. CHARTING A VIA MEDIA 
To polarise scholarship on neoliberalism in and beyond the accounting academy as 
gathered at two poles marked as ‘market rule’ and ‘governmentality’ is, of course, to 
reduce the complexity of a debate that is clearly not as simple as two camps warring over 
who is ‘right’. Fractures undoubtedly exist within perspectives, and some theorisations are 
markedly ill-suited to being positioned at one or other pole. Nonetheless, I align with 
Jamie Peck’s analysis on the state of research on neoliberalism, where he argues that 
it is almost as if there is a fork in the road, between those who would take a political-
economic or macroinstitutionalist path and those pursuing more particularized 
approaches, often in a poststructuralist and/or ethnographic vein (with the latter being 
different paths to the usually more-provisional recognition of neoliberal influences or 
inflections in particular or localized settings). 
(Peck, 2013, p. 141) 
Here, I have schematised this “fork in the road” by drawing on Loïc Wacquant’s Three 
steps to a historical anthropology of actually existing neoliberalism (2012), but, as the reader will 
have noticed, I have also drawn heavily on Jamie Peck and Wendy Brown in setting out 
the field of approaches to and critiques of theorisations of neoliberalism. Common to the 
works of Brown, Peck and Wacquant is a theoretical dexterity and intellectual openness 
that leads them to produce understandings on neoliberalism that do not remain confined 
to one or other academic silo. As earlier discussed, Brown’s welding of Marxist with 
Foucauldian thought is an especially elegant of example of this dexterity. And so, with the 
help of Brown, Peck and Wacquant, I construct a bridge – in Wacquant’s (2012, p. 71) 
terms, a “via media” – between the approaches to neoliberalism as hegemonic political 
economy of market rule and as governmentality by considering neoliberalism as a project 
to stamp the market onto the citizen through the state. 
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Following Wacquant (2012), I therefore argue that neoliberalism, although a “stuttering”, 
“zigzagging” process (Peck, 2013, p. 140), a “weasel word, unruly signifier, and rascal 
concept” (Peck & Theodore, 2019, p. 255), a “a loose and shifting signifier” (Brown, 2015, 
p. 20), 
nonetheless has an institutional core that makes it distinct and recognisable. This core 
consists of an articulation of state, market, and citizenship that harnesses the first to impose 
the stamp of the second onto the third. 
(Wacquant, 2012, p. 71) 
I build this theoretical bridge insofar as I require aspects of both approaches to 
neoliberalism in order to enquire into the role played by accounting in a neoliberal society. 
I argue that, on the one hand, without an understanding of neoliberalism as it relates to 
capitalism, we “will not grasp the intricate dynamics between the political rationality and 
the economic constraints, and we will also not grasp the extent and depth of 
neoliberalism’s power in making this world and unfreedom within it” (Brown, 2015, p. 
76). And, on the other, without an understanding of neoliberalism as a governmentality – 
or, more precisely, a ‘political rationality’ – we will fail to appreciate the peculiar and novel 
subjectivities produced by neoliberalism, especially individualised, entrepreneurialised and 
responsibilised selves. 
This latter point is worth stressing, as it is a crucial component in the make-up and 
trajectory of my thesis as a whole. It is essential that the world-making features of 
neoliberalism are acknowledged because these construct subjects whose wants, needs and 
desires are increasingly structured by capitalist categories: 
Weber and Marx assume a political exterior and subjective interior that is 
disharmonious with capitalism – political life featuring at least the promise of freedom, 
equality and popular sovereignty and a figure of subjective personhood bound to 
ideals of worth, dignity, self-direction, even soulfulness. It is precisely such an exterior 
and interior that neoliberal reason’s configuration of states, citizens and souls in the 
image of homo oeconomicus, and elimination of homo politicus, threaten to extinguish. 
(Brown, 2015, p. 111) 
The next question must be, then, how is this ‘neoliberal citizen’ constructed? How is homo 
politicus – a citizen whose existence is determined by categories that extend well beyond 
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those of market capitalism – threatened by homo oeconomicus? My answer to this is to 
emphasise the active role the state plays in this process. However, in introducing the state 
in an active capacity, a tension is created in terms of the way the state is theorised by 
Foucault. Similarly, modification will also be needed to address the nature of this process, 
theorised by Wacquant as an inherently brutal ‘stamping’ of the market onto the citizen. 
3.1.3. HARNESSING THE STATE TO STAMP THE MARKET ONTO THE CITIZEN AND SEEP 
THE MARKET INTO THE CITIZEN 
If the absent ‘Other’ in Foucault’s theorisation of neoliberalism is capitalism (or Marx), 
then it might reasonably be said that the surprise guest is the state. The state, along with 
capitalism, was a category or object that Foucault expressly avoided in the vast majority 
of his work. However, in The Birth of Biopolitics the state features frequently – not as an 
object of analysis as such, but as a significant constituent in Foucault’s theoretical 
engagement with neoliberalism. Still, a particular series of theoretical and methodological 
commitments relating to the nature of power and the political exercise of power restrict 
Foucault from affording the state an active role in the constitution of neoliberal subjects. 
I argue, however, that to understand neoliberalism the state must be assigned a prominent 
position as a force that acts on subjects. Rather than treating the state as a constituent of 
a ‘loose assemblage’ or ‘diffuse network’ of actors, apparatuses, devices and technologies 
that comprise the field of power, I conceptualise the state as a ruling, dominant force that 
exerts authority over its subjects.14 Thus, contrary to misconceptions around the ‘roll-
back’ of the state, neoliberalism has always been related to the “crafting” and 
“redeployment” of the state (Wacquant, 1999, 2010a): 
Neoliberalism is not an economic but a political project; it entails not the dismantling 
but the reengineering of the state. 
(Wacquant, 2012, p. 71)15 
 
14 The next section, 2.3 ‘Accounting and the state’, will explicate my position on the state in detail. 
15 In In the Ruins of Neoliberalism (2019), Wendy Brown acknowledges that her earlier work on neoliberalism, 
Undoing the Demos (2015), was insufficiently sensitive to the active role of the state in producing and securing 
neoliberalism: “something I didn’t emphasise adequately in 2015 but would now stress, is the extent to 
which neoliberalism could generate a political formation that combined libertarianism with a very strong 
statism that works to secure, essentially, the deregulated public sphere that neoliberalism itself generated” 
(Brown, 2018c, p. 14). 
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Furthermore, whilst it is apposite to say the state has not been ‘rolled-back’ as a whole, it is 
necessary to recognise the extent to which the ‘state crafting’ and ‘reengineering’ spoken 
of by Wacquant entails the strengthening of the state in its repressive, penal violent 
faculties, with the social, collective, protective functions being simultaneously weakened 
or eroded (Bourdieu, 1998a, pp. 1-10). As Peck and Theodore (2019, p. 249) argue: 
Projects of neoliberalization, it has been fairly clear all along to those willing to see, 
have never been synonymous with a simple diminution, or withdrawal, of the state, but 
instead have been variously concerned with its capture and reuse, albeit in the context 
of a generalized assault on social-welfarist or left-arm functions, coupled with an 
expansion of right-arm roles and capacities in areas like policing and surveillance, 
incarceration and social control, and the military. 
However, to focus only on the material aspects of reengineering and redeployment of the 
state – the withering of the social and swelling of the repressive functions – would be to 
give a partial answer as to how homo politicus is threatened by homo oeconomicus. I want to 
modify the thesis, advanced by Wacquant, that the state ‘stamps’ the market onto citizens, 
adding to this the essential notion, picked up on by Foucault, that neoliberalism relates to 
a shift in art or style of the exercise of political power. 
What Wacquant’s allusion to ‘stamping’ the market onto the citizen obscures is the degree 
to which neoliberalism also relies on indirect modes of intervention into the lives of 
citizens, measures that are subtle and discreet. ‘Stamping’ implies a brutality of force that 
is certainly a feature of neoliberalism (Wacquant, 2008, 2009b), but neoliberalism’s 
reconfiguration of citizens as homo oeconomicus – that is, its reconstitution of subjectivities 
– operates also in an insidious, quiet mode, reshaping what citizens think is normal, 
acceptable and reasonable. It is no accident that the subtitle to Wendy Brown’s Undoing 
the Demos is Neoliberalism’s Stealth Revolution; indeed, in the opening chapter, Brown writes 
that: 
This book is a theoretical consideration of the ways that neoliberalism, a peculiar form 
of reason that configures all aspects of existence in economic terms, is quietly undoing 
basic elements of democracy. 
(Brown, 2015, p. 17, emphasis added) 
Therefore, if neoliberalism, operates on two levels – the material and the symbolic – it 
might well be said that austerity, privatisation, depletion of social security and so on, are 
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the brutal sledgehammer (material), whilst the reconstitution of subjectivities, reshaping of 
citizens as homo oeconomicus, is the poisonous gas, seeping into the citizenry (symbolic). It is at 
this point possible to restate Wacquant’s formulation on neoliberalism with my own 
modification: 
Neoliberalism consists in an articulation of state, market and citizen that harnesses the 
state to stamp the market onto and seep the market into the citizen. 
This is my formulation in response to the question I posed some time ago, at the 
beginning of this section: ‘What do you mean by neoliberalism?’ But if I have answered 
this question, the pressing matter now is to consider what this approach to neoliberalism 
can accomplish and contribute in the study of accounting. As I set out in sections covering 
the literatures on neoliberalism as ‘market rule’ and as ‘governmentality’, much has been 
learnt about the essentially ‘violent’ means by which neoliberalism ‘stamps’ its authority 
on the citizen and how accounting is implicated in these actions. Likewise, we have 
developed a sophisticated understanding of how accounting is interlaced with 
neoliberalism as governmentality at the level of rationality; that is, how accounting is an 
essential component in establishing neoliberal modes of power. However, as Cooper 
(2015b) argues in her review of the literature in accounting on neoliberalism, we have a 
much less developed sense of how accounting operates at the level of practice under 
neoliberalism, and how it is that neoliberal subjectivities are produced: 
It is essential when trying to understand the practices of accounting in a neo-liberal 
world to investigate the operation of accounting at the level of practice. 
The extent to which accounting knowledge can produce altered subjectivities is an 
issue which is worthy of future research (see Armstrong, 2015). Alvesson and 
Kärreman (2004) argue that it is important to investigate how subjectivity is formed 
“empirically”. 
(Cooper, 2015b, p. 19) 
It is this less studied aspect of neoliberalism that I focus on in the thesis, namely, 
investigating the role of accounting in the constitution of neoliberal subjectivities. Of 
course, if I were to import in its entirety the theorisation of neoliberalism as 
governmentality, I would at this point draw on the Foucauldian notion of power as 
emerging through discourses that constitute subjectivities. However, as earlier noted – 
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and as will be explored in what follows – Foucault’s antipathy towards study of the state 
and explicit abandonment of the interest inherent in the ‘ruler-ruled’ relation makes a 
Foucauldian analysis of how a state ‘stamps’ a subjectivity on its citizens theoretically 
muddled, if not conceptually illogical. On this point, Wacquant asserts that an analysis of 
neoliberalism that denies a major role for the state would obscure 
what is ‘neo’ about neoliberalism, namely, the remaking and redeployment of the state as the core 
agency that actively fabricates the subjectivities, social relations and collective 
representations suited to making the fiction of markets real and consequential. 
(Wacquant, 2012, p. 68) 
Whilst I share with Wacquant the view that the state has an active role as ‘ruler’ in 
neoliberalism – which, to reiterate once more, negates for me the possibility of a 
Foucauldian reading of the state – I depart from Wacquant in terms of my approach to the 
nature of the processes through which the state fabricates subjectivities. Where Wacquant 
insists on a (coercive) ‘stamping’ of the market onto the citizen, I see this as only a part 
of the process, where the other side consists in a subtle, stealthy, seeping into the citizen 
of market values, norms and vocabularies (Brown, 2005, 2006, 2015). 
How, then, do I theorise this ‘seeping’ constitution of neoliberal subjectivities, if not 
through an appreciation of neoliberalism as governmentality? The answer: as ideology – 
where ideology is understood not only as a veil that mystifies social relations and subject 
positions, but actively fabricates them, calling them into being through interpellation: 
In Marx’s formulation of ideology as a function of class inequality, and in particular 
as consequent to the camera obscura issuing from the social division between manual 
and mental labour (see The German Ideology), ideology is that which obscures the terms 
of its own making along with the power that makes the world. But this claim, designed 
to describe the relationship of ideology to power, reveals yet does not account for the 
extraordinary power of ideology itself. In other words, what Marx did not explain, and 
what Althusser formulated the interpellative dimension of ideology to address, was 
the extent to which ideology does not simply (mis)represent the world but is itself 
productive of the world, and particularly of the subject. 
(Brown, 1995, p. 142) 
I set out a detailed discussion of theorising with and studying ideology later in the thesis, 
but for now it suffices to say that the theoretical concept of ideology is particularly well 
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suited to my theorisation of neoliberalism, inasmuch as its roots in Marx’s thought 
demand a role for capitalism and the state in its study (Althusser, 2008), both of which, I 
argue, are crucial components in understanding immanent social, political and economic 
conditions. By way of a pre-emptory signpost as to where we are headed, I am interested 
here in interrogating the way that ideological representations – specifically, accounting 
representations that are presented as ‘transparency’ – are world-making, contributing to 
the interpellation of a neoliberal citizenry (a body of citizens who think of themselves as 
customers of the state and as entrepreneurs of the self). 
A final, methodological, note is needed here before moving on to the next section. 
Though I am content to conceive of neoliberalism in “multiple-dimensions” – that is, as 
a hegemonic mode of capitalist political economy, as a market discourse, as a 
governmentality, as an ideology (Brown, 2018b) – it is arguably necessary and important 
to continue to isolate specific features of neoliberalism for study, as I do so here with 
ideology. Indeed, as Peck (2013, p. 144) ruefully remarks, adopting a ‘non-essentialist’ 
perspective on neoliberalism is “hardly a receipt, admittedly, for an easy methodological 
life”. In focusing specifically on neoliberalism as ideology, I have afforded myself the 
opportunity to develop a rich and detailed understanding of a particular aspect of 
neoliberalism that would perhaps escape our attention with the requisite theoretical and 
methodological contortions necessary to successfully execute a multi-perspectival study 
of neoliberalism. To study one aspect of neoliberalism is not to set out to ‘refute’ other 
theorisations, nor is it the same as reductive, monological or simplistic analyses that assert 
neoliberalism is only related to the object of study or that other perspectives on 
neoliberalism are “misrepresentations” – as Mirowski (2009) bluntly charges in relation 
to the theorisations of Pierre Bourdieu (1998b) and David Harvey (2005) (see Dunn, 2017, 
p. 440). It is possible, in other words, to study a specific feature of neoliberalism – like 
ideology – whilst acknowledging that the feature in question is a part of what makes 
neoliberalism powerful. 
I move now to elaborate my theory of the state. Up to this point, I have hinted at the 
categories associated with theorising the state – alluding at various moments to differences 
in the way power is seen as operating – without explicitly engaging with these problems. 
Insofar as speaking of neoliberalism demands clarification over definition, this is even 
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more the case with the state, where the state was a (disputed) category of study in academia 
long before neoliberalism. 
3.2. THEORISING THE STATE 
There are still peoples and herds somewhere, but not with us, my brothers: here there 
are states. The state? What is that? Well then! Now open your ears, for now I shall 
speak to you of the death of the peoples. The state is the coldest of all cold monsters. 
Coldly it lies, too; and this lie creeps from its mouth: ‘I, the state, am the people.’ It is 
a lie! It was creators who created peoples and hung a faith and a love over them: thus 
they served life. It is destroyers who set snares for many and call it the state: they hang 
a sword and a hundred desires over them. 
Everything about it is false; it bites with stolen teeth. Even its belly is false. 
(Nietzsche, 1969, pp. 75, 76) 
Furthermore it is evident that all forms of the state have democracy for their truth, 
and for that reason are false to the extent that they are not democracy. 
(Marx, 2009, p. 31) 
In this section, I address this simple question: What do I mean when I write ‘the state’? 
Of course, the answer to this question has important implications for the answer to a 
related question, namely – what does the state look like? To write of the state as a thing 
and to be concerned with the appearance of the state certainly requires an elucidation of 
what one means by it. To begin this task, it must first be noted that treating the state as 
an ‘it’ is not itself unproblematic; rather, to treat the state as an ‘it’ is to impart onto it a 
false coherence of ethos, identity, strategy and telos:16 
Despite the almost unavoidable tendency to speak of the state as an “it,” the domain 
we call the state is not a thing, system, or subject, but a significantly unbounded terrain 
of powers and techniques, an ensemble of discourses, rules, and practices, cohabiting 
in limited, tension-ridden, often contradictory relation with one another. 
 
16 That said, tyrannical states – the Soviet Union under Stalin, Nazi Germany under Hitler – always strove 
to maintain an appearance of a core state identity and project. This suggests that the ‘state without ends’ is 
perhaps a more modern, liberal democratic entity. Still, the notion of the state of liberalism as ‘a state 
without ends’, or that it is a ‘vacuum’ with regards to moral, social, political and economic values, is a 
dangerous misconception (e.g. Brown, 1995, pp. 135-165); rather, the state of liberalism wishes to appear as 
without ends, values, predispositions, and so on. 
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(Brown, 1995, p. 174) 
Thus, whilst I admire and sympathise with aspects of Nietzsche’s (1969) artful portrait of 
the state as “the coldest of all cold monsters” (see also Nietzsche, 1887, p. 72), particularly 
in respect to the authority of the state as a seized, violent authority, I also share Brown’s 
analysis, regarding the state as “not a thing, system, or subject”. As such, I see the state 
not as “a monolith, a coherent actor (whether operating autonomously or as the diligent 
servant of the dominant), or a single lever liable to being captured by special interests or 
movements springing from civil society”, but instead as a “space of forces and struggles over 
the very perimeter, prerogatives and priorities of public authority, and in particular over 
what ‘social problems’ deserve its attention and how they are to be treated” (Wacquant, 
2012, p. 73). In what follows, I set out my Bourdieusian theory of the state (3.2.1), 
developing this by discussing the symbolic basis of the authority of the state (3.2.2) and 
concluding this section by reflecting on the significance of the historical emergence of the 
welfare state (3.2.3). 
3.2.1. A BOURDIEUSIAN THEORY OF THE STATE 
The state is the culmination of a process of concentration of different species of capital: capital of 
physical force or instruments of coercion (army, police), economic capital, cultural or 
(better) informational capital, and symbolic capital. It is this concentration as such 
which constitutes the state as the holder of a sort of meta-capital granting power over 
other species of capital and over their holders. 
(Bourdieu, Wacquant, & Farage, 1994, p. 4) 
In his remarks on the state cited earlier, Wacquant (2012) sets out an understanding of 
the state informed by Bourdieu, specifically drawing on Bourdieu’s concept of the 
“bureaucratic field” (Bourdieu, 1998a, 1998c, 2004, 2014b; Bourdieu et al., 1994). For 
Bourdieu, the state is understood as a “collection of fields”, which can be classified into 
a schema of “The State’s right and left hands” (Bourdieu, 1998c, p. 183). ‘Right hand’ 
fields comprise of the economically-oriented and coercive functions of the state (e.g. the 
treasury, the tax authority, the judiciary, the justice system, the military). ‘Left hand’ fields 
comprise of the socially-oriented and protective functions of the state (e.g. the health-
service, the education system, social welfare institutions). Within each bureaucratic field, 
there is a co-axial pair of “battles” for power. There is a “vertical battle” for power 
between “the ‘high-state nobility’ of policy-makers” and “the ‘low-state nobility’ of 
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executants” (Wacquant, 2012, p. 73). In other words, as on all fields, there is a battle 
between actors within the field, to ascend to the top of the field. There is also a “relational, 
horizontal battle” between state sub-fields for different species of capital (economic, 
social, cultural and symbolic).17 
Bourdieu’s conception of the state is itself derived from a Weber’s “classic formula” of 
the state, as set out in Politics as a Vocation: 
Today, however, we have to say that a state is a human community that (successfully) 
claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory. 
(Weber, 1970, p. 78)18 
Here is Bourdieu’s reformulation of Weber: 
Max Weber said that the state was the monopoly of legitimate violence. And I correct 
him and say it is the monopoly of legitimate physical and symbolic violence. 
(Bourdieu, 2014c, p. 346, emphasis added) 
Thus, Bourdieu does not merely adopt a Weberian reading of the state – though his works 
on the state remain, at a fundamental level, Weberian (see especially the influence of 
Weber (1970, pp. 77-128; 1978) on Bourdieu (2004); Bourdieu et al. (1994)) – rather, he 
takes it as a point of departure and moves to develop and enrich Weber’s treatment of 
the state in theoretical and historical terms. Here I focus on two aspects of that 
development – one theoretical, one historical – in order to unfold my own understanding 
of the state. The first (theoretical) development relates to Bourdieu’s (2014b, p. 4) 
insistence on the symbolic component of the authority of the state, whereby the state does 
not secure subservience through material means alone (3.2.2). The second (historical) 
development concerns Bourdieu’s incorporation of a reflection on the welfare state to his 
formulation (3.2.3). Bourdieu’s contribution is here extremely important, insofar as it 
introduces a route to theorising the state that does not force us to remain confined to 
 
17 Wacquant (2012, p. 73) states that “one can diagram neoliberalism as the systematic tilting of state 
priorities and actions from the Left hand to the Right hand, that is, from the protective (feminine and collectivizing) 
pole to the disciplinary (masculine and individualizing) pole of the bureaucratic field.” 
18 In this, Weber accords with Trotsky: “‘Every state is founded on force,’ said Trotsky at Brest-Litovsk. 
That is indeed right” (Weber, 1970, p. 78). 
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treating the state as an essentially or exclusively ‘negative’ or ‘destructive’ entity that 
administers violence and domination alone. It must be noted, however, that in simple 
chronological terms the welfare state did not exist in Weber’s lifetime,19 so his conception 
of the state is certainly not ‘lacking’ in this regard; rather, it merely reflects the immediate 
empirical conditions in which he developed his theory of the state. 
3.2.2. THE SYMBOLIC AUTHORITY OF THE STATE 
By way of preamble, therefore, what I want to say is: be careful, all sentences that have 
the state as subject are theological sentences – which does not mean that they are false, 
inasmuch as the state is a theological entity, that is, an entity that exists by way of 
belief. 
(Bourdieu, 2014b, p. 10) 
For Weber, the demos in a state, that is, the people “in the sense of a shapeless mass, 
never ‘governs’ larger associations, but rather is governed” (1978, p. 985). And insofar as 
the demos, the many, is governed by a few – a relation which Weber recognises as one of 
domination – Weber holds that this position as ‘governed’ is consciously assented to by 
the demos, and thereby that the legitimacy of the state is recognised by its subjects in “a 
free act of clear conscience” (Bourdieu et al., 1994, p. 14). Here, then, is Weber’s approach 
to the structure of domination by the state in democracy: 
Like the political institutions historically preceding it, the state is a relation of men 
dominating men, a relation supported by means of legitimate (i.e. considered to be 
legitimate) violence. If the state is to exist, the dominated must obey the authority 
claimed by the powers that be. When and why do men obey? Upon what inner 
justifications and upon what external means does this domination rest? 
(Weber, 1970, p. 78) 
Weber’s answer to the question he sets here – a question which is a restating of David 
Hume’s reflection on this matter20 – is that there are “three inner justifications, hence 
 
19 The same can be said of Nietzsche, and all of those referred to as theorists of classical liberalism. 
20 “Nothing appears more surprising to those, who consider human affairs with a philosophical eye, than 
the easiness with which the many are governed by the few; and the implicit submission, with which men 
resign their own sentiments and passions to those of their rulers. When we enquire by what means this 
wonder is effected, we shall find, that, as Force is always on the side of the governed, the governors have 




basic legitimations of domination” (1970, pp. 78-79). The first relates to the “authority of 
the ‘eternal yesterday’” – a fundamentally conservative justification of, ‘It has always been 
this way, so this is the way it is’. The second relates to domination secured by a 
charismatic, heroic, prophetic individual – a relation of loyally obeying a revered leader. 
The third relates to domination by means of “belief in the legal statute and functional 
‘competence based on rationally created rules” – that is, ‘I believe these laws are sacrosanct 
and I will commit to keeping them’. 
Bourdieu’s departure from Weber on the nature of domination hinges on the extent to 
which the subject knows they are subjugated and the ‘response’ they take in response to 
this. In other words, it hinges on the extent to which the arbitrary nature of their own 
domination is transparent to them. In Weber’s account, it is as if the subject knows they 
are subjugated by an illegitimate authority and that they then proceed, through a 
conscious, rational process of weighing up their position, to settle on the most appropriate 
“inner justification” with which they may settle the question of their domination by the 
state, rendering this domination legitimate in their own mind. In other words, in relation 
to the state, Weber presumes a subject whose “political exterior and subjective interior” 
(Brown, 2015, p. 111) is disharmonious with domination by the state, that this domination 
is known to them, that it appears as unnatural and illegitimate, and that they need to 
reconcile this in their own mind to render it legitimate. Note also the degree to which this 
citizen of Weber, who rationalises and justifies their domination, resembles the 
“calculating citizen” of Rose’s Governing by Numbers (1991, p. 673), how democratic power, 
the power of the state, “is calculated power, calculating power and requiring citizens who 
calculate about power.” 
By contrast, for Bourdieu, the nature of domination by the state (though secured through 
material, physical means of violence) must also be considered in relation to the symbolic 
power of the state, which itself rests on two interrelated notions: belief and misrecognition. 
Bourdieu (1994, p. 9) argues that the state “is the site par excellence of the concentration 
and exercise of symbolic power”. Symbolic power is a power that is constituted and 
exercised through submission secured by a perception of legitimacy that is unquestioned 
 
maxim extends to the most despotic and most military governments, as well as to the most free and more 
popular.” Hume, D., ‘Of the first principles of government’, in Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects, vol. 1 
(Edinburgh, 1777), pp. 33ff, cited as in Bourdieu (2014a, p. 162). 
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and untested. In other words, symbolic power relies on belief (not rationalisation or 
calculation) if it is to operate and be sustained. Contrary to a material power relation, 
which is powerful whether I believe in it or not – if I am badly beaten or assaulted, this 
will not ‘go away’ if I stop ‘believing’ that it happened – symbolic power relations must 
have the belief of the dominated party if they are to be affective. If I do not believe in the 
legitimacy of the dominant, the symbolic order is dissolved into a physical order, which 
then descends into a confrontation or struggle on a material plane. So, inasmuch as we do 
not actively test or problematize the authority of the state, we effectively submit to it as 
powerful through the belief that it is powerful. Thus, I advance the point that the power 
of the modern democratic state rests on the precise opposite of the ‘calculative’ and 
‘calculating’ foundation proposed by Rose (1991). That is, it rests not on citizens who 
calculate about power, but rather through citizens who do not calculate about power, who 
believe in power.  
And, in a second contrast with the process of “inner justification” proposed by Weber, 
Bourdieu contends that there is not a conscious, knowing act of submission to the 
authority of the state as a superior force in terms of concentration of capital and the means 
of dispensing ‘legitimate’ physical violence, but a “doxic submission to the established 
order” (Bourdieu, 2004, p. 15). This “doxic submission” constitutes an act of “symbolic 
violence” by the demos, that is, a violence committed upon themselves, which they do 
not realise they perform in submitting to the authority of the state. As Bourdieu explains, 
Indeed, essentially, what is problematic is the fact that the established order is not 
problematic; and that the question of the legitimacy of the state, and of the order it 
institutes, does not arise except in crisis situation. 
(Bourdieu et al., 1994, p. 15) 
In effect, then, doxic submission implies a misrecognition of the authority and dominance 
of the state as natural and legitimate, rather than as the constructed and contingent product of a 
series of historically conditioned material and symbolic struggles over capital and 
authority (Bourdieu, 2004; Bourdieu et al., 1994). 
A final point is necessary here. For Bourdieu (1992, p. 168), ‘misrecognition’ is a specific 
analytical category. He states: “I call misrecognition the fact of recognizing a violence which 
is wielded precisely inasmuch as one does not perceive it as such.” Whereas 
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misrepresentation operates at the level of a ‘trick’, misrecognition concerns the structuring of 
our predispositions, day-to-day thoughts and practices – what Bourdieu would call our 
‘habitus’ (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 53) – and it is as such a more sinister force insofar as subjects 
cannot merely be shown the workings of the ‘trick’ to ‘break-out’ of an ideological state.  
But how is it that this happens? How do the citizens that make up the demos come to 
inflict this violence on themselves, believing in the legitimacy of an oppressive power 
structure that is the output of a historical struggle between dominant and dominated 
groups for the control of capitals? In this thesis, I argue that this misrecognition is 
constituted by ideology, wherein ideology is understood not as a simple misrepresentation, but 
as ‘built-in’, structural, to the way we see the world. We are, in a sense, always already 
ideologically conditioned (or, as Althusser would say, we are always ideologically 
“interpellated”). The task is not, therefore, to see things ‘as they really are’: how can we 
ever know that we have indeed reached the ‘real’ thing? It is instead to appreciate the way 
ideologies address us and structure our understanding of the world around us (I will return 
to this matter later in the thesis, see section 4.1). 
3.2.3. THE HISTORICAL EMERGENCE OF THE WELFARE STATE 
The second aspect of Bourdieu’s development of Weber’s theory of the state I wish to 
address concerns the historical emergence of the welfare state. Bourdieu’s formulation of 
the “The State’s right and left hands” (Bourdieu, 1998c, p. 183) allows a more 
sophisticated treatment of the character of the state-citizen power relation, one that is 
capable of recognising that the relation between state and citizen is irreducible to a single 
domineering dynamic, whilst also retaining a place for the state as ruler (Bourdieu et al., 
1994). In Bourdieu’s formulation, the Left hand of the state (the protective, social functions 
of welfare, healthcare, and education) cannot be bound up in the same utterance of ‘the 
state’, as the Right hand of the state (the repressive, individualising, economic, functions of 
the military, the police, the law, and the treasury). To do so would be to (falsely) imply 
that they operate in accordance with the same logics (Wacquant, 2012). 
To be sure, wrestling with the multi-faceted ‘nature’ of the state poses problems for its 
critique on both Left and Right today. In recent history, the Left has arranged itself – 
broadly speaking – in the defence of a state that the Right has demonised and attacked. 
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This, Wendy Brown (1995, pp. 17-18) points out, amounts to a reversal of traditionally 
adopted positions on the state: 
Traditionally it has been left liberals, following in the tradition of Mill and Thoreau, 
who viewed the state as a danger to freedom (conceived as popular sovereignty); 
conservative liberals such as Samuel Huntington or Henry Kissinger, following 
Hobbes and Hegel, tended to cast the state as a fount of freedom, protector against 
danger from without and domestic manager of our problematic particularity and 
atomistic energies. 
The point here is to emphasise that the state is not a fixed entity that can be considered 
as the necessary ally of one particular political pole or programme and an enemy of the 
other. The state can be criticised and defended by representatives of both poles on the 
political spectrum. To further illustrate this, let us briefly consider how the notion of the 
welfare state is approached by the Left and the Right. 
Over the last forty years, the Right has taken to assaulting and rolling-back both the 
material instances of and theoretical basis for the welfare state. Conservative and Right-
wing governments have attacked the network of protective social security and welfare 
institutions established post-WWII, either by privatising these functions, imposing drastic 
austerity measures or by abolishing certain services altogether. And yet, what is often 
omitted from reflections on the welfare state is that its emergence can be traced, in various 
contexts, to Right-wing governments attuned to the ‘threat’ of a socialist revolution in 
response to extremely poor living and working conditions. Indeed, it is Bismarck who is 
said to have regarded the welfare state as “a bulwark against socialism” (Lowe, 2005, p. 
38): 
Bismarck was anxious to make German social democracy less attractive to working-
men. He feared “class war” and wanted to postpone it as long as possible. […] in 1884 
he argued explicitly that if the state would only “show a little more Christian solicitude 
for the working-man”, then the social democrats would “sound their siren song in 
vain”. 
(Briggs, 1961, p. 249) 
For the Left, the welfare state could be theorised as, on the one hand, a source of social 
security, an entity offering protection from naked capitalist exploitation and a means of 
caring for the most vulnerable and those cast aside by capitalist relations of production. 
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On the other, and especially in Marxist perspectives, the state, in all its forms, is regarded 
as essentially “diabolic” (Bourdieu, 2014b, p. 6). As Althusser (2014, p. 239) explains: 
The Marxist tradition is strict, here: in the Communist Manifesto and the Eighteenth 
Brumaire (and in all the later classical texts, above all in Marx’s writings on the Paris 
Commune and Lenin’s on State and Revolution), the state is explicitly conceived as a 
repressive apparatus. The state is a ‘machine’ of repression, which enables the ruling 
classes (in the nineteenth century the bourgeois class and the ‘class’ of big landowners) 
to ensure their domination over the working class, thus enabling the former to subject 
the latter to the process of surplus-value extortion (i.e. to capitalist exploitation). 
As Marx puts it, the state is a repressive “organ of class domination” (Lenin, 1932, p. 8).21 
Thus, the state is seen as the essential means of repressing revolutionary instincts among 
oppressed classes, ensuring subservience from its citizens through deception, institutions 
of law and order, bureaucratic mechanisms of control and supervision, but even, and 
perhaps especially, through its provision of social securities and protections. For instance, 
Marcuse (1972, p. 51) writes of the welfare state as a “state of unfreedom”, that, although 
securing advances in standards of living, essentially secures advances in “the standard of 
administered living”. In other words, in sustaining and reproducing well-fed and well-
educated workers, the welfare state serves capitalism, inducing what Gramsci might call 
‘political quietism’. Nevertheless, Marcuse does not seek to belittle the “economic and 
political liberties” secured and delivered by the welfare state. Rather he is instead intent 
on stressing the contradictory and multiple effects of these “liberties”: 
Rejection of the Welfare State on behalf of abstract ideas of freedom is hardly 
convincing. The loss of the economic and political liberties which were the real 
achievement of the preceding two centuries may seem slight damage in a state capable 
of making the administered life secure and comfortable. If the individuals are satisfied 
to the point of happiness with the goods and services handed down to them by the 
administration, why should they insist on different institutions for a different 
production of different goods and services? 
(Marcuse, 1972, pp. 52-53) 
 
21 ‘What is to be done’ about the state, to the state or with the state is then a matter of great contention, 
attested to by fractures between reformist, anarchist, and revolutionary Marxists. For some, the state is to 
be destroyed, for others, the state is to be overthrown and set to work in favour of the dominated, it is to 
become ‘a State of all the people’. For an extended discourse on this matter, see Laclau and Mouffe (1985, 
esp. pp. 1-36). 
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Or, as he puts it more directly in Marxism, Revolution and Utopia (2014, p. 179): 
Why should the overthrow of the existing order be of vital necessity for people who 
own, or can hope to own, good clothes, a well-stocked larder, a TV set, a car, a house 
and so on, all within the existing order? 
(Cited as in Jeffries, 2017, p. 303) 
Here, Marcuse draws attention to the capacity of the welfare state and political and 
economic reforms to raise standards of living and in so doing render individuals passive 
and politically inert by luring them into material comfort with cheap consumer goods and 
services. Paradoxically, materially ‘progressive’ reform serves to reinforce and secure existing 
class relations (see also Antonio, 1981, p. 336).22 In this respect, Marcuse’s critique of the 
welfare state is the obverse of Bismarck’s instrumental approach to the welfare state – 
both recognise its stultifying effects, but do so from diametrically opposed positions. 
There is another important dimension to the multitude of social relations generated by 
the welfare state, discussed by Wendy Brown in States of Injury (1995), which is that of 
dependence. Writing within the sphere of feminist politics, though with clear and profound 
implications beyond this sphere, Brown (1995, p. 169) sets out the problematic of 
institutionalized protection: 
Whether one is dealing with the state, the Mafia, parents, pimps, police, or husbands, 
the heavy price of institutionalized protection is always a measure of dependence and 
agreement to abide by the protector’s rules. 
So, where Marcuse’s point is to call to attention the way in which the welfare state charms 
formerly radical individuals into docile passivity, Brown’s point is subtly different insofar 
as she focuses on the way that welfare state institutions also produce subjects who are 
dependent on the state for protection, and who are thus subjugated even as they are liberated 
from material hardships. This relation maintains a position of powerlessness on behalf of 
the individual: the forces that led them to require protection continue to exist, only they 
are now insulated from these forces by another dominant power. Thus, the common 
thread running between both Marcuse and Brown is in their concern with, and attempt 
 
22 It is this paradoxical nature that leads him to describe the welfare state as “a historical freak between 




to further understand, the complexity of subjugation by the state. Even as it acts to protect 
materially dispossessed citizens, even when the state acts in a ‘protective’, ‘caring’ and 
‘social’ mode, it continues to reproduce relations of domination over its subjects. 
The intention of working through this brief discussion of the welfare state is to reiterate 
and further stress the point that the state does not have a single face. It is not simply Nietzsche’s 
“coldest of cold monsters” (1969, p. 75), nor is it only, stresses Bourdieu, “the dumb 
instrument of the dominant class’s hegemony” (2014b, p. 19). Its manifestations are 
various and its interventions are multi-faceted: it protects the vulnerable and cares for the 
sick (e.g. in the UK, through the NHS) and at the same time administers violence on the 
vulnerable, in physical and bureaucratic form (e.g. the Ministry of Defence, the Home 
Office).23 Adopting a Bourdieusian understanding of the state allows us to reflect on its 
various manifestations, to resist demonising it exclusively in terms of presiding over 
means of violence and control, but also to refrain from idealising it in terms of its 
(problematic) protective interventions. However, what is perhaps most important in a 
Bourdieusian theory of the state is the preservation of a place – present in Weberian and 
Marxist theorisations of the state alike – for the state as (class) ruler. 
A final note is needed to draw this section to a close. As I later set out (see section 5.2, 
‘Empirical context’), I study the state in relation to the field of prisons, an empirical 
context in which its relation to the citizen is unequivocally materially repressive. 
Nonetheless, I attempt to introduce some tension to the treatment of the state by 
proposing a conception of the state as a collection of fields, fields that are traversed by 
forces and struggles that are set in pursuit of diverse and conflicting ends. This is to say 
that the state can be repressive and domineering, but that it can also be protective and 
securing. Still, given that I situate myself within a research tradition firmly based in critical 
theory, I empathise with and treat as especially important the illumination of relations of 
exploitation, domination and alienation, insofar as those who are the subjects of such 
relations are deprived of the means through which they can challenge or articulate their 
subjugation. 
 




3.3. THEORISING STATE TRANSPARENCY 
Having discussed what I mean by ‘the state’, this section will address the subject of state 
transparency through a historical reading of how the way in which the state appears or is 
made visible to the citizenry has developed and evolved over time. This section will 
therefore proceed as follows. First, I discuss how the appearance of itself that is 
constructed by the state is fundamentally an interested act (3.3.1). Second, I consider 
historical forms of transparency of the state that are experienced corporeally (3.3.2). 
Third, I discuss the antithesis of transparency and visibility – opacity and secrecy – and 
reflect on the spectral power that derives from mystery (3.3.3). Finally, I address the 
represented, visual and digital form of contemporary transparency (3.3.4). 
3.3.1. INTEREST AND THE APPEARANCE OF THE STATE 
To understand the emergence of the ‘transparent state’, it is important that we first 
consider the history of state visibility. In other words, if we are to take seriously the claim 
that the modern, liberal democratic state has now opened itself up to our view – or 
‘thrown open its doors’, to use the vernacular of proponents of open government – 
requires that we first examine how the state has made itself seen in the past and how else 
might it show itself, other than through the medium of technologies of transparency. To 
reflect on the history of the visibility of the state, I want to reflect on Foucault’s (1977) 
account of the shift from openness and visibility in spectacular, ceremonial punishment, 
to secret, private punishment – from ‘The spectacle of the scaffold’ to ‘The birth of the 
prison’. 
Though Discipline and Punish can be read as tracing the emergence of a new kind of power 
(disciplinary power) in punishment, it is also fundamentally an account of a change in the 
visibility of power, and especially, contrary to what we might perhaps expect, the visibility 
of the power of the state. As I have taken care to reiterate, accounting is a technology 
bound up with the activity of making visible. In seminal contributions to the accounting 
literature on the subject of visibility, readings of power informed by themes set out by 
Foucault in Discipline and Punish, are utilised to understand the power of accounting as a 
technology that, through making visible, makes possible activities of governing and 




It must, however, be acknowledged that proceeding with a Foucauldian account of state 
visibility – that is, the way the state makes itself seen – may seem an odd, or even 
contradictory place to begin in light of my previous remarks concerning the state, in which 
I set out my Bourdieusian theory of the state (see section 3.2). Indeed, Foucault’s 
expressed antipathy and deliberate withdrawal from study of the state and the concept of 
interests is a striking feature of his work in comparison to that of his historical intellectual 
contemporaries (e.g. Althusser, 2014). For instance, in the opening chapter of Discipline 
and Punish – “The body of the condemned” (1977, pp. 3-31) – Foucault states explicitly 
that his approach to the study of power deliberately excludes the notion of interested 
practice, that it requires that “one abandons the opposition between what is ‘interested’ 
and what is ‘disinterested’” (1977, p. 28). Moreover, in The Birth of Biopolitics, Foucault is 
determined to eschew anything that could be perceived as a coherent or structured ‘theory 
of the state’: 
You will, of course, put to me the question, or make the objection: Once again you 
do without a theory of the state. Well, I would reply, yes, I do, I want to, I must do 
without a theory of the state, as one can and must forego an indigestible meal. 
(Foucault, 2008, pp. 76-77) 
By contrast, to consider the state in Bourdieusian terms first implies a specific theory of 
the state, and second, maintaining a role for interest both in terms of how we understand 
both the interests of individual state fields and of the state as a whole as an aggregate of 
these fields (Bourdieu, 2014b). The concept of interest is essential in Bourdieu’s 
theoretical apparatus: “Bourdieu’s basic premise is that there is no such thing as a 
disinterested act” (Grenfell, 2011, p. 165). To be sure, one cannot speak of a specific 
‘interest’ of the state as a whole, but it is certainly the case that individual state fields, and 
individual actors on those fields, have an interest in competing for capitals in order to 
administer programmes and retain symbolic authority; the outcome of struggles between 
bureaucratic sub-fields, between ‘Left hand’ and ‘Right hand’ state functions and services, 
thus determines the balance or ‘tilt’ of the state at a specific point in time. Under 
neoliberalism, there is a “double rightwards skewing” of the state (Wacquant, 2012, p. 74), 
with the repressive, coercive functions of the state being funded and expanded 
(Wacquant, 2014) and their obverse, the social, protective functions, being assaulted and 
weakened (Wacquant, 2009b). 
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It is important to point out that the notion of interest employed by Bourdieu should not 
be read as synonymous with the notion of (self-)interest as conceived in the theoretical 
lexicons of functionalist, utilitarian or economistic theories (e.g. as in Agency Theory or 
in Rational-Choice Theory) (Bourdieu, 1986, pp. 16, 28). For Bourdieu, interests can be 
pursued in a rational, calculative and conscious process, but, that said, he considers it the 
case that our interests are structured by the conditions of the field in which an individual 
is situated, and that actions are a product of illusio, that is, our propensity to ‘play the game 
and believe that the game is worth playing’ (Grenfell, 2011, p. 155). Wacquant (2012) 
explains that by retaining a place for interested action and struggle for different “species” 
of capital, Bourdieu’s theory of the state fundamentally relates to “rulership”, the exercise 
of authority by a dominant (ruler) over a subordinate group (ruled). 
Why, then, begin this section by working through Foucault’s account of ‘The spectacle of 
the scaffold’? What I set out here is a re-reading of ‘The spectacle of the scaffold’ that 
reincorporates the notion of interest on the part of the state. Where Foucault removes interest, 
intention and an active role for the state in staging a particular ‘festival’ of punishment, I 
reintroduce these concepts. Crucially, I do this not in an attempt to counter Foucault or the 
Foucauldian literature in accounting, but rather to extract new insights from Foucault’s 
work that escape us if we adhere to his call to abandon “the opposition between what is 
‘interested’ and what is ‘disinterested’”. Put differently, a reading of ‘The spectacle of the 
scaffold’ with interest yields much in the way of understanding (historic) practices of state 
visibility. In any case, Foucault’s own perspective on the scaffold is perhaps less abstracted 
from notions of interest/disinterest, ruler/ruled than he would wish. But, above all, 
reading Foucault’s account of the scaffold with interest allows us to appreciate that the 
state did not mete out brutal punishment for no reason and that the condemned did not 
end up atop the scaffold by themselves. The barbarous punishment of the criminal served 
a function, to reify the power of the state before an assembled audience. 
The point to be underlined here is that whilst power clearly does not operate only as a 
relation between rulers and ruled – as an interested relation between dominant ruler and 
dominated subject – it is also the case that it continues to operate in this way as well as in 
the diffuse, normalising, disciplining ways brought to our attention by Foucault. Indeed, 
as Terry Eagleton (2004, pp. 4-5) sagely puts it: 
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The political left always needs to be on guard against reductionism and conspiracy 
theories – though as far as the latter are concerned it would be unwise for radicals to 
wax so subtle and sophisticated, become so coy of appearing crude, as to forget that 
certain theoretical concepts are indeed from time to time put to the uses of political 
power, and sometimes in quite direct ways. 
In other words, it is not ‘conspiratorial’ to theorise the state as ruler. Indeed, in doing so, 
one stands on firm intellectual ground. And so, we should not withdraw from studies of 
the state as establishing relations of domination, as exercising physical and symbolic 
violence as a means of securing the subservience of citizens in a state. By making this 
point, my intention is certainly not to position myself as anti-Foucault, but rather to make 
the case that we must be aware of the pitfalls of regarding the interrelations between 
accounting and the operations of power and of the state only through an understanding 
informed by Foucault. In so doing, we risk narrowing our understanding of the state. 
Furthermore, is it not essential that we read the account of the scaffold with interest if we 
are to understand the experience of the condemned? Without interest, it is as if the 
condemned simply materializes at the site of the scaffold and that they assent to their 
‘role’ in the sequence of events that constitutes their own brutal death. Again, without 
interest it is as if the condemned is not being executed against their will. This is a relatively 
simple observation, but insofar as I write in a tradition associated with humanism and the 
injunction to expose and illuminate barbarous forms of power and domination, it is a 
necessary one. We should remember that ‘the condemned’ has no interest in being 
subjected to a gruesome ritual of public torture. The point here is to emphasise that when 
read with interest the ‘spectacle of the scaffold’ can tell us much about the role played by 
visibility in the workings of domination, and that the way the state makes itself visible (or 
not), the appearance projected (or suppressed), has significant implications for the production 
and constitution (interpellation) of its subjects. 
3.3.2. DIRECTLY LIVED, OR VISCERAL, CORPOREAL TRANSPARENCY 
Foucault begins Discipline and Punish by working through a gruesome, detailed account of 
the torturous execution of ‘Damiens’, a man convicted of the attempted murder of the 
King of France. Against the barbarous, revolting punishment Damiens was subjected to, 
Foucault juxtaposes a school-like, regulated time-table of physical and educational 
activities that makes up the daily routine of young offenders in a Parisian prison. In what 
is a Nietzschean move, Foucault proceeds to unsettle the justification for this alteration 
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in penal practice, arguing that this “has been attributed too readily and too emphatically 
to a process of ‘humanization’” (1977, pp. 7, 16). And whilst Foucault’s primary thesis is 
to argue that the soul replaced the body as the target of penal intervention, he is also, as 
part of his developing of this thesis, concerned with “the disappearance of punishment 
as a spectacle” (1977, p. 8). 
The spectacle of punishment as it was meted out at the scaffold was, explains Foucault 
(1977, p. 49), “an exercise of ‘terror’”, staged to flood the onlooking citizens with a sense 
of their role as subjects of power and subject to power: 
The ceremony of punishment, then, is an exercise of ‘terror’. When the jurists of the 
eighteenth century began their polemic with the reformers, they offered a restrictive, 
‘modernist’ interpretation of the physical cruelty of the penalties imposed by the law: 
if severe penalties are required, it is because their example must be deeply inscribed in 
the hearts of men. Yet, in fact, what had hitherto maintained this practice of torture 
was not an economy of example, in the sense in which it was to be understood at the 
time of the idéologues (that the representation of the penalty should be greater than the 
interest of the crime), but a policy of terror: to make everyone aware, through the 
body of the criminal, of the unrestrained presence of the sovereign. The public 
execution did not re-establish justice; it reactivated power. 
Spectators “must be made to be afraid” (Foucault, 1977, p. 58). The material brutality and 
inhumanity of the public theatre of punishment symbolised the authority of the state over 
the individual; to the spectator it bellowed, ‘This is what you’ll get if you mess with us’, 
‘Look what we can do to you’. The spectacle of punishment served, then, as a form of 
educating experience; in Foucault’s terms (1977, p. 111), as “a school rather than a 
festival” (cf. Nietzsche, 1887, pp. 51-55). That ‘educating experience’ was to instil 
compliance and reverent fear of the sovereign amongst subjects, to quash resistance and 
radical spirit. Hence the punishment is quite deliberately excessive, “carried out in such a 
way as to give a spectacle not of measure, but of imbalance and excess” (1977, pp. 49, 
50), so that the spectator might be forcefully reminded of their subjugated position in the 
social strata. It is for the spectator, for the assembled audience, says Foucault (1977, pp. 
57-58), that this whole spectacle of punishment is staged: 
In the ceremonies of the public execution, the main character was the people, whose 
real and immediate presence was required for the performance. An execution that was 




Whilst we would not spring at first to thinking of it in this way, the spectacle of a brutal 
punishment is, in effect, a mode of transparency. The state is saying: ‘Look at the power 
we hold over you’. And it is the visibility of this excess of violence that is the essential quality 
in its political functioning, for 
above all, the importance of a ritual that was to deploy its pomp in public. Nothing 
was to be hidden of this triumph of the law. 
(Foucault, 1977, p. 49) 
Indeed, as a mode of transparency capable of laying bare the hierarchical relation between 
state and subject, the public torture and execution offered a markedly direct experience 
of the character of the state to all of those in attendance. This was a subjectivising experience. 
The assembled audience would be immersed in a visceral experience of the state. Their 
senses would be activated in such a way as to elicit a deep physical and psychological 
reaction in the present and as to leave a deep impression in their memory. In terms of 
visibility, the spectacle of the scaffold operated as a kind of ‘hyper-visibility’, where there 
could be no suggestion that anything is hidden: “Not only must people know, they must see 
with their own eyes” (Foucault, 1977, p. 58, emphasis added). 
But of interest to us now is the decline of this ‘spectacular’ mode of punishment. What 
brought this about? Though we cannot trace a single force as driving the decline of the 
public execution and torture, we can highlight a contributing factor that is of great 
importance for understanding the historical trajectory of state transparency: solidarity in 
the face of tyranny. As Foucault (1977, pp. 63, 73) explains, the “great spectacle of 
punishment ran the risk of being rejected by the very people to whom it was addressed”, 
because, 
the people never felt closer to those who paid the penalty than in those rituals intended 
to show the horror of the crime and the invincibility of power; never did the people 
feel more threatened, like them, by a legal violence exercised without moderation or 
restraint. The solidarity of a whole section of the population with those we would call 
petty offenders – vagrants, false beggars, the indigent poor, pickpockets, receivers and 
dealers in stolen goods – was constantly expressed: resistance to police searches, the 
pursuit of informers, attacks on the watch or inspectors provide abundant evidence 
of this (cf. Richet, 118-119). 
It was, in any case, dangerous, in that it provided a support for a confrontation 
between the violence of the king and the violence of the people. 
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Thus, excessive, outrageous, terrorising demonstrations of power, whilst in part staged to 
dispirit and breed compliance, had the capacity to produce civil unrest and rebellious, 
politicised, radical, revolutionary subjects.24 There developed, “on the part of state power, 
a political fear of the effects of these ambiguous rituals” (Foucault, 1977, p. 65). The threat 
of mass revolt and a sustained reformist protest movement set against public executions 
eventually saw the emergence of a new, private, hidden mode of punishment. To what 
extent, though, that the reformers’ ‘humanist’ spirit could be said to have driven 
punishment into private is debatable. Rather, it is the case that the motives of the 
‘humanist’ reformers was rather less ‘pure’ than would be assumed. In any case, it became 
abundantly clear that seeing the state in its ugly, brutal, excessive seat of authority served 
not to yield compliant, disciplined subjects, but unruly, rebellious and threatened ones 
who thought of themselves as dominated. 
3.3.3. OPACITY AND SECRECY, AN ANTITHESIS TO TRANSPARENCY 
If we regard the ‘spectacle of the scaffold’ as a kind of ‘hyper-visibility’, then the ‘birth of 
the prison’ is its antithesis: the migration of punishment of the individual from the ultra-
transparent theatre of the public spectacle, a space purposefully designed to be visible, to the 
isolation and separation of the prison, a space purposefully designed to be opaque.25 Where the 
state once engaged in theatrical, spectacular flourishes of excessive power it then 
retreated, literally ‘behind closed doors’, to the material opacity of prison. In effect, there 
was a great closing of the state with regard to punishment – what was once physically 
elevated,26 as something that demanded to be seen, was now to be concealed and withheld 
from sight. And where Foucault proceeds to analyse the effects of this privatisation of 
the formerly public ritual of punishment on the condemned, how in prison their punishment 
is now directed at the soul, here I would like to focus on the effects that this shift had on 
 
24 On this, the following gives a sense of the playful, mischievous spirit of the audience: “If the crowd 
gathered round the scaffold, it was not simply to witness the sufferings of the condemned man or to excite 
the anger of the executioner: it was also to hear an individual who had nothing more to lose curse the 
judges, the laws, the government and religion” (Foucault, 1977, p. 60). 
25 Of course, there was also a change in the nature of the punishment itself – it was not the same wicked 
torture administered in private. This is not to deny the brutality of early and contemporary modes of 
imprisonment, but it is to recognise that the exercise of power was to be directed no longer primarily at the 
body of the criminal, but also at their soul. 
26 The scaffold, as today on buildings under construction, reached up to a great height; the intent being, of 
course, to display the fate of the criminal to as many as possible. Foucault (1977, p. 58) notes that “The first 
time the guillotine was used the Chronique de Paris reported that people complained that they could not see 
anything and chanted, ‘Give us back our gallows’ (Lawrence, 71ff).” 
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those who were formerly the spectators of punishment. How did this affect the way that 
they regarded the power of the state, the way that they constituted and thought of 
themselves in relation to power? What changed when this dramatic, subjectivising theatre 
of punishment was no longer staged? 
The closing of the state, moving into private that which was expressly public, serves to 
mystify the workings of the state. Whilst the horror of torturous executions at the site of 
the scaffold was all too real, it was also, in many ways, a complete and whole experience. 
Indeed, though the scaffold said, ‘This is what you’ll get if you mess with us’, it also said, 
‘This is all we can do to you’. Of course, as Foucault’s work makes clear, the terror that 
could be inflicted on the body of the individual could be utterly revolting in its barbarity. 
And yet, for the spectator, this was a stunningly complete account of state power. Again, in 
the treatment of ‘the criminal’, there could be no suggestion that anything was hidden. 
Though it is not a central component of his thesis, Foucault (1977, p. 50, emphasis added) 
does pass comment on this, nothing that, 
A body effaced, reduced to dust and thrown to the winds, a body destroyed piece by 
piece by the infinite power of the sovereign constituted not only the ideal, but the real 
limit of punishment. 
Paradoxically, then, the transparency or total visibility of the power of the state served to 
give it form, to reify it as a material force, a terrifying and powerful force, but a limited, 
worldly force nonetheless. When the threat of the powerful is replaced by a demonstration 
of its authority, however painful this demonstration may be in physical terms, it destroys 
the symbolic authority of power, the component of power that rests on the fantasy of all 
possible horrors. In Žižek’s (1997, p. 201) terms, the potency of “the Big Other”, in this 
instance, the State, loses its “spectral quality”. 
In effect, what the ‘hyper-visibility’ of the public spectacle achieved was a total 
transparency that left the spectator in full awareness of the power of the state. But, as we 
have seen, this ‘hyper-visibility’ was also reifying: it deactivated the symbolic, spectral, 
mysterious aspect of power. And thus, with his account of the ‘birth of the prison’, 
Foucault draws our attention to the revival of this aspect of power. That is, in migrating 
the activity of punishment behind closed doors, the mystery of power was reactivated. Of 
course, the power of mystery is not confined to the sphere of punishment alone, but also 
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relates to the mystery of ‘what goes on’ behind the doors and walls of iconic state 
structures – the likes of The Kremlin, Whitehall, and The Pentagon. A brief literary 
diversion here will help to further explain what is meant by this. 
In The Castle (1926), Franz Kafka tells the story of a Land Surveyor who grapples with the 
authorities in a village where power is seated in ‘the castle’. The tale is one of frustration, 
contradiction, struggle, but above all, mystery. Indeed, mystery is the key figure in this 
novel. Neither the castle, nor the village, are placed in this world, which gives the text an 
ethereal, dream-like nature.27 The castle exerts great power over ‘K.’, the Land Surveyor, 
and all those in the village, and yet at no point does Kafka permit us to peek behind the 
castle walls, to walk its corridors or to enter its bureaus. Instead, K., and a series of 
accomplices, friends, lovers, officials and foes, are enchanted by the aura of the unknown 
that encircles the castle and its infuriatingly complex, absurdly bureaucratic workings. In 
fact, we seldom see the castle in the novel – Kafka always describes it as blurred, fading, 
distant, faint, shrouded in mist and darkness. The frustration this engenders in the reader 
is mirrored in the frustration of K., who is waylaid from an initial focused determination 
to enter the castle as he becomes embroiled in twisting, complicated disputes and 
relationships. 
In mystifying the castle, Kafka plays upon the power of the unseen, and the unknown, to 
animate our imaginations. In the same way, when punishment is no longer theatrical and 
spectacular, when the hyper-visibility of the spectacle of the scaffold is traded for the 
austere walls of the prison, the migration of punishment into the private sphere collapsed 
the known force of the state – reified in and transposed onto the body of the condemned 
– into an unknown, unimaginable one. The spectator, who was once filled with the 
knowledge borne of directly lived, visceral experience, and may in the past have known, 
‘That is what they can do to me’, now must ask, ‘What will they do to me in there?’ The 
leering face of the dominant, materialised in the theatre of public execution and torture, 
retreats behind a brick veil. The once known becomes unknown and in that move it 
harvests mythic fear which, unlike fear of worldly, material forces, is not bounded by 
 
27 One of Kafka’s other great texts, Amerika (1938), tells the story of ‘Karl’, a young man sent to America 
by his parents after he is accused of scandal with the family’s maid. Kafka, never having visited America, 
constructs his version of America in the novel entirely from his understanding taken from newspaper 
clippings, books, images, stories and so on. The result is a mesmerising, surreal reality. 
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empirical, material constraints (Adorno & Horkheimer, 1969, p. 16).28 The brutal 
subjectivising experience is replaced with a spectral, mysterious one. 
If in the mystery of the unseen the state could exercise authority through threat and the 
power of fantasy, why should it trouble itself with dramatic, spectacular demonstrations 
of its power, like those of the scaffold, when these serve only to reify and render 
transparent structures of class power? Why should the state engage in theatrical 
punishment when such a ritual yields social upheaval and incites revenge and revolt on 
the part of the many? Such lessons about the material appearance of domination have, in 
liberal democracies and in other state formations, been learned. That is, overt and 
excessive displays of dominance constitute not frightened, subservient subjects, but 
instead unruly and rebellious ones, subjects aware of the terms and extent of their 
domination and who can organise and revolt in response. So how should we regard claims 
that the state has today been ‘opened up’, made ‘transparent’? Why should states profess 
such enthusiasm for this ‘opening up’? Why, indeed, should the state be concerned with 
‘throwing open its doors’? What interest would the state have in informing its citizens 
about its activities? 
3.3.4. REPRESENTED, OR VISUAL, DIGITAL TRANSPARENCY 
Having considered the dynamic of state visibility in history and the effects of both ‘hyper-
visibility’ and opacity, we must now reflect on the contemporary emergence of the 
‘transparent’ or ‘open’ state. And, having begun by positing the visibility of the state as an 
interested act – that is, how the state chooses to appear is a function of the interest of the 
state in projecting a particular view of itself to its citizens – we must also begin to question 
the extent to which it is in the interest of the state to make itself transparent to the citizen. 
To begin this task, I want to consider Žižek’s reflection on the radical and emancipatory 
spirit of the Enlightenment and how, paradoxically, 
not only does freedom of thought not undermine actual social servitude, it positively 
sustains it. The old motto ‘Don’t think, obey!’ to which Kant reacts is 
counterproductive: it effectively breeds rebellion; the only way to secure social 
servitude is through freedom of thought. 
 
28 Horror films, specifically those that eschew crass gore and brutal violence as horror, operate using this 
principle, the effects of which are stunningly immersive, even when we know we are watching a film. 
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(Žižek, 2002, p. 3, emphasis added) 
By following a similar logic to that developed by Žižek, we can here propose that if 
mystery was an antidote to the unruly subjects produced by directly visible brutality of the 
state, then ‘openness’ is an antidote to curious subjects, who desire to know more about 
the terms of their domination. If in history we have seen the bright flashes of the violent, 
sovereign state (‘the spectacle of the scaffold’, public hangings, lavish, extravagant military 
parades) and the closed, mysterious state (the faceless, impenetrable bureaucratic 
fortresses of The Kremlin, The Pentagon, and so on), we now see a state that declares 
itself open, a state that has ‘thrown open its doors’ and professes to have made the inner 
workings of its vast machinery visible to its citizens. This ‘open state’ is presented under 
a banner that is adorned with the label of ‘open government’. In this section, I reflect on 
the idea of open government, outlining the development of this idea into a zeitgeist, 
positioning it in recent historical context, and finishing by considering the implications of 
its visual, digital form. 
But before proceeding to discuss open government, an important conceptual and 
terminological issue must be clarified, which is the distinction between ‘the state’ and 
‘government’. Are these mere synonyms for each other? If not, what distinguishes them? 
The Marxist and Foucauldian research traditions are here almost perfect reflections of 
one another: Marxists writing on the state, the Foucauldians writing on government, but 
not the other way around. To add further complexity, Foucault refers to a 
“governmentalization of the state” (Lemke, 2002, p. 58). A reflection on the distinction 
between the state and government could itself be the subject of an extensive isolated 
reflection, but here I want to be brief, though as precise as possible, in advancing my own 
distinction, which will be unavoidably partial, geographically and historically 
contextualised in reference to the UK and necessarily political, inasmuch as this is an issue 
that elicits a broad variety of theorisations (see Robinson, 2013). 
Reiterating my Bourdieusian theory of the state, as set out earlier in this text (see section 
3.2.1), I treat the state as a human community that claims the monopoly of the legitimate 
use of physical and symbolic violence in a specific territory. I treat the state as a collection 
of fields, as a collection of institutional apparatuses and functions. I treat government as a 
temporal, party-political formation composed of a cabinet of parliamentary 
representatives elected by a demos, headed by a Prime Minister. The government 
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exercises the prerogative authority of the state, which remains (symbolically) situated in 
the crown, whilst it retains a majority of support from the demos, as tested by periodic 
electoral ballot. I regard government as a specific historical mode of administering the 
authority of the state. In this sense, I consider the state and government as intertwined, 
rather than as discrete entities. For instance, in the UK, in a ceremonial process rich in 
symbolic and historic content, it remains the case that the sitting monarch – who formally, 
though wholly symbolically, remains the head of the British state – issues an invitation for 
the Prime Minister elect to form a government. Once formed, the Prime Minister assumes 
the role of the head of government, a government to whom the powers of the state 
formerly concentrated in the house or personage of the monarch are granted (Bourdieu, 
2004). Thus, I restate my position on government in terms that resonate with my 
Bourdieusian formulation on the state; I see government as 
the human community that claims the legitimate monopoly over the administration 
of the apparatuses and functions of the state. 
Now, to the question of ‘open government’ – what is this? To begin in simple, practical 
terms, open government relates to providing individual citizens with unprecedented 
access to previously unpublished government data. Mass online, (exclusively) digital 
publication of government data, or ‘datasets’, containing financial and non-financial 
information, is complemented by a range of ‘data-hubs’, ‘portals’ and ‘dashboards’ that 
provide an overview of the performance of government services as monitored in an array 
of audit and performance rankings, ratings, statistics and classificatory systems that rely 
on the representative capacities of accounting technologies. 
Setting aside for now the question of how ‘useful’ (an important side-note here is to ask, 
‘Useful to whom?’, and ‘Useful for what?’) the kind of information presented in open 
government is, it must be acknowledged that access to and the publishing of state 
materials is certainly not, in and of itself, a new phenomenon. What is new, however, is 
the zeitgeist of open government. It represents a significant historical development that the 
state itself is volunteering to “throw open its doors” (The Coalition: our programme for government, 
2010, p. 20), not begrudgingly releasing heavily redacted documents after receiving 
‘Freedom of Information’ (FOI) requests or reluctantly permitting the publication of 
sensitive materials under the “30-year rule” (Dunton, 2013). Indeed, it is frequently 
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repeated in all announcements, articles and documents relating to open government and 
government transparency that transparency will be a ‘good’ thing for both the state and 
its citizens. Transparency is spoken of not as a pesky, troublesome, cumbersome 
requirement that is imposed on the state, but instead as a productive, generative, democratic 
force to be “unleashed” by the state (Open Data White Paper: Unleashing the Potential, 2012). 
And when “unleashed” the array of promises assembled in the name of transparency is 
staggering. Transparency, we are assured, will deliver a state that is more democratic, more 
accountable, achieves ‘better outcomes’, is more productive, empowers its citizens to 
participate in government, and spurs innovation and economic growth (Cameron, 2010a; 
Government Transformation Strategy: better use of data, 2017). What is this if not a drastic 
resetting of the relation, in rhetoric at the very least, between information, citizen and 
state? 
Again, that the British state should itself volunteer to openness and transparency, and that 
it should do so whilst hailing the benefits of a strengthened democracy and an informed 
and empowered citizenry is a peculiar break with the historical perception and maintaining 
of the state as a clandestine, closed institution. That said, such has been the frenzy around 
transparency in transnational governance, the idea of states ‘volunteering’ to be 
transparent is now somewhat unrealistic. However, as one of the ‘first-movers’ in the 
space of governmental transparency and open government it is not unreasonable to refer 
to the UK as ‘volunteering’ to a series of commitments to greater transparency. In recent 
years, where the open government idea has developed into a global movement with an 
organisational core, ‘The Open Government Partnership’29, presiding over the brand of 
‘Open Government’ (Kornberger, Meyer, Brandtner, & Höllerer, 2017), it is arguable that 
states who are not part of this ‘institutional norm’ are now pressured to do so by the 
weight of social and political expectation. This (necessary) ‘voluntary’ commitment could 
be framed, then, through a lens of “coercive isomorphism” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). 
Or, as put by Mehrpouya and Salles-Djelic (2014, p. 28): 
The swift adoption of FOI acts by countries that, in practice, remain highly non-
transparent is consistent with the findings of Hafner-Burton et al.: nations with the 
worst human rights records are more likely to adopt the UN Human Rights charter in 
 
29 See: https://www.opengovpartnership.org/. 
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order to improve their legitimacy within the international community (Hafner-Burton, 
Tsutsui, & Meyer, 2008). 
Still, the extent to which transparency, the central core of open government, has become 
an incontrovertible, “transnational norm” in governance, demands our utmost attention. 
The question of government transparency must be submitted to rigorous and sincere 
critique, especially insofar as a great deal of what is paraded as ‘transparency’ is constituted 
by an ensemble of accounting technologies. 
A note by way of clarification is needed here. I am concerned with transparency as it 
relates to the idea, spirit or zeitgeist of open government, not with Open Government as 
an organisation (in the form of the ‘Open Government Partnership’). In other words, I 
distinguish between study of ‘open government’ (as a spirit, a zeitgeist) and ‘Open 
Government’ (as an organisation). I position my study of transparency within the 
ascendancy of this zeitgeist in democratic governing. 
Of course, to speak of a zeitgeist is to engage in a mode of study in which the movements 
of history are appreciated and analysed. I believe the question of why phenomena emerge 
in time is inseparable from the movements of history. In other words, I do not wish to 
present open government as an ahistorical phenomenon that mysteriously materialises 
independent of immanent social, political and economic conditions. As such, I place open 
government, this phenomenon of the self-declaring ‘open and transparent state’, in its 
immediate historical context. However, I do not set out here to offer a far-reaching 
‘genealogy’ on the emergence of open government; this is beyond the scope of this 
chapter, and indeed of the thesis as a whole. 
Specifically in the UK, the phenomenon of open government could at first be considered 
in respect to the Members of Parliament (MP) expenses scandal, which emerged in 2009, 
a year prior to the public announcement of open government (Ruppert, 2015). Chronic 
abuse of the parliamentary expenses system – which saw MPs extract millions of pounds 
of taxpayers money through spurious and lavish expense claims (see Van Heerde-Hudson, 
2014) – further undermined feeble public trust in individual politicians and the British 
political system. Also contributing to a swell in public mistrust of the political class was 
the invasion of and subsequent occupation of Iraq, presided over by then Prime Minister 
Tony Blair. British involvement in the Iraq war would later be attributed to flawed, 
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overstated and misleading ‘intelligence’ documents relating to the existence of weapons 
of mass destruction in Iraq (Strong, 2017). 
Clearly, though, the open government phenomenon is not solely and wholly reducible to 
the public and media clamour around a series of specific local or national scandals – the 
global, international nature of open government attests to this (see G8 Open Data Charter, 
2013). As Arnold (2009a, 2009b) and Mehrpouya and Salles-Djelic (2019) both point out, 
the global financial crisis of 2008 reinforced calls for transparency, with transparency 
being held up as a “panacea” capable of ‘solving’ the problems of the global financial 
system (cf. Roberts, 2009, esp. p. 957). “Why do we cling”, muses Arnold (2009a, p. 807), 
“to the notion that improved transparency, rather than a reconfiguration of political and 
economic power, is a solution to the crisis?”  
Beyond efforts to restore trust in the state, a recently scandalised political class and in 
global financial markets, the open government project to promote transparency is also 
closely aligned with the utopian neoliberal project of reshaping of the citizen in the image 
of the capitalist firm (Wacquant, 2012). The idea that citizens, as ‘customers’, would be 
able to monitor the performance of the state and provide ‘feedback’ on that performance 
is a prominent feature in manifestos laying out strategies and models of neoliberal 
government (see Osborne & Gaebler, 1992; Osborne & Plastrik, 1997). Indeed, in the 
UK, structural reforms to government brought about in the late 1980s by then Prime 
Minister, Margaret Thatcher, leant on performance metrics as instruments of 
accountability, so that citizens might ‘hold government to account’ by monitoring 
reported performance (Cooper, Tweedie, Baker, & Andrew, 2019). Just as the theory of 
strong-form market efficiency relies on a notion of unimpeded access to information for 
all, so too open government is built on a foundation that asserts democracy will work 
more efficiently if citizens are able to make decisions on the basis of easily accessible 
information (Mehrpouya & Salles-Djelic, 2014). In this sense, open government is a 
typically neoliberal agenda, applying market structures and logics to a non-market arena 
(Brown, 2015). 
Public access to data on the ‘performance’ of state institutions is, then, not new as such. 
From Thatcher onward, the British state has taken to publishing performance data to 
allow its ‘customers’ to make ‘informed choices’. Thatcher’s successor, John Major, 
launched the ‘Citizen’s Charter’ (The Citizen’s Charter: Raising the Standard, 1991), an 
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initiative designed to reinforce the Thatcher legacy of privatising and contracting-out and 
firmly impressing the new concept of citizens as consumers. Elected in 1997, Tony Blair, 
head of the (New) Labour government, pressed on with the neoliberalization of the state, 
continuing and extending many of the programmes animated by Thatcher and Major (see 
Modernising Government, 1999). However, open government goes well beyond the 
‘openness’ of its close historical predecessors in terms of the form of access to materials 
on the state and the performance of government. This is made possible through its 
constitution in visual and digital form as ‘dashboards’, ‘data-portals’ and ‘data-hubs’. The 
imagery evoked in these terms is itself curious: a sense of central access is conferred by the 
notion of the ‘hub’; a phantasmic access to another world by the ‘portal’; and a spirit of 
control and piloting of a machine by the ‘dashboard’. 
An address to the first of these qualities, the visual, is not new to contemporary 
transparency per se, insofar as past initiatives that could be said to be bracketed under the 
rubric of transparency also rely exclusively on visual form in communication. Past 
‘transparency’ initiatives in the British state, like those of the Thatcher, Major and Blair 
administrations, all of which endorsed the idea that citizens should be able to monitor the 
activities of government, rely on visual mediums of communication (printed forms of 
reporting). This may seem a somewhat trivial point, but it is absolutely significant 
inasmuch as it implies that the nature of social relations between the state and citizens can 
be rendered transparent solely through an appeal to sight, absent an attempt to address 
the other faculties of the sensory system (sense of touch, taste, smell, and sound). 
To a large degree, the idea that transparency, as a visual concept, should be enacted in a 
visual lexicon of representation is logical. Yet, the relations between a state and a citizen, 
and between classes, which are complex and multi-faceted, are plainly not solely enacted 
in visual terms. Above all, these are experienced corporeally, insofar as they contribute to 
the constitution of the minutiae of the reality of our everyday existence (e.g. Bourdieu, 
1984; Žižek, 1989). As such, to render the activities of a state transparent would, if this is 
indeed possible, require an appeal to a notion of experience and perception that is far 
broader than that of mere appearances. 
Now, to the question of the digital form of contemporary transparency, a feature that does 
distinguish open government from its predecessors. Past ‘transparency’ initiatives 
operated through a traditional mode of publishing, following a process resembling that 
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familiar to us from traditional financial reporting practices in accounting, that is: records 
are maintained over the course of a specific time period, at the end of the period those 
records are compiled into a standardised pro-forma, that report is subsequently audited 
and finally is published, either in print or in digital form, but in either case formatted as a 
linear document, presenting information in an ordered, chronological sequence (flowing 
from first to last page in a sequential fashion). Users of such information could 
subsequently analyse and scrutinise a document that referred to things ‘past’, things that 
have ‘happened’. In this sense, information made available to the public was presented as 
historical and fixed, being presented at the end of a period in time (a month, a quarter, a 
year). 
Whilst open government continues to provide citizens with access to traditional modes 
of reporting, akin to annual financial or corporate social responsibility reports, I want to 
draw attention to the exclusively digital, virtual sphere of open government and to how 
this changes the nature of our understanding and perception. The shift from the material 
constraints associated with the printed, or even ‘static’ digital forms (i.e. a scan or any 
document that is un-editable), means that transparency constituted in the digital sphere 
can be constituted in ways that simply cannot be reproduced ‘on paper’ without 
compromising the functionality of the original form. In open government, transparency 
is wholly mediated by a computer (screen) (Meijer, 2009). This is to say, the transparency 
of open government addresses citizens in a new category of perception, where ‘data’ can 
be presented as ‘live’, ‘dynamic’, ‘interactive’, ‘real-time’, ‘searchable’, and so on. ‘Data-
hubs’, ‘dashboards’, ‘data portals’, all of these rely on the sphere of the digital for their 
operation. If one prints a ‘data-hub’, its links to other parts of the network are neutered; 
if one prints a ‘dashboard’, its capacity to update and incorporate ‘real-time’ updates 
collapses; if one prints a ‘data portal’, its functionality is forfeited. The point here is that 
the “digital break”, as Žižek (1997, p. 195) explains, consists in the perpetual suspension 
of finality: 
As any academic knows, the problem with writing on the computer is that it potentially 
suspends the difference between ‘mere drafts’ and the ‘final version’: there is no longer 
a ‘final version’ or a ‘definitive text’, since at every stage the text can be further worked 




Put differently, in the virtual sphere, the capacity for edits and changes means that there 
is no ‘historical’ quality to transparency in the sense that would be felt with a ‘traditional’ 
form of reporting where accounts are stated in definitive, temporal terms, ‘accounts as at’, 
‘accounts for the year ended’, and so on. The significance of this should not be 
understated, for it makes possible a range of changes in the qualities of the material that 
is presented to the user, and by extension to the way in which that material is then 
perceived and understood by that user. Changes in the nature of perception, argues Walter 
Benjamin in The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction (2007) are intimately 
connected with social transformations and the movements of history: 
During long periods of history, the mode of human sense perception changes with 
humanity’s entire mode of existence. 
(Benjamin, 2007, p. 222) 
For Benjamin, “changes of perception” were interwoven in “social transformations”, and 
thus he was keenly aware of the impact of technologies on production in the sphere of 
the economy, but also in the realm of the arts and culture. In particular, Benjamin’s 
remarks on photography, film and art are of concern to us here: 
Earlier much futile thought had been devoted to the question of whether photography 
is an art. The primary question – whether the very invention of photography had not 
transformed the entire nature of art – was not raised. Soon the film theoreticians asked 
the same ill-considered question with regard to the film. But the difficulties which 
photography caused traditional aesthetics were mere child’s play as compared to those 
raised by the film. 
(Benjamin, 2007, p. 227) 
Modifying slightly Benjamin’s formulation, we might say today that the difficulties posed 
by the film are “mere child’s play” in comparison to those raised by the digital – after all, 
a film is a technological development of the photograph. So it is with the move of 
transparency from paper-based documents, or at the very least ‘static’ digital 
reproductions or scanned copies of paper-based documents, to an immaterial, always 
open, virtual existence in ‘cyberspace’. Could it be that in a move to the always provisional, 
never final sphere of the virtual that – perversely – a digital form of transparency, like a 
‘dashboard’, could be said to have an aura (in Benjamin’s sense) that is lost once it is 
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translated out in a material form? We must interrogate what has changed in the 
presentation of transparency in a virtual form. Žižek argues that in this process of 
transition to new technologies, we are able to perceive, in that fleeting moment of overlap 
in technological development, what is lost and what is gained in that act of development: 
One should adopt towards cyberspace a ‘conservative’ attitude, like that of Chaplin 
vis-à-vis sound in cinema: Chaplin was far more than usually aware of the traumatic 
impact of the voice as a foreign intruder on our perception of cinema. In the same 
way, today’s process of transition allows us to perceive what we are losing and what 
we are gaining – this perception will become impossible the moment we fully embrace, 
and feel fully at home in, the new technologies. 
(Žižek, 1997, p. 166) 
Therefore, in the study of transparency, and specifically in the study of the computer-
mediated, visual, digital transparency of open government, the question must be, what is 
lost and what is gained in relation to more ‘traditional’ forms of directly lived 
transparency? 
In this spirit, I first propose that with the advent of digital technologies of representation 
of transparency – in which transparency is presented in an ever-expanding array of 
dazzling, dynamic colourful forms that appear to render stale and outmoded the austere 
simplicity of a black-and-white report – we are gaining the capacity to access and interact 
with vast stores of data in a way that would have been simply impossible in a non-digital 
age. With the advent of digital transparency, we are gaining the capacity to see more data, 
which we have come to equate with the belief that we are seeing the world more clearly. 
We are gaining the capacity to access information at great speed, unencumbered by material 
constraints of time and space. We are gaining a means of representing information that 
makes it more visually attractive, more enticing to the eye. 
But what are we losing? With the emergence of digital transparency we are losing a material 
connection with the world beyond the immediate environment in which we look at a 
screen. We are losing directly lived experience, increasingly seeing a representation of a 
reality that we do not have access to. Specifically in relation to the state, we are losing a 
sense of our position as subjects. Represented, visual, digital transparency breaks the link 
between the visibility of domination and its material site. Rather than seeing the material 
effect of domination connected to the dominant as the brutality meted out by the state 
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onto the body of the condemned, in contemporary practices of transparency we see only 
a representation of the state, without the domination. That is, our domination by the state, 
and the practice of the state dominating others made visible to us in transparency, is 
experienced in an immaterial way, as a relation between myself and an image. In this 
respect, in digital, visual ‘transparency’, both the dominant (the state) and the dominated 
(the subject) are absent. And seeing a representation in which both the dominant and the 
dominated are absent makes it exceptionally hard, if not impossible, to conceive of that 
representation as a representation of domination. 
If in contemporary practices of transparency we lose a sense of our own domination, or 
have this sense dulled to a greater degree than before, we also lose a sense of mystery. 
Indeed, transparency – if realised in its purest form – promises the end of mystery and 
the unknown. In this respect, transparency is bound up with Enlightenment notions of 
sight and the emancipation that would spring from a total sight. Transparency, as the 
antithesis of mystery and opacity, promises to provide total sight and in so doing promises 
to be a liberating force. In ‘opening up’ and declaring itself ‘transparent’, the state acts to 
say, ‘You can see everything now’. But this statement should not appear alone, it must be 
adjoined with its implicit (and sinister) accompaniment, ‘You can see everything now, so 
there is no need to look for anything else’. 
I will now bring this section to a close by making the claim that the transparency of the 
state we see is an ideological object, and that it is so in a double sense. First, I consider 
transparency as an ideological object insofar as the promise of transparency is to end 
ideology, that is, to end misrepresentation, illusion, obfuscation, and deception – to show 
things as they are. But is not a promise of the end of ideology itself the height of ideology? 
As Žižek (1989, p. xxiv) would say, joining Althusser (2005), is promising the end of 
ideology not an ideological move par excellence? Second, I propose that in their glossy, 
polished interactive appearance, contemporary practices of transparency elevate the 
category of form above that of content. In other words, in contemporary, digital, visual 
transparency it is not the substance of what is presented that is the important aspect of it, 
but it is the fact that is there and that it looks glossy, organised, professional and under 
control. Once more I invoke Žižek (1997, p. 192), where he contends that “the primacy 
of form over content, is ideology at its purest.” 
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But is it wise to invoke a theoretical framing of transparency as ideology? Is the study of 
ideology not at best, unfashionable, at worst, hopelessly outdated? Has the time for the 
study of ideology come and gone? Is it not the case that we now live in a ‘post-ideological’ 
society? In the next chapter, I set out and develop my case for the theorisation of 
transparency as ideology and spectacle.
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4. THEORISING TRANSPARENCY AS IDEOLOGY AND SPECTACLE 
In her reflection on the role of accounting in the global financial crisis and the challenge 
faced by accounting research in its aftermath, Arnold (2009a, p. 807) urges a “rethinking” 
of transparency, arguing that “research is needed to examine the ideological roots of the 
notion of ‘transparency’”. In their recent work, Mehrpouya and Salles-Djelic (2019, p. 12) 
respond directly to Arnold, explicitly articulating their work in reference to her call for 
research. It is perhaps surprising, therefore, that Mehrpouya and Salles-Djelic proceed to 
construct a genealogy of transparency, theorising transparency by drawing on the work of 
Foucault and of the wider literature in governmentality studies. Though Mehrpouya and 
Salles-Djelic produce a rich, historical account of the mutation and evolution of 
transparency in transnational governance, without mobilising a rich theory of ideology 
they cannot confront directly the basis of transparency in ideology. If in accounting we 
wish to understand the relation between transparency and ideology, then we necessarily 
require a theory of ideology with which to do this. However, to take up study of ideology 
today is a significant intellectual and theoretical challenge. 
Whilst the study of ideology is by no means new to accounting, it is – as with the broader 
Marxist theoretical corpus of which it is a part – most certainly ‘out of fashion’ in 
accounting research (Catchpowle & Cooper, 1999), if indeed it could have ever been 
considered ‘in fashion’ (Cooper, 1997). In part, this derives from a preference for adopting 
theoretical perspectives that might be labelled ‘postmodern’ or ‘poststructuralist’ 
(Neimark, 1990), perspectives which dismiss theories of ideology on epistemological 
grounds. In addition, the notion of ideology also suffers from a chequered intellectual and 
conceptual identity, such that studies of ideology are repeatedly (and erroneously) written 
off merely as equivalents to conspiracy theorising. 
I argue that in thoughtlessly dispensing of the notion of ideology – whether it be on 
political, moral, ontological, epistemological, methodological or philosophical grounds – 
we jettison a finely tuned theoretical instrument that is precisely suited to the study of 
transparency in specific, and accounting in general. Especially with regards to transparency – 
which is, let us not forget, a profound claim to present things ‘as they are’, undistorted, 
without illusion – there is perhaps no concept more theoretically suited to its study than that of ideology. 
To be sure, this is not to suggest the adoption of a ‘classic’ theorisation of ideology lifted 
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straight from the pages of Capital or The German Ideology. Indeed, as I go on to discuss in 
the sections that follow, the notion of ideology has been subjected to an array of 
conceptual criticisms, restatements and major theoretical modifications. 
It is in two examples of the restatement and modification of the concept of ideology that 
I root the twin theoretical foundations of this thesis. First, I draw from the scholarship of 
Slavoj Žižek to propose an understanding of transparency as an ideological object, where 
by ideology I mean not an illusion that mystifies reality ‘as it really is’ and brings about a 
state of ‘false consciousness’, but a structuring fantasy erected in support of our reality, a 
framework that moulds our subjectivity and experience of reality. Second, I draw on the 
work of Guy Debord to theorise transparency as a specific analytical form of ideology: as 
spectacle. In the remainder of this chapter I set out my readings of ideology (4.1) and 
spectacle (4.2). 
4.1. THEORISING IDEOLOGY 
4.1.1. MISREPRESENTATION, MYSTIFICATION AND A WORLD UPSIDE-DOWN 
If we are to say that a ‘classic’ reading of ideology is today outmoded, and that to ‘properly’ 
study ideology today we need a contemporary reading of it, it is first important that we 
know from where we depart. Thus, we must proceed by asking: what is a ‘classic’ reading 
of ideology? Here, I develop a brief outline of what we might mean when we say ‘ideology’ 
in reference to what is perhaps the foundational text in the elucidation of the theory of 
ideology: The German Ideology. 
It is in The German Ideology that we find the famous allusion to the effect of ideology as 
being akin to that of a camera obscura:  
If in all ideology men and their circumstances appear upside-down as in a camera 
obscura, this phenomenon arises just as much from their historical life-process as the 
inversion of objects on the retina does from their physical life-process. 
(Marx & Engels, 1970, p. 47) 
What we have here is a historical-materialist reading of ideology as misrepresentation. 
Ideology, in this reading, is the naturalising of what is unnatural by the dominant class. 
Ideology obscures the arbitrary, contingent basis of class divisions and antagonisms and 
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(mis)presents these as ‘the way things are’, not as the historically conditioned outcome of 
an iniquitous and exploitative relation between capital and labour in the realm of 
production. In The German Ideology, Marx and Engels argue that it is the dominant classes 
that produce ideology, and that they do so in order to maintain their rule, distorting reality 
by representing their own particular, sectional interests as universal, general ones 
(Giddens, 1983, p. 19): 
Ruling Class and Ruling Ideas 
The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is 
the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The 
class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the 
same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, 
the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it. The 
ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material 
relationships, the dominant material relationships grasped as ideas; hence of the 
relationships which make the one class the ruling one, therefore, the ideas of its 
dominance. 
(Marx & Engels, 1970, p. 64) 
In this distortion of reality, our experience of reality is ‘false’. That is, we are in a state of 
‘false consciousness’, wherein we see an inverted picture of social reality that we treat as 
truth. To demystify history is to turn this picture the ‘right way up’. Thus, in the classic 
reading, ideology acts as a veil, a mask, an illusion or a distortion: ideology misrepresents the 
reality of ruling class domination and obscures the terms of this misrepresentation. 
Viewed as such, it is the task of the ideology critic to reveal or unmask the 
misrepresentations that conceal the arbitrary grounds on which the many are dominated 
by the few through the capitalist mode of reproduction, supported by the interconnected 
forces of state, law and religion (Marx & Engels, 1848). In other words, it is the task of 
the ideology critic to penetrate the mystifications that induce ‘false consciousness’, to 
awaken the masses of dominated and exploited people as to the arbitrary conditions of 
their subservience and to urge them into struggle against it and towards its overthrow and 
their liberation from its fetters (see Lenin, 1932; Trotsky, 2008). 
4.1.2. IN THE REALMS OF FANTASY: IDEOLOGY AS STRUCTURING (SOCIAL) REALITY 
As indicated at the beginning of this section, to take up ideology as a theoretical lens today 
requires that one addresses and responds to the methodological critique raised against the 
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‘classic’ theorisation of ideology as set out in the preceding section. Put differently, if we 
continue to see ideology as a useful lens with which to interpret and understand the world, 
we must also develop that lens in response to critique of it. 
Why, though, is the theorisation of ideology posed above – as an illusion concealing the 
true conditions of a reality of domination, exploitation and class rule – bracketed under 
the heading of ‘classic’? Why is it that this particular notion of ideology has been subject 
to critique, modification, restatement, or, in a great many cases, complete abandonment? 
To do full justice to such questions could be a subject constitutive of a thesis-in-itself, or 
perhaps even the work of an entire career. Nonetheless, here I approach these questions, 
considering the ‘classic’ reading of ideology in relation to its contemporary restatement 
and renewal by Slavoj Žižek. I develop a discussion of Žižek’s renewal of the concept of 
ideology as a force that structures (social) reality, rather than obscuring or misrepresenting 
it. I do so in four sections, addressing four categories of critical reproach for the ‘classic’ 
theory of ideology: the first, relating to the ‘static’ character of ideology; the second, to the 
epistemological position of the critic of ideology;30 the third, to the question of the production 
of ideology; and the fourth, to the political status of the subject of ideology. 
(i) The Static Character of Ideology. 
First, then, to the question of the ‘static’ character of ideology in its ‘classic’ statement. 
Conspicuously absent from my account of a ‘classic’ reading of ideology is a reference to 
Capital. Indeed, as Žižek (1989, p. 24) says, “The most elementary definition of ideology 
is probably the well-known phrase from Marx’s Capital: ‘Sie wissen das nicht, aber sie tun es’ – 
‘they do not know it, but they are doing it’”. And yet, in Capital we seldom find any explicit 
reference to ideology (Giddens, 1983), this despite its holistic ‘identity’ (as a text) being a 
critique of bourgeois political economy as obscuring and securing the domination of the 
capitalist economic system – i.e. as a critique of ideology. As Žižek explains, drawing on 
the work of Étienne Balibar, things are a great deal more complicated in Capital than they 
are in relation to the elucidation of a conception of ideology as akin to the inverting, 
distorting effects of a camera obscura: 
 
30 I will return to deal with some of the themes discussed here in relation to the ‘status of the critic of 
ideology in relation to its study’ in section 5.2, ‘Ontological and epistemological reflections’. 
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In The German Ideology, the (omnipresent) notion of ideology is conceived as the 
chimera that supplements social production and reproduction – the conceptual 
opposition that serves as its background is the one between the ‘actual life-process’ 
and its distorted reflection in the heads of ideologues. Things get complicated, 
however, the moment Marx engages in the ‘critique of political economy’: what he 
encounters here in the guise of ‘commodity fetishism’ is no longer an ‘illusion’ that ‘reflects’ 
reality but an uncanny chimera at work in the very heart of the actual process of social production. 
(Žižek, 1994b, p. 30, emphasis added) 
Let us consider what Marx has to say (in Capital) on this ‘uncanny chimera’ that is 
implicated in ‘the actual process of social production’: 
A commodity is therefore a mysterious thing, simply because in it the social character 
of men’s labour appears to them as an objective character stamped upon the product 
of that labour; because the relation of the producers to the sum total of their own 
labour is presented to them as a social relation, existing not between themselves, but 
between the products of their labour. This is the reason why the products of labour 
become commodities, social things whose qualities are at the same time perceptible 
and imperceptible by the senses. In the same way the light from an object is perceived 
by us not as the subjective excitation of our optic nerve, but as the objective form of 
something outside the eye itself. But, in the act of seeing, there is at all events, an 
actual passage of light from one thing to another, from the external object to the eye. 
There is a physical relation between physical things. But it is different with 
commodities. There, the existence of the things qua commodities, and the value 
relation between the products of labour which stamps them as commodities, have 
absolutely no connection with their physical properties and with the material relations 
arising therefrom. There it is a definite social relation between men, that assumes, in 
their eyes, the fantastic form of a relation between things. 
(Marx, 1867, p. 47) 
The point to be highlighted here is that in the apparently simple relation between myself 
and a commodity – by ‘commodity’, I mean any good or service I might purchase in the 
economy – there lies more than meets the eye in objective, material reality. Somewhat 
differently to the misrepresentation invoked in the imagery of the camera obscura, though 
informed by that notion, in commodity fetishism there is an act of misrecognition. Marx 
argues that in the apparently simple relation to the commodity, which to the eye appears 
merely as a relation between myself and a ‘thing’, there is concealed a whole system of 
forces and relations of production that sustain and reproduce the capitalist mode of 
production, which exploits the labour of the many (the workers, or the proletariat) for the 
profit of the few (the owners of the means of production, or the bourgeois). And it is 
commodity fetishism, Marx argues, that disguises what are interpersonal social relations 
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(of domination) as mere relations between things. But, curiously, what Marx does not 
explicitly argue, is that this ‘active’ force causing misrecognition is ideology (although the 
notion of ideology is evidently at the core of Marx’s reading of class). 
We could say, therefore, that in a ‘classic’ reading of ideology, we are left with two distinct 
conceptions of ideology. The first is from The German Ideology, which is explicit, in that it 
directly engages with the concept of ideology, but inadequate, inasmuch as it posits ideology 
in a static, epistemologically naïve mode. The second is from Capital, which is implicit, 
insofar as Marx does not call it a theory of ideology as such, but that is adequate, in that it 
is a theoretically sophisticated explanation of commodity fetishism as a structuring force 
of (social) reality. Thus, if ideology were merely static, a veil to be punctured, a mist to be 
cleared, the ideology critic might, as does a magician, utter a series of incantations and 
reveal the nature of the deception, unmask the imposter – abracadabra! But plainly it is not 
as simple as this, as Marx’s conception of the notion of commodity fetishism makes clear, 
though this remains tantalisingly uncoupled from a conception of ideology. 
In The Sublime Object of Ideology, Žižek welds together the notion of commodity fetishism 
with a theory of ideology – read through a marriage of Lacan and Hegel – in order to 
posit ideology as structuring social reality, not merely reflecting it (Žižek, 1989, esp. pp. 
1-56). In a sense, what Žižek accomplishes here is a reconstruction of the scattered pieces 
of a theory of ideology as an active, dynamic force that Marx did not articulate with one 
another, insofar as Marx (and Engels) did not develop a systematized ‘theory of ideology’ 
(Eagleton, 1994; Rosen, 1996). In other words, Žižek says explicitly what Marx only says 
implicitly in his pronouncements on commodity fetishism in Capital: that ideology 
structures (social) reality, rather than inverting or mystifying it (Žižek, 1989); that it is a 
“generative matrix” (Žižek, 1994b); that it is world-making, not a veil or mask concealing 
some ‘true’ state of ‘things as they are’ (Žižek, 1997). We might say, parodying Mackenzie 
(2008), that Žižek posits ideology as an engine, not a camera obscura: 
This is probably the fundamental dimension of ‘ideology’: ideology is not simply a 
‘false consciousness’, an illusory representation of reality, it is rather this reality itself 
which is already to be conceived as ‘ideological’ – ‘ideological’ is a social reality whose very 
existence implies the non-knowledge of its participants as to its essence – that is, the social 
effectivity, the very reproduction of which implies that the individuals ‘do not know 
what they are doing’. ‘Ideological’ is not the false consciousness’ of a (social) being but this being 
itself in so far as it is supported by ‘false consciousness’. 
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Ideology is not a dreamlike illusion that we build to escape insupportable reality; in its 
basic dimension it is a fantasy – construction which serves as a support for our ‘reality’ 
itself: an ‘illusion’ which structures our effective, real social relations 
(Žižek, 1989, pp. 15-16, 45)31 
What does this mean? It means that ideology is implicated in the construction of who we 
are, how we think, how we speak, how we act and how we see the world. Not as simple as a 
‘misrepresentation’ of that world ‘as it is’, ideology influences and shapes our 
subjectivities. Ideology is constitutive of relations of domination, not a ‘special effect’ or 
‘false front’ that patches up the workings of domination. In other words, and drawing on 
Althusser’s notion of “interpellation” – which is critiqued and developed by Žižek in The 
Metastases of Enjoyment (1994a, pp. 54-85) – ideology ‘calls out’ to its subjects. There is not 
a ‘one-way’ relation between ‘unthinking subject’ and ‘static’ ideology, but a two-way 
mediation between a ‘thinking subject’ and ‘dynamic’ ideologies that reach out to us and 
shape our practices and our sense of self. This means that ideology is not a veil concealing 
a ‘true’ reality ‘as it is’, but that ideology structures our experience of reality. In this respect, 
there is no privileged access to reality without ideology; misrecognition of reality is 
“unavoidable”: 
The point is not just that we must unmask the structural mechanism which is 
producing the effect of subject as ideological misrecognition, but that we must at the 
same time fully acknowledge this misrecognition as unavoidable – that is, we must 
accept a certain delusion as a condition of our historical activity 
(Žižek, 1989, p. xxv)32 
But what then becomes of the ideology critic? If we accept “misrecognition as 
unavoidable”, as Žižek suggests, then what is the function of a critique of ideology? What 
 
31 Though, this must not be equated with an existential relativist, nihilist perspective on reality: “When 
Lacan says that the last support of what we call ‘reality’ is a fantasy, this is definitely not to be understood 
in the sense of ‘life is just a dream’, ‘what we call reality is just an illusion’, and so forth.” (Žižek, 1989, p. 
47). 
32 Here Žižek’s position is broadly in line with that of Adorno. For Adorno (1997, p. 312), “ideology – false 
consciousness – is socially necessary” (where ‘false consciousness’ refers not to a ‘false’ consciousness of 
reality ‘as it is’, but of a reality I know contains my own domination, that I see through, but that I practice 
nonetheless). Also, see Adorno (1973, p. xxi). 
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can be accomplished by a critique of ideology if the prospect of vanquishing 
misrecognition has itself been vanquished? 
(ii) The Epistemological Position of the Ideology Critic. 
We come then, to our second reflection in the contemporary reading of ideology, which 
concerns the epistemological position of the ideology critic. Let us begin by considering 
Žižek’s (1994b) remarks on the matter, written under the heading, ‘Critique of Ideology, 
today?’. He asks, 
does not the critique of ideology involve a privileged place, somehow exempted from 
the turmoils of social life, which enables some subject-agent to perceive the very 
hidden mechanism that regulates social visibility and non-visibility? Is not the claim 
that we can accede to this place the most obvious case of ideology? Consequently, 
with reference to today’s state of epistemological reflection, is not the notion of 
ideology self-defeating? So why should we cling to a notion with such obviously 
outdated epistemological implications (the relationship of ‘representation’ between 
thought and reality, etc.)? Is not its utterly ambiguous and elusive character in itself a 
sufficient reason to abandon it? 
(Žižek, 1994b, pp. 3-4) 
What Žižek draws attention to here is the necessity of a rethinking of the critique of 
ideology in light of the restatement of ideology as a generative, structuring force, rather 
than as a veil or an illusion. 
A ‘classic’ reading implies that there is a route of ‘escape’ from ideology and that the 
ideology critic might reveal the route of this escape by exposing ideology as 
misrepresentation and setting history ‘the right way up’ (Giddens, 1983). The broader 
implication here, for which the classic tradition in ideology is rightly reproached, is that 
the ideology critic must, in order to ‘see things as they are’, have privileged access to 
‘transcend’ to a ‘non-ideological’ view of reality, that the ideology critic has come to know 
the ‘real’ state of things. Of course, the existence of such a ‘transcendent’ view of (social) 
reality, with its links to the notion of Absolute Truth, has been discredited and so with it 
a (naïve) critique of ideology founded on this notion. For how can the critic, the 
researcher, or the theorist lay claim to having unmasked an illusion to which they are also 
subject? Or to having transcended a mystified totality, a totality of which they are a part? 
Or to pronouncing from their newly found exalted position, ‘the way things really are’? 
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Indeed, is it not the case that – paradoxically – the thesis of an end of ideology, pronounced 
by the ideology critic, is in fact the ideological move par excellence? (Žižek, 1989). 
So how should the ideology critic approach their task today, if not by renouncing it, 
trading it for a ‘slick, hyper-real, postmodern’ perspective? Here, I want to briefly outline 
two essential repositioning moves for the critic in a contemporary study of ideology. The 
first, regarding the relation of ideology to truth; the second, relating to the position on 
‘transcendence’. 
Firstly, concerning truth. In the contemporary reading of ideology, the task of the critic 
of ideology ceases to be the penetration of a false mystification in search of the ‘true 
reality’ lying beyond it. In this respect, we must take a brave and radical step and accept 
that ideology can be true: 
The theoretical lesson to be drawn from this is that the concept of ideology must be 
disengaged from the ‘representationalist’ problematic: ideology has nothing to do with 
‘illusion’, with a mistaken, distorted representation of its social content. To put it 
succinctly: a political standpoint can be quite accurate (‘true’) as to its objective 
content, yet thoroughly ideological; and, vice versa, the idea that a political standpoint 
gives of its social content can prove totally wrong, yet there is absolutely nothing 
‘ideological’ about it. 
(Žižek, 1994b, p. 7) 
But, if ideology can be true – a proposition that is the antithesis of the ideology of the 
camera obscura – what makes something ‘ideological’? Žižek continues, 
An ideology is thus not necessarily ‘false’: as to its positive content, it can be ‘true’, 
quite accurate, since what really matters is not the asserted content as such but the way 
this content is related to the subjective position implied by its own process of enunciation. We are 
within ideological space proper the moment this content – ‘true’ or ‘false’ (if true, so 
much the better for the ideological effect) – is functional with regard to some relation 
of social domination (‘power’, ‘exploitation’) in an inherently non-transparent way: the 
very logic of legitimizing the relation of domination must remain concealed if it is to be effective. In 
other words, the starting point of the critique of ideology has to be full 
acknowledgement of the fact that it is easily possible to lie in the guise of truth. 
(Žižek, 1994b, p. 8) 
Therefore, the point is not to direct our attention and analysis at the ‘positive content’ of 
ideology, i.e. ‘what is says’, but to consider the relations and subject positions that are 
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sustained or produced by this content. For instance, to relate this assertion to accounting 
– is it not the case that a statement of financial position can be objectively, empirically 
true (in terms of the application of the rules for the production of accounting statements, 
measurement of assets, recognition of liabilities and so on) and yet remain thoroughly 
ideological insofar as it conceals the logic of exploitation and domination sustained by the 
capitalist economic system? Or, to use another example, proposed by Žižek, let us 
consider the question of the objectively and empirically false figure of the Jew propagated 
by the Nazis. Should we say, ‘This is false’ and leave it at that, or should we ask, ‘If this is 
false, why was this lie constructed?’ 
The proper answer to anti-Semitism is therefore not ‘Jews are really not like that’ but 
‘the anti-Semitic idea of Jew has nothing to do with Jews; the ideological figure of a 
Jew is a way to stitch up the inconsistency of our own ideological system.’ 
(Žižek, 1989, p. 49) 
A contemporary critic of ideology, therefore, must focus their analytical capacities on the 
function of the content of ideology, not the veracity of the content itself, if they are to 
understand the legitimations of domination that remain central to the character of 
ideology. 
The second act of epistemological repositioning which the critic of ideology must today 
engage in concerns the ‘transcendent’ status of critique as implied in the classic tradition. 
What is the riposte to the justified denouncement of the possibility of ‘transcendence’? 
Rather than simply accepting the charge that a transcendent critique would be impossible 
whilst retaining the belief that it might be desirable, the critic of ideology must recognise 
the necessity of an immanent critique of ideology (Antonio, 1981). That is, if we are to 
understand ideology, we must remain at the level of ideology, recognising that there is no 
‘naked reality’ or ‘reality as it really is’ without ideology: 
In vain do we try to break out of the ideological dream by ‘opening our eyes and trying 
to see reality as it is’, by throwing away the ideological spectacles: as the subjects of 
such a post-ideological, objective, sober look, free of so-called ideological prejudices, 
as the subjects of a look which views the facts as they are, we remain throughout ‘the 
consciousness of our ideological dream’. 
(Žižek, 1989, p. 48) 
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If in studying ideology we deal with varying representations of reality, the point, as earlier 
made, is not to reproach these for the degree to which they do or do not ‘faithfully 
represent’ (a phrase familiar to us in accounting) reality, but to learn from the way in which 
these representations each present a version of reality that structures it from a different 
perspective. To attempt to transcend ideology and present an objective, true version of 
events would be to ignore the key point that ideology need not be false in order to be 
effective, not to mention that such a ‘true version of events’ would itself constitute an 
ideologically infused object (as we see today in accounting in the form of ‘dialogic 
accounts’, objects that do not acknowledge their own ideological construction). Thus, the 
ideology critic need not (must not) claim to transcend ideology, to set history ‘the right 
way up’, nor to reveal ‘the way things really are’. Instead, their task must be to demonstrate 
that we do not live in a post-ideological world, that whilst ideology might not mask ‘the 
way things really are’, that it does mask a dominant interest, a certain logic of domination. 
There is, as such, a kind of tempering of what is to be achieved in critique of ideology, a 
reigning in of the claim made by the critic, who must no longer claim ‘this is how things 
really are’, but instead should aim to discern the message directed by ideology at the 
subject, to reconstruct the message, rather than puncturing illusions or throwing away veils. 
As Žižek explains, in reference to the film They Live (Carpenter, 1988), since ideology 
structures our reality, we need to construct ‘ideology glasses’ with which to see it: 
To see the true nature of things, we need the glasses: it is not that we have to take off 
ideological glasses in order to see reality directly as it is – we are ‘naturally’ in ideology, 
our natural sight is ideological. 
(Žižek, 1997, p. xiii) 
How might this work in practice? Žižek (1997, p. xiv) argues that, for example, 
when you are shown a scene of starving children in Africa, and asked to do something 
to help them, the true message visible through the glasses would be something like 
‘Don’t think, don’t politicize, forget about the true causes of their poverty, just act, 
contribute money, so that you will not have to think!’33 
 
33 For more on this see the film Pervert’s Guide to Ideology (Žižek & Fiennes, 2012) and an interview, Slavoj 
Žižek: Down with Ideology! (Žižek, 2016). 
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The task is, therefore to work at understanding the way ideology calls out to its subjects, 
the way it interpellates them in the service of some other dominant interest. But the 
question must now be: from where does this ideology come? Is it exclusively produced 
‘from above’, imposed by those ‘in power’, the dominant, to ‘trick’ or deceive those 
‘below’? In other words, are those who are ‘deceived’ tricked by a knowing or unknowing 
deceiver? Or does ideology come ‘from below’? Do we misrecognise ideology 
spontaneously, as individual subjects? 
(iii) The Production of Ideology. 
We arrive now at our third task in the elaboration of a contemporary theory of ideology, 
concerning the production of ideology. To return to the figures of the camera obscura 
and commodity fetishism: in the former, the ruling class (the ‘ideologists’) knowingly paints 
a picture of reality to deceive the masses, to keep them in thrall to the capitalist, exploitative 
social order; in the latter, the masses organically, spontaneously, misperceive the nature of 
social reality without explicit intervention ‘from above’ (Eagleton, 1994, p. 23). How does 
ideology operate today? How do I break out of this dichotomy whilst remaining consistent 
in my theoretical approach to one of the central figures in this thesis (the ruling state)? To 
do so, I say it is not a question of either ‘from above’ or ‘from below’, but both of these. 
How is this so? 
To say that ideology both operates ‘from above’ and ‘from below’ is bound up with the 
question of the extent to which the object of ideology (in this thesis, transparency as a 
branch of accounting) is presented as an object of ideology by the dominant class, (here, 
the state). To say that the state ‘knows’ that it produces ideology implies first, a level of 
consciousness on behalf of the collection of fields and struggles that is ‘the state’ that is 
false, but also that, in an epistemological sense, the state could somehow discern what is 
ideological and what is not. This is the break that must be made from the notion of the 
camera obscura, in which it is as if the dominant class knows the truth of history, has 
privileged access to it, and then deliberately obfuscates it in ideological procedures. This, 
we know, is an epistemological fallacy, insofar it rests on the logical requirement that to 
‘write history upside down’, one first must know what history looks like ‘the right way 
up’. So, does this imply that ideology really does operate ‘from below’? 
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If ideology operates ‘from below’ – as in the misrecognition of commodity fetishism – 
does this not betray my position on the state, and start to look uncannily similar to a 
Foucauldian theorisation of power, as flowing not from the “headquarters” but from all 
around, from everywhere? The problem with this Foucauldian notion is that it fails to 
consider the objects of ideology (again, in this text, transparency and accounting) as 
objects that secure and reproduce the interests of the dominant (the state) by being 
addressed to subjects (you and I). Or, put differently, I do not subject the state to ideology, 
insofar as the relation between myself and the state is not one in which I can subject the 
state to a material or symbolic order. 
We have then the prospect of producers of ideology who regard themselves as simply 
pronouncing ‘the way things are’, not consciously, deliberately ‘writing history upside 
down’, and receivers of ideology who treat these ideological objects as ‘the way things are’. 
In this respect, the modern restatement of ideology preserves elements of the classic 
tradition – i.e. the dominant ideas of society are those of the dominant class – but adapts 
these to an approach that disengages ideology from being a question of representing 
reality ‘as it is’ (what is effaced is not reality ‘as it is’, but a certain relation of domination). 
Still, this does not answer our question, where does ideology come from? 
The theoretical key to breaking this stalemate is the notion of ‘interpellation’, developed 
by Althusser (2008). Interpellation explains the way in which ideologies constitute their 
subjects by ‘calling out to them’, or by ‘hailing’ them, as Althusser would say. How does 
this answer the question of the production of ideology? The point is that in Althusser we 
find the “conjugation” (Žižek, 1994b) of the notions of ideology as ‘administered’ by a 
dominant authority (for Althusser, as for Marx, by the state) and as experienced 
‘spontaneously’ by the subject. 
In Althusser’s (2008, pp. 44-51) classic illustration of interpellation – the scene on the 
street of a police officer hailing an individual walking ahead (“Hey, you there!”)34 – the 
point is to illustrate not only that the hailed individual turns around to address the hailing 
authority (“By this mere one-hundred-and-eighty-degree physical conversion, he becomes 
a subject”) but that the individual in question already knows that this hailing was addressed 
 




to them. Consider this: if the subject were facing the police officer in question, not walking 
away from them, she would know that this hailing was directed at her (by a visual 
connection with the authority); the point made by having her turn around is that she 
already knew, she already recognises, that she was the subject being addressed. The former 
case (the individual facing the authority) is not ideology per se, insofar as she can see and 
recognise the authority that is addressed; the latter (the individual ‘with their back to’ 
authority) is ideology, insofar as she is subjected to authority in such a way that she defers 
to it unthinkingly. 
Can this relation be broken, or do we always ‘turn around’? Althusser (2008, pp. 48-49) 
leaves a crack, a chink of light in this regard when he posits that in the hailing of the 
individual “nine times out of ten it is the right one”. If the nine times is the functioning of 
ideology, we must aim at the tenth time, the failure of ideology to grasp its subject fully and 
completely ten times out of ten. In other words, we should look for crevices and cracks in 
the functioning of ideology. 
So, in sum, we have the subject who is always already in ideology, in that she turns around 
at its call, and we have the authority from whom the call originates. And thus, we now 
have the two sides of the ‘from above’ and ‘from below’ dichotomy established in a unity. 
As Žižek (1994b, p. 19) remarks, for Althusser, “ideology does not grow out of ‘life 
itself’”, but nor does it come solely from above, i.e. ideology has no existence outside of 
its being addressed to subjects – “there is no ideology except by the subject and for 
subjects” (Althusser, 2008, p. 44). Put simply: ideology comes ‘from above’ and ‘from 
below’. 
(iv) The Political Status of the Subject of Ideology. 
We have come now to our final point in exploring the renewal of the reading of ideology, 
which concerns the subject and their political status in relation to ideology. Once more we 
must begin by asking, what might the classic tradition have to say on this matter? 
To answer this, it helps if we foreground the whole study of ideology as an answer to the 
question of why, in a capitalist (today, neoliberal) society, by and large the many accord 
peaceably with the terms of their subjugation by the forces of the state and capitalism. 
That is, ideology is an answer “to what is a puzzling but frequently observed feature of 
political life: namely, that those who are maltreated – oppressed, exploited, even enslaved 
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– do not always reject that treatment” (Rosen, 2000, p. 393). By way of response to this, 
the classic reading of ideology would assert that domination of the many by the few is 
secured by illusion and mystification. The presupposition that follows this is that if we, as 
political subjects of a dominant order, saw things ‘as they are’, awoke from our state of 
‘false consciousness’, we would ‘come to our senses’ and rise up to overthrow the 
conditions of our enslavement to that dominant order. Restating Marx’s formulation in 
Capital, of ‘they do not know it, but they are doing it’, we might say that ‘if they knew what 
they were doing, they would not do it’. Or, at the very least, they would try not to do it, struggle 
against it, insofar as the overthrow of an existing order is never a matter solely of defeating 
it in the realm of ideas, since order is secured by material and symbolic supports (here we 
should recall Bourdieu’s modification of Weber on the power of the state). For inasmuch 
as Marx saw his ‘philosophy’ as a philosophy-of-action, the implication is that we cannot 
overthrow ideology ‘in our heads’ (it is precisely this sort of naïve ‘idealism’ that Marx and 
Engels rage against in The German Ideology), that we must also act in practice, in material 
reality (Eagleton, 1997). 
Yet what today needs addressing, and what Marx did not live to see, was a capitalism that 
worked to make its subjects comfortable in the environment of its making, both in terms 
of material (a nice car, a fancy TV, a comfortable sofa) and symbolic (Christmas, the 
weekend, the family, the Church) conditions. That is, Marx did not experience a social 
reality of political subjects who are ‘at home’ in their immediate social surroundings, who 
find these not intolerable, unbearable, alien or oppressive but who identify with them, 
regard them as ‘common sense’ (Eagleton, 2012). As Horkheimer (1972, p. vi) puts it, 
Since the years after World War II the idea of the growing wretchedness of the 
workers, out of which Marx saw rebellion and revolution emerging as a transitional 
step to the reign of freedom, has for long periods become abstract and illusory, and 
at least as out of date as the ideologies despised by the young. 
And as Wendy Brown similarly explains, “Weber and Marx assume a political exterior and 
subjective interior that is disharmonious with capitalism – political life featuring at least the 
promise of freedom, equality and popular sovereignty and a figure of subjective 
personhood bound to ideals of worth, dignity, self-direction, even soulfulness” (2015, p. 
111, emphasis added). In other words, Brown argues that Marx conceives a “vampire-
like” capitalism, from whose clutches (or fangs) political subjects would yearn for 
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emancipation from exploitation. Marx portrays subjects who think of themselves as 
enslaved. But today we are perhaps confronted with the prospect that neoliberalism – as 
capitalist rationality spread throughout non-market spheres, penetrating the soul – 
reshapes subjectivities in such a profound way that, in Brown’s terms, ‘the political 
exterior and subjective interior’ of the subject are harmonious with capitalism (‘I do not think 
of myself of ‘exploited’, nor do I feel in need of ‘emancipation’. It isn’t perfect, but I enjoy 
my life as it is’). 
The assumption of ‘false consciousness’ was always that its obverse – ‘true consciousness’ 
– would accord with the struggle to overthrow capitalism and realise the prospect of 
emancipation. However, a contemporary reading of ideology must contend with subjects 
who do not crave emancipation from capitalism because they neither perceive nor think of 
themselves as exploited by capitalism. In this sense, we are now within the realms of the 
Frankfurt School readings of ideology. The Frankfurt School developed the critique of 
ideology to incorporate an appreciation for the historical social reality not of naïve or 
ignorant (unknowing) subjects who might be ‘enlightened’ by the (knowing) ideology 
critic, but the nightmare of subjects who cannot be awoken from ‘false consciousness’ 
insofar as they have come to desire this state, to identify with the conditions of their own 
domination: 
I have just suggested that the concept of alienation seems to become questionable 
when the individuals identify themselves with the existence which is imposed upon them and have in 
it their own development and satisfaction. This identification is not illusion but reality. 
However, the reality constitutes a more progressive stage of alienation. The latter has 
become entirely objective; the subject which is alienated is swallowed up by its 
alienated existence. There is only one dimension, and it is everywhere and in all forms. 
The achievements of progress defy ideological indictment as well as justification; 
before their tribunal, the ‘false consciousness’ of their rationality becomes the true 
consciousness. 
(Marcuse, 1972, p. 23, emphasis added) 
The most intimate reactions of human beings have been so thoroughly reified that the 
idea of anything specific to themselves now persists only as an utterly abstract notion: 
personality scarcely signifies anything more than shining white teeth and freedom 
from body odour and emotions. The triumph of advertising in the culture industry is 
that consumers feel compelled to buy and use its products even though they see through 
them. 
(Adorno & Horkheimer, 1969, p. 167, emphasis added) 
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In this respect, the best efforts of the ideology critic to emancipate subjects are not 
perceived as liberating, but rather in their attempt at inducing a liberating effect are rebuffed 
as irritating. As Adorno (1997, p. 312, emphasis added) explains: 
When it is a matter of art, the bourgeois habit of attaching itself fiercely and with 
cowardly cynicism to something once it has seen through it as false and untrue 
becomes an insistence that: “What I like may be bad, a fraud, and fabricated to dupe people, 
but I don’t want to be reminded of that and in my free time I don’t want to exert myself or get upset.” 
Therefore, we are in a historical moment in which, drawing on Žižek (1989, p. 30), we 
might reformulate Marx’s ‘they do not know it, but they are doing it’, as ‘they know it, yet 
still they do it’. The point is that the ‘illusion’ of ideology lies not in our knowledge (or lack) 
of its operation, but as to our practice. As Žižek (1989, p. 30) explains: if, on the one 
hand, 
the illusion were on the side of knowledge, then the cynical position would really be a 
post-ideological position, simply a position without illusions: ‘they know what they 
are doing, and they are doing it’. 
But, on the other hand, 
if the place of the illusion is in the reality of doing itself, then this formula can be read 
in quite another way: ‘they know that, in their activity, they are following an illusion, 
but still, they are doing it’. 
The easy example to draw on here is that of the critical theorist in academia today, who 
knows that the journal ranking system is performative, shallow, erodes spaces of sincere 
scholarly enquiry and encourages ‘gap-spotting’, yet still does all they can to publish in top-
ranked journals. 
What does this mean? In a strange way, we end up far closer to Marx than we were to 
begin with, in asserting the need to appreciate the role of material practices and historical 
conditions in sustaining orders of domination that structure our world: 
In direct contrast to German philosophy which descends from heaven to earth, here 
we ascend from earth to heaven. That is to say, we do not set out from what men say, 
imagine, conceive, nor from men as narrated, thought of, imagined, conceived, in 
order to arrive at men in the flesh. We set out from real, active men, and on the basis 
of their real life-process we demonstrate the development of the ideological reflexes 
and echoes of this life-process. The phantoms formed in the human brain are also, 
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necessarily, sublimates of their material life-process, which is empirically verifiable and 
bound to material premises. 
(Marx & Engels, 1970, p. 47)35 
The important point for this thesis is that to study ideology, one should endeavour to 
identify and study ideological practices. To put it rather crudely: we should study not only 
how ideology makes us think, but also what it makes us do. Of course, the ‘arrow’ would 
work both ways, there is a dialectical relation between ideas and practices: i.e. what we do 
shapes what we think and what we think shapes what we do. So, in this thesis I want to 
direct our attention to the practice of transparency, not only – as we might be enticed into 
doing in a postmodern, cynical era that glorifies (fetishizes) the performative power of 
language, of ‘discursive devices’ – the language or discourse of transparency. In other 
words, I want to focus (quite literally) on what we do when we ‘practice’ transparency (i.e. 
where we ‘do’ transparency, what we do and say, if anything, during and after ‘doing 
transparency’). 
What are we now left with after our journey through the classic theory of ideology and 
into its contemporary renewal and restatement? First, ideology is not a static illusion that 
conceals reality as it is, but that it is an active force that constructs our experience of social 
reality. Second, the ideology critic must not claim to reveal reality ‘as it is’ (this is 
impossible), but instead must work to demonstrate the operations of ideology in 
concealing modes of domination in everyday life (this is achievable). Third, ideology is 
neither wholly imposed ‘from above’ by dominant interests, nor does it emerge wholly 
spontaneously on the part of the subject ‘from below’, that both of these processes are at 
work. Fourth, that political subjects cannot be assumed to long for their own 
emancipation and that ideology is what keeps them ‘deceived’ and ‘asleep’. Instead, 
ideology works to construct subjectivities accustomed to contemporary social, political 
and economic conditions (this means people cannot be ‘awoken’ from a ‘deception’). 
 
35 This is not to suggest that Marx was not sensitive to the power of language, as is commonly (mis)asserted. 
For example, consider this short excerpt from The German Ideology: “Language is as old as consciousness, 
language is practical consciousness that exists also for other men, and for that reason alone it really exists 
for me personally as well; language, like consciousness, only arises from the need, the necessity, of 
intercourse with other men.” (Marx & Engels, 1970, p. 51). 
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In sum, I have in this section laid a general foundation of what I argue ideology is and how 
I propose we may study it. But before moving on to introduce the specific instrument of 
ideology critique deployed in this thesis – Guy Debord’s notion of ‘spectacle’ – I would 
like to enter a brief note on the issue of representation, and representationalist philosophy 
in accounting, and how a ‘post-representational’ theorisation of ideology, posed by Žižek, 
fits into the terrain of the extant literature in accounting. 
4.1.3. IDEOLOGY AND (POST)REPRESENTATIONALISM IN ACCOUNTING RESEARCH 
To repeat again a truly radical step we took earlier, let us remember that in its 
contemporary restatement, 
the concept of ideology must be disengaged from the ‘representationalist’ problematic: 
ideology has nothing to do with ‘illusion’, with a mistaken, distorted representation of its 
social content. 
(Žižek, 1994b, p. 7) 
Of what relevance is this to a study of accounting? And, specifically, to transparency? To 
be sure, in studying transparency, it is all too easy to become caught up in existentialist 
rumination over representational questions of what transparency ‘shows’ and what it 
‘hides’. To some extent, this is a necessary and useful procedure, but to acknowledge that 
transparency and the technologies of accounting used to constitute it do not represent the 
‘full picture’ is not a novel contribution in the study of either. To be sure, appreciating the 
incapacity of technologies like accounting to perfectly or unambiguously represent the 
world is part of our journey in the study of accounting, but it should certainly not be the 
final destination if we wish to understand what is new about how accounting operates in 
society (Quattrone, 2016a). 
As I set out in remarks above, in which I outlined my Žižekian reading of ideology, I look 
to move beyond concerns with accounting representations as inadequate, inherently 
reductive attempts at ‘re-presenting’ phenomena (Tinker et al., 1982). My point, following 
Žižek in his discussion of Freud (on dreams) and Marx (on commodities), is that we may 
well look for what lies ‘beyond’ or ‘behind’ accounts but in so doing, we will find what we 
expected to find (missing pieces, absence of detail, a darker, messier world). Instead, and as 
for Freud and Marx, 
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the point is to avoid the properly fetishistic fascination of the ‘content’ supposedly 
hidden behind the form: the ‘secret’ to be unveiled through analysis is not the content 
hidden by the form (the form of commodities, the form of dreams) but, on the 
contrary, the ‘secret’ of this form itself. 
(Žižek, 1989, p. 3) 
Or, as is expressed similarly by Giddens (1983, p. 20, emphasis added): 
The most subtle forms of ideology are buried in the modes in which concrete, day-to-day 
practices are organized. If one simply treats ideology as the content of propositional belief 
systems, a vast area of human action which is ideologically relevant is excluded. 
However, a move beyond “representationalist analysis” in accounting is not new (see 
McKernan, 2007). Indeed, as Busco and Quattrone (2018b, p. 15) explain, a move beyond 
both a simple, “positivist belief” in (and critical or interpretive critique of) the 
representational capacities of accounting (Solomons, 1991) and a “constructivist 
approach” (Hines, 1988) to critiquing accounting technologies and institutions has been 
systematized and extensively adopted in the accounting literature in the form of a 
Latourian theory of accounting inscriptions (Chua, 1995; Robson, 1992). And so, it must 
here be asked, why is it that I do not simply take up this theorisation? Why do I feel it 
necessary to introduce my own ‘post-representational’ theory to the literature where one 
exists already? (Particularly where this existing ‘post-representational’ theory offers a route 
out of the “crude dichotomy” of understanding accounting either “as a means of 
representation” or “as a construction of realities” (Busco & Quattrone, 2018b, p. 17)). 
There are a variety of responses that might be given to this question, but I want to focus 
here on one, namely, concerning the object of interest in studies influenced by Latour and 
ANT (especially, Latour, 1987). The study of accounting inscriptions operates on an 
epistemological plane where knowledge and understanding is sought from the study of 
accounting content, whether that be in the form of financial statements, annual reports, 
management control systems, rankings, indicators, charts and so on. What is studied is 
how accounting inscriptions are positioned within, and are constitutive of, networks and 
how through creating particular visibilities they enable and generate particular relations, 
actions and interactions (Robson & Bottausci, 2018). In other words, inscriptions are 
studied in their capacity as constitutive, not as representative. The questions of interest are not, 
‘What does this representation hide?’, ‘What is lost in this representation?’, but, instead, 
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‘What relations does this representation call into being?’, ‘What actions and interactions 
does this representation enable?’ Thus, where it was Hines’ (1988) seminal contribution 
to demonstrate accounting’s constitutive and not re-presentative character, Latourian 
research proceeds from a similar point as an axiomatic methodological tenet in order to 
study the relations and practices that are constituted and brought into being by 
representations (Robson, 1992, p. 690). That is to say, in a study of accounting 
inscriptions, the ‘reality’ depicted (or obscured) by accounting is not a specific site or 
object of study; what is of interest is the function of accounting inscriptions as nodal 
points in a network enabling action and interactions between actors. 
To some degree, I am sympathetic with such work, inasmuch as it breaks out from a 
mesmerising spiral of the representationalist tradition that seems locked into a naïve 
realist, existentialist frame that would see us endlessly argue over whether accounting does 
or does not accurately represent reality. However – and here I bring to the fore my own 
political and social lens on the matter – I believe that it is unfortunately too often the case 
that such work does little to advance our understanding of how accounting is positioned 
in relations of domination and exploitation; this is, to my mind, a crucial role to be played 
by the researcher (or ‘public intellectual’) (Cooper, 2002). In other words, it is rarely the 
case that Latourian accounting research is expressly critical of relations in organisations 
and society (partly, this is a product of its methodological structure – see Modell (2019)). 
But, and more to the specific theoretical point in question, in my work, I am explicitly 
concerned with appearance, the aesthetic, the form of accounting. In what constitutes my 
‘Žižekian break’ from both Latourian accounting research and from a mode of critique in 
accounting that centres on an ‘unmasking’ of ‘what lies behind’ or ‘what is hidden’ in the 
content of accounting, I am specifically focused on studying the appearance of the 
representation itself. Therefore, the point is not to establish that the representation is 
incomplete, inadequate or partial and to penetrate the ‘veil’ of the representation in search 
of the ‘real thing’ that ‘lies behind it’; nor is it to position transparency within a network 
of actors and interactions and to understand the action that it enables or constrains. 
Rather, my aim is to understand – following the example of Cooper et al. (1994) and 
Gallhofer and Haslam (1996) – what influences and effects are produced by the form of 
the accounting representation itself, how the aesthetic of the representation is implicated 
in the constitution of subjectivities. The questions now become, ‘Why does transparency 
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look like that?’, ‘Does appearance matter?’, ‘What effects are produced by the way we 
experience transparency?’ 
I want to move on now to introduce a theory of ideology that accords amicably with 
Žižek’s reading of ideology and allows me to focus specifically on the appearance of 
transparency, how the aesthetic of transparency – treated as not just ‘the way it looks’, but 
also as the way it is experienced – is part of its constitution as an ideological object. For 
this task, I introduce Guy Debord, who – alongside Althusser and Žižek – Frederic 
Jameson positions as among the most significant figures in the recent history of Marxist 
thought (Sofronov, Jameson, Amariglio, & Madra, 2008). 
4.2. THEORISING SPECTACLE 
4.2.1. ŽIŽEK AND DEBORD 
Before laying out Debord’s theory of ‘spectacle’, I want to justify briefly why it is I have 
felt it necessary to introduce another theoretical figure to a thesis that already plays host 
to contributions from an array of critical theorists. The answer here relates to the question 
of analysis. If with Žižek I can pronounce transparency as an ideological object (par 
excellence!), can argue that it is a means of effacing a relation of domination, a means of 
‘lying in the guise of truth’ by ‘admitting everything’, pronouncing the ‘end of ideology’ 
(for this is what the promise of transparency truly entails), how might I then analyse the 
way that this ideological object interpellates its subjects? 
The point I wish to make here concerns the nature of my critique of ideology, which 
concerns not the content of ideology, but its form; not ‘what it says’, but ‘how it looks 
and how it is experienced’. And if it is through Žižek (1997, p. 192) that I have reached 
this position, where he pronounces the primacy of form over content as “ideology at its 
purest” (see also Adorno, 1997, p. 7), it is through Debord that I can advance from here, 
to analyse this primacy of form, insofar as Debord develops a theory of ideology that 
specifically addresses the social relations produced by – not merely reflected or 
represented in – appearances. Debord’s theory of spectacle is, as Frederic Jameson (2012, 
p. 293) states, “a theory of the image”, and is ultimately a theory of how society is 
governed by appearances, a proposition that is at the core of this thesis. 
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To be sure, aspects of this suturing of Žižek and Debord are imperfect, as is the case 
whenever a variety of voices are recruited in theory. For instance, Debord’s preservation 
of a notion of ‘false consciousness’ is somewhat out of place, and is therefore one aspect 
of his theoretical apparatus that I do not adopt. Yet there is much to be gained from 
augmenting Žižek’s critique of ideology with Debord’s critique of a society governed by 
representations. The common basis in Hegelian-Marxism shared by Debord and Žižek, 
something that manifests itself in their common reading of ideology through commodity 
fetishism, makes their alliance more straightforward. Likewise, and in what I argue 
consists the core of the union between Debord and Žižek, Debord maintains, akin to 
Žižek in The Sublime Object of Ideology, that spectacle (as ideology) is no mere distortion of 
reality, but that it “is the very heart of society’s real unreality” (Debord, 1967b, p. 13). 
Thus, in Debord I find the means to conduct an analytical critique of the aesthetic of 
transparency, how this aesthetic interpellates the subjects of transparency and how this in 
turn relates to democracy. In what follows, I set out a reading of Debord’s theory of 
spectacle, with the key theoretical themes developed here informing analysis and 
discussion later in this thesis. 
4.2.2. DEBORD AND THE SOCIETY OF THE SPECTACLE 
The whole life of those societies in which modern conditions of production prevail 
presents itself as an immense accumulation of spectacles. All that once was directly 
lived has become mere representation. 
(Debord, 1967b, p. 12)36 
The above statement is perhaps the most quoted of all the theses in Guy Debord’s The 
Society of the Spectacle. Certainly, one could be mistaken for thinking that this seems quite 
the opposite of a post-representationalist perspective on ideology given that representation 
is in fact the centrepiece of Debord’s famous maxim. To say that Debord was concerned 
with representation is of course true, but, like Žižek, Debord is fundamentally concerned 
with moving beyond a critique of representation that reproaches it ‘for not representing’ 
 
36 A note is needed here on the editions of The Society of the Spectacle cited in this thesis. I draw here on two 
versions, one published by Rebel Press in 2005 (Debord, 1967a), the other by Zone Books in 2006 (Debord, 
1967b). I have found it necessary to do this insofar as the idiosyncrasies introduced by the translators 
responsible for each edition have led to some sections in one translation being far superior to its 
counterpart, and vice versa. 
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and into a realm in which representation is critiqued as a productive force in society. The 
point is not what ‘lies behind’ the representation, but the social relations that the 
representation, in its very appearance (‘the way it looks’), calls into being. 
Though Debord writes of ‘the society of the spectacle’, it would help us now to answer the 
simple question, ‘what is a spectacle?’ The proper theoretical answer to this is that there 
is no such thing as ‘a’ (singular) spectacle: Debord never refers to the spectacle in the 
singular, as ‘a spectacle’, always referring to it as ‘the spectacle’. This tells us that we have 
here a theory of totality, which deals with society as a whole, a feature typical of critical 
theories. The spectacle is a social relation, one in which our everyday lives are structured 
by and shaped in relation to representations: 
The spectacle is not a collection of images; rather, it is a social relationship between 
people that is mediated by images. 
(Debord, 1967b, p. 12) 
The spectacle, therefore, is a generalised condition of social separation in which we are 
increasingly distanced from the reality that we see in representation. For Debord, this 
separation is a destructive social force that leads to alienation and isolation. 
Insofar as the spectacle addresses individuals, interpellates them, in a visual register, it is 
quite proper to say that if what we are talking about cannot be seen, it is not part of what 
Debord would regard as the social relation of the spectacle. Though spectacles may be 
accompanied by sound, this is not their essential feature. If we play a film without the 
sound, it retains its spectacular effect. But if we play the sound of a film without the 
images, it loses this spectacular effect. Thus, the essential sensory dimension of the 
spectacle is its plea to the spectator in the domain of the visual: 
Since the spectacle’s job is to cause a world that is no longer directly perceptible to be 
seen via different specialized mediations, it is inevitable that it should elevate the human 
sense of sight to the special place once occupied by touch; the most abstract of the 
senses, and the most easily deceived, sight is naturally the most readily adaptable to 
present-day society’s generalized abstraction. This is not to say, however, that the 
spectacle itself is perceptible to the naked eye – even if that eye is assisted by the ear. 
The spectacle is by definition immune from human activity, inaccessible to any 
projected review or correction. It is the opposite of dialogue. 
(Debord, 1967b, p. 17) 
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What must also be emphasised is that Debord’s theory of the spectacle is specifically 
concerned with visibility not in the epistemic sense of ‘making things knowable’ – e.g. 
making visible the performance of divisions in a firm by monitoring the ROI of each 
division – but in the sense of visibility as it relates to the way things ‘actually look’ in their 
quality as an image, that is, in terms of representations of subject and objects, colours, 
lines, shadows, depth, textures, and so on. For Debord, the images that mediate reality 
and produce the spectacle remain signs for the ‘thing-in-reality’: 
The spectacle cannot be set in abstract opposition to concrete social activity, for the 
dichotomy between reality and image will survive on either side of any such 
distinction. Thus the spectacle, though it turns reality on its head, is itself a product of 
real activity. 
(Debord, 1967b, p. 14) 
Importantly, this distinguishes Debord from Baudrillard (Flyverbom & Reinecke, 2017), 
in that Baudrillard posits a ‘hyper-reality’ of autonomous images in which signs represent 
no-thing and are therefore pure fictions that have gone ‘beyond representation’ of an 
underlying material reality (Baudrillard, 1981). Though Debord focuses on the role of 
appearances in society, he does so whilst maintaining the significance of the material referent 
to which those images refer, a staple theme of the reproach for postmodernism by critical 
theorists (see How, 2003, pp. 8-9). In other words, Debord is no Derridean postmodernist 
for whom we might say ‘il n’y a pas de hors-texte’ (or, more appropriately, ‘il n’y a pas de 
hors-image’). Instead, Debord remains grounded in the critical tradition in that he seeks to 
develop emancipatory knowledge whilst insisting on the importance of the dialectical 
interplay between material and ideal realms – essence and appearance – in determining 
our experience and understanding of reality (Schroyer, 1973): 
Essence is what must be covered up, according to the mischief-making law of 
unessentiality; to deny that there is an essence means to side with appearance, with the total ideology 
which existence has since become. If a man rates all phenomena alike because he knows of 
no essence that would allow him to discriminate, he will in a fanaticized love of truth 
make common cause with untruth. 
(Adorno, 1966, p. 169, emphasis added) 
In the remainder of this section, I work through an overview of Debord’s theory of 
spectacle, structuring it in relation to the four categories with which I developed the 
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contemporary restatement of the theory of ideology. First, I discuss the ‘active’ force of 
the spectacle. Second, the epistemological position of the critic in relation to the spectacle. 
Third, the question of the production of the spectacle. Fourth, the political status of the 
subject in relation to the spectacle. 
(i) The Active Force of the Spectacle. 
The spectacle cannot be understood either as a deliberate distortion of the visual world 
or as a product of the technology of the mass dissemination of images. It is far better 
viewed as a weltanschauung that has been actualized, translated into the material 
realm. 
(Debord, 1967b, p. 13) 
Debord’s theory of spectacle is inseparable from the concept of ideology. Debord’s 
Spectacle and its later accompaniment, Comments on the Society of the Spectacle (1988), are replete 
with Marxist allusions to the notion of ideology and the accompanying figures of 
Feuerbach, Hegel, the proletariat, the state, capital, alienation, and so on. Most 
importantly, though, Debord’s theory of the spectacle is rooted in a reading of ideology 
synthesised from readings of Marx on the commodity and commodity fetishism. The 
second chapter of Spectacle is indeed entitled, ‘The Commodity as Spectacle’ and in it 
Debord introduces the figure of the commodity – “our old enemy” (Debord, 1967b, p. 
26). In this respect, Debord’s theorising of spectacle ran contrary to the zeitgeist of ideology 
criticism in the 1960s and 1970s. In a letter to Giorgio Agamben, written in August of 
1990, Debord remarks that, 
I was happy to have attempted – in 1967 and completely contrary to Althusser’s 
sombre denial – a kind of “salvage by transfer” of the Marxist method by adding to it 
a large dose of Hegel, at the same time as it reprised a critique of political economy 
that wanted to bear in mind the Marxist method’s ascertainable developments in our 
poor country, as they were foreseeable from what preceded them. 
(Debord, cited as in Agamben, 2000a, p. 15) 
Agamben himself also remarks on Debord’s “remarkable” move contra Althusser: 
In the 1960s, however, the Marxian analysis of the fetish character of the commodity 
was, in the Marxist milieu, foolishly abandoned. In 1969, in the preface to a popular 
reprint of Capital, Louis Althusser could still invite readers to skip the first section, 
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with the reason that the theory of fetishism was a “flagrant” and “extremely harmful” 
trace of Hegelian philosophy. 
(Agamben, 2000b, p. 75) 
But why is this important to us? The point here to be highlighted is the fact that Debord 
sees spectacle as a force that does not merely represent (or distort) reality, but one that 
structures our experience of it, producing a weltanschauung: 
Ideology is the foundation of the thought of a class society within the conflictual course 
of history. Ideological entities have never been mere fictions – rather, they are a 
distorted consciousness of reality, and, as such, real factors retroactively producing 
real distorting effects; which is all the more reason why that materialization of ideology, 
in the form of the spectacle, which is precipitated by the concrete success of an 
autonomous economic system of production, results in the virtual identification with 
social reality itself of an ideology that manages to remould the whole of the real to its 
own specifications. 
(Debord, 1967b, p. 150) 
Like Žižek’s reading of the commodity and commodity fetishism, for Debord, spectacle 
is not a mere distortion of reality ‘as it is’, but is rather an active force that works to 
reproduce and structure our perception of social reality at the everyday level. Hence, in 
the latter part of the above excerpt Debord writes that spectacle works to “remould the 
whole of the real to its own specifications” (see also Debord, 1988, p. 7). We are not 
dealing, therefore, with a simple illusion, but a world-making, constitutive and structuring force: 
For one to whom the real world becomes real images, mere images are transformed 
into real beings – tangible figments which are the efficient motor of trancelike 
behaviour. 
(Debord, 1967b, p. 17) 
What, in concrete, material practice, might we point to as an example of spectacle? 
Debord insists that the “alpha and omega” of spectacle is separation, that is, “social practice 
split into reality and image” (1967a, pp. 13, 8). Thus, he lists forms of spectacle, “news, 
propaganda, advertising, entertainment” (that we would recognise as media), technologies 
for mediated, as opposed to direct, communication. Later, I will further develop my thesis 
around the spectacle of state transparency, but for now I would like to develop an 
illustration in brief. To do this, there is surely no better example today than of what 
124 
 
Debord (1967a, p. 7) would call “a separate-pseudo world that can only be looked at”, and 
that is the virtual world of Instagram. 
The images that populate the feeds of Instagram are not mere representations to be 
‘judged’ by users as to their accuracy or veracity of representation – rather, the images of 
Instagram structure the way users see and experience social reality, fuelling their desires, 
wants, needs, and also their insecurities, anxieties and narcissistic tendencies. As 
Flyverbom and Reinecke (2017, p. 1638) neatly summarise, “Online platforms such as 
Facebook, Twitter and Instagram do not just depict social relationships, but reconfigure 
them and produce new status hierarchies that did not exist before.” This is to say, the 
images that together form the spectacle are not mere inert representations of reality, but 
representations of reality that hail their subject, call out to them and intervene in their 
thoughts and practices. 
Thus, the point is not that Instagram hides the way ‘things really are’ by encouraging us 
to project ‘touched-up’, perfect versions of ourselves to be made visible to the public. In 
this sense, Instagram does not conform universally to a ‘classic’ reading of ideology. This 
is demonstrated perhaps most clearly in the contemporary phenomenon of ‘body positive’ 
campaigns that showcase images of users without make-up or of users who do not 
conform to what are regarded as ‘traditional’ or ‘conventional’ standards of objective, 
material beauty (Cwynar-Horta, 2016). On the one hand, these campaigns, which are 
funded and endorsed by capitalist organisations, subvert the prototypical critique of 
Instagram as a breeding ground for vanity, narcissism and destructive expectations for 
what constitutes a ‘normal’ appearance (e.g. for men, it might seem normal to resemble a 
Spartan-like warrior; for women, to aspire to embody a series of contradictory qualities, 
e.g. to be at once voluptuous and curvy, but also to be slim and slight). In this respect, 
‘body positive’ campaigns – in a very loose sense – could be considered a moment of 
traditional ideology critique, literally revealing the ‘way things are’ behind the mask (the 
mask, in this case, being either material make-up or digital touching-up). But, on the other 
hand, in purporting to show users ‘as they really are’, are we not then in an ideological 
moment par excellence? In the sense that images of ‘body positive’ campaigns (always 
‘sponsored by’ this or that cosmetic or pharmaceutical company) are not of ‘super-fit’, 
angelic beings, nor are they augmented or ‘doctored’ to enhance the subject, the 
campaigns are all the more powerful as world-making ideologies. Recall, earlier, in our 
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exploration of Žižek’s (1994b, p. 8) work on ideology, how ideologies can be true – “if 
true, so much the better for the ideological effect”. So no longer do I need to feel the 
shame of not looking like an angel or a warrior when buying the product in question, now 
it is also for me, whatever I look like, and I can buy with a clear, ‘ethical’ conscience (Žižek, 
2016). 
To stick with our example of Instagram, we might also reflect on the way in which 
Instagram has, in a way, become ‘more real’ – in the strict sense of being more important 
– than reality itself. Not only do users need to look like they are ‘having a good time’ (even 
if they are not, it is important that it looks as if they are), but the very existence of their 
reality relies on its statement in spectacular form. The trite pseudo-philosophical 
conundrum of, ‘If a tree falls down in a wood and no-one is there to hear it, did it make 
a sound?’ is today better stated as, ‘If I go out for a drink with friends and no-one 
Instagrams’ it, did it happen?’ ‘Insta’ or it didn’t happen!’ ‘Pics or it didn’t happen!’ The 
ubiquity of such statements would be – for Debord (1967a, p. 6) and his invocation of 
Feuerbach – the symptom of an age in which individuals prefer ‘the sign to the thing 
signified’: 
Feuerbach’s judgment on the fact that his time preferred “the sign to the thing 
signified, the copy to the original, fancy to reality,” has been thoroughly vindicated by 
the century of the spectacle, and in several spheres where the nineteenth century 
preferred to keep its distance from what was already its fundamental nature: industrial 
capitalism. Thus it was that the bourgeoisie had widely disseminated the rigorous 
mentality of the museum, the original object, precise historical criticism, the authentic 
document. Today, however, the tendency to replace the real with the artificial is 
ubiquitous. In this regard, it is fortuitous that traffic pollution has necessitated the 
replacement of the Marly Horses in place de la Concorde, or the Roman statues in the 
doorway of Saint-Trophime in Arles, by plastic replicas. Everything will be more beautiful 
than before, for the tourists’ cameras. 
(Debord, 1988, p. 51, emphasis added)37 
 
37 As briefly mentioned at the beginning of this section, such discussion of reality pulls us into the orbit of 
Baudrillard and the notion of the ‘hyper-real’, in which Baudrillard – radicalising Feuerbach – remarks that 
in an age of ‘simulation and simulacra’ we encounter the phenomenon of the ‘copy without an original’ 
(Baudrillard, 1981). However, Baudrillard’s position is distinct from Debord’s, not least in terms of 
Baudrillard’s critique of Marx (Baudrillard, 1975), but also insofar as Debord remains within an 
epistemological and ontological tradition that stops short of the more radical position adopted by 
Baudrillard (see Best & Kellner, 1999; Bunyard, 2011). 
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Of course, not all of us use or are subjected to Instagram, but ‘spectacular’ parallels 
abound elsewhere in everyday life. Today we are increasingly required and aspire to appear 
beautiful in representation as judgement about us takes place in the realm of representation, 
rather than in directly-lived experience. For example, organisations produce visual 
spectacles of performance – e.g. in the form of glossy advertising campaigns proclaiming 
awards won – whilst leaving untouched the processes and practices that are supposed to 
underwrite this performance (Roberts, 2018). Such practices are especially prevalent in 
environmental or corporate social reporting (Boiral, 2013; Gumb, 2007). Above all, then, 
the point to be taken here is that the spectacle is a powerful, world-making ideological 
force. 
(ii) The Epistemological Position of the Critic of the Spectacle. 
In order to describe the spectacle, its formation, its functions, and the forces that work 
against it, it is necessary to make some artificial distinctions. In analyzing the spectacle 
we are obliged to a certain extent to use the spectacle’s own language, in the sense that 
we have to operate on the methodological terrain of the society that expresses itself 
in the spectacle. 
(Debord, 1967a, p. 9) 
In the above statement, Debord clarifies that the critic of spectacle must remain rooted 
in the society that they describe. The critique of the spectacle is therefore an immanent – 
as opposed to a transcendent – critique, one which aims to understand and critique the 
contradictions within ‘actually existing’ society (Antonio, 1981). The profound implication 
here is that the critic of spectacle need not lay claim to know reality ‘as it is’, and to set 
the world the ‘right way up’. In analysing the spectacle, the critic need not, therefore, 
penetrate the ‘veil’ erected by the appearance, but instead reflect on the social relation 
produced by that very appearance. Recall: “The spectacle is not a collection of images; 
rather, it is a social relationship between people that is mediated by images.” (Debord, 
1967b, p. 12). 
The role of the critic of spectacle is therefore not to convict the images of spectacle for 
not representing ‘the way things really are’. First, we will find what we expected, a darker 
messy reality lying behind the pristine representation (Žižek, 1989). Second, how could 
the critic know ‘the way things really are’ if they too are distanced from the reality 
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represented in the image? The task instead is to convict the spectacle in terms of what it 
does not deliver. The tactic in critique of spectacle is therefore one of negation: 
Critical theory must communicate itself in its own language – the language of 
contradiction, which must be dialectical in both form and content. It must be an all-
inclusive critique, and it must be grounded in history. It is not a “zero degree of 
writing,” but its reversal. It is not a negation of style, but the style of negation. 
(Debord, 1967a, p. 112) 
Negation, in my own understanding and interpretation of it, relates to the practice of first 
taking seriously the claims made by ideology or spectacle (affirmation) and then setting 
these in opposition with the reality of empirical, concrete practices (negation of the 
affirmation) in order to bring forth the contradiction contained in those gestures, events, 
acts, or, in this case, images. Negation entails thinking in contradictions in order to 
eliminate them and is in this sense closely bound up with the ideas of protest and critique 
(Marcuse, 1972, pp. 127-173). Negation does not, therefore, set out to falsify ideological 
claims and replace them with reality ‘as it really is’ (the Absolute Real), but to falsify these 
on their own terms, by showing that they do not deliver that which they profess to. 
Negation is driven by the dialectical contradiction of what is with what is not. To give an 
example, we might negate a claim to transparency by contrasting this pure, Absolute claim 
with the ‘actually existing’ social relations, i.e. material practices, which this claim is related 
to. In this thesis, the claim that the state has ‘thrown open its doors’, been made 
‘transparent’ and that this will yield greater accountability and democratic participation, 
will be opposed to the empirical, concrete practices related to transparency, and thus the 
contradiction of transparency will be brought out. 
In a world of ideology, and thus of domination, negation allows us to perceive the logic 
of domination that is covered by the ideological effect: 
In a world that really has been turned on its head, truth is a moment of falsehood. 
(Debord, 1967b, p. 14)38 
 
38 For instance, since in capitalist society we experience reification – capital employs labour, things rule people, 
and not the other way round – the critical act of negation is in fact a negation of the already existing negation 
of life by capitalism. 
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Negation is the stance that must be taken to break the spectacle. If we treat the spectacle 
as the “visible negation of life” (Debord, 1967b, p. 14), then in its negation – the negation 
of a negation, in Hegelian terms – we might find life and the potentiality of liberation, or at 
the very least illuminate the logic of domination operative in ideology.39 
(iii) The Production of the Spectacle. 
The spectacle is the ruling order’s nonstop discourse about itself, its never-ending 
monologue of self-praise, its self-portrait at the stage of totalitarian domination of all 
aspects of life. The fetishistic appearance of pure objectivity in spectacular relations 
conceals their true character as relations between people and between classes: a second 
Nature, with its own inescapable laws, seems to dominate our environment. 
(Debord, 1967a, p. 13) 
In many ways, Debord’s notion of spectacle is a perfect theoretical lens through which to 
see contemporary society. Agamben (2000b, p. 79) is full of praise for Debord, musing 
that, “Probably the most disquieting aspect of Debord’s book is the fact that history seems 
to have committed itself to relentlessly confirm their analyses” (see also Agamben, 1993). 
From an accounting perspective, too, Debord’s (1967a, p. 17) assertion that the spectacle 
is “capital accumulated to the point that it becomes images”, can be empirically 
substantiated by considering the vast sums of capital constituted in immaterial, i.e. 
intangible, form. In 1975, intangible assets made up just 17% of the market value of S&P 
500 firms; in 2015, intangible assets accounted for 84% of the S&P 500 (Intangible Asset 
Market Value Study, 2017). However, in spite of these compelling injunctions to take up 
Debord’s work as a lens on society today, we must always take care to refer theory to the 
immediate historical context in which it is situated. In this regard, what must not be 
ignored is the extent to which developments in communication technologies have seen 
spectators join in the production of spectacles. Agamben’s endorsement, originally published 
in Italian in 1996, comes well before the advent of personal telecommunications devices 
(mobile phones, tablets, laptops) capable not only of simple communicative tasks – calling 
and texting – but also of sending and receiving photographic and videographic material. 
 
39 In Negative Dialectics (1966), Adorno addresses the positive, affirmative teleological trajectory of Hegelian 
dialectics – that the real is rational, that what is good appears – in the historical gloom of a post-Holocaust 
world. The essential point made by Adorno is that the outcome of the dialectical process need not be 
positive (i.e. ‘good’). Hence, thought must remain critical (Adorno & Horkheimer, 1969). 
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Thus, as with the earlier question of ‘where does ideology come from?’ the question of 
‘where does spectacle come from?’ must also be posed. 
If we were to proceed here in step with Benjamin (2007), we might begin by sounding a 
note of optimism at this development. We might hope that the development of mass 
media technologies in which users might become producers could be put in the service of 
radical and socially transformative practice. In other words, we might say, following 
Marx’s assertion that the contradictions within capitalism will lead to its collapse 
(‘capitalism produces its own gravediggers’), that spectacle, a product of capitalism, might 
be put to use in its destruction. This may be so. To be sure, in particular cases, the radical 
impact of spectacular technologies has been profound in relation to social movements, 
the most famous case of which is surely in organising the popular movement in Egypt 
(Howard & Hussain, 2011; Lim, 2012).40 However, if we were to characterise the impact 
of the technological developments of social media in recent years, we could not ignore 
what has emerged as an unprecedented commodification of social and cultural life, a 
commodification that seems to confirm Debord’s analysis that representation and 
appearances govern modern life. 
But Debord’s analysis must also be modified and renewed – as he would of course agree, 
as a Hegelian versed in the dialectical movements of history – to account for historical 
technological developments. In this respect, the production of spectacle, a production 
that Debord sees as “inseparable from the modern state” (1967a, p. 13), must be revisited 
and revised. For Debord, the spectacle is produced by and in the interests of the ruling 
classes. This is not to say that Debord sees the ruling classes as essentially enlightened as 
to the ‘true’ nature of reality and that they knowingly mystify ‘the way things really are’. For 
Debord, “even the deceivers are deceived” (1967a, p. 7). In other words, ‘No-one knows 
reality as it really is, not even the dominant’. But what cannot today be ignored is the role 
played by individuals in the production of spectacle. Individuals are no longer merely 
subjected to a flow of appearances and images that they do not control, they actively 
contribute to its production. Debord once wrote, 
 
40 Although, harsh material conditions were the spark that launched this movement – i.e., once people could 
not afford food to eat. 
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Imprisoned in a flattened universe bounded by the screen of the spectacle that has 
enthralled him, the spectator knows no one but the fictitious speakers who subject him 
to a one-way monologue about their commodities and the politics of their 
commodities. The spectacle as a whole serves as his looking glass. What he sees there 
are dramatizations of illusory escapes from a universal autism. 
(Debord, 1967a, p. 118) 
At the technological level, when images chosen and constructed by someone else have 
everywhere become the individual’s principal connection to the world he formerly 
observed for himself, it has certainly not been forgotten that these images can tolerate 
anything and everything; because within the same image all things can be juxtaposed 
without contradiction. 
(Debord, 1988, p. 27) 
We might now address certain aspects of such pronouncements. Concerning the first, 
where Debord sees “atomised and manipulated masses” (1967a, p. 119) that are 
‘imprisoned’ and ‘enthralled’, we might enter a more nuanced conception of a subject that 
interprets the ‘one-way monologue’ of spectacle, that subjectivities produced by spectacle 
are not uniform in their composition (we do not all think of ourselves in the same way). 
In other words, there is no ‘mass’ of uniformity in the construction of subjectivities 
(Kaplan, 2012). To the second, we must acknowledge the degree of contribution to the 
construction of spectacle that the spectator-turned-producer engages in. No longer can it be 
said that, ‘images chosen and constructed by someone else’ connect us to a world formerly 
experienced directly. Today (to some extent) the individual tailors these images to their 
own needs, chooses what they want to see, and contributes to the production of what 
others see. The crucial caveat that must be entered here is that many of the images we see 
are already heavily edited, staged and controlled by distant others. Moreover, we know 
that the algorithms that govern our digital excursions and interactions are crafted in such 
a way as to show us more of what ‘we want to see’. Nonetheless, is this not the perfect 
counterpart to our earlier discussion of ‘where does ideology come from?’ to which my 
answer, following Althusser and Žižek, was both ‘from above’ and ‘from below’, 
constituted by both the dominant and the dominated. 
With this being said, we must also ask, does Debord’s ‘one-way’ spectacle still operate 
today? Do the state and capitalist organisations, in whose union we have the ruling force 
in today’s society, continue to reproduce ‘non-stop discourse’ about themselves? 
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Overwhelmingly, the answer to this is yes. It is my argument, and one that I will shortly 
develop with empirical material, that transparency has precisely a spectacular effect in 
Debord’s ‘classic’ sense, in that there is not a two-way relation between spectator-turned-
producer and the spectacular content. In transparency, we have only a one-way relation, a 
relation between a spectator and an unanswerable, unchallengeable, incontestable authority. 
This should come as no surprise. When it comes to producing and reproducing 
commodities in the interests of capitalism, the engagement of users is actively encouraged 
such that it might be exploited in a circular relation of production and consumption. 
When it comes to democracy, however, the two-way relation is eviscerated. The user is not 
invited into the sphere of production, which in democracy is the sharing of power. This 
bring us to our final section, where I want to consider the political status of the subject in 
relation to spectacle. 
(iv) The Political Status of the Subject of the Spectacle. 
As long as necessity is socially dreamed, dreaming will remain a social necessity. The 
spectacle is the bad dream of a modern society in chains and ultimately expresses 
nothing more than its wish for sleep. The spectacle is the guardian of that sleep. 
(Debord, 1967b, p. 12) 
What is this statement if not the echo of the pronouncements of the Frankfurt School, 
specifically those of Adorno, Horkheimer and Marcuse, in their despair at a society in 
which people ‘see through’ ideology, and yet wish not to escape its grip? Recall Adorno’s 
(1997, p. 312) words, cited earlier: “What I like may be bad, a fraud, and fabricated to 
dupe people, but I don’t want to be reminded of that and in my free time I don’t want to 
exert myself or get upset.” The point here is that, for many, ‘the society of the spectacle’ 
is not a problem, not something to be overthrown or overcome, but something normal, 
something to be enjoyed. Debord hints at this, and prefigures (albeit faintly) the spectator-
turned-producer role of the individual: 
What is more, many see it as a civilizing invasion, as something inevitable, and even 
want to collaborate. 
(Debord, 1988, p. 4, emphasis added) 
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To take another contemporary example, let us consider the dominance of media-
streaming services, such as Netflix. Is Netflix something that people wish to escape from? 
Or, put differently, is Netflix seen as something ‘oppressive’? Certainly not. And why 
should it be seen as such, insofar as the content we find on Netflix offers us a practically 
unlimited supply of distraction and escape from our world. The point here is that, in 
alignment with those points I discussed earlier, neoliberalism – in the economic North, 
to be necessarily specific41 – does not ‘exploit’ the individual in a ‘vampire-like’ way; 
instead, it makes individuals comfortable in the world of the making of capitalism, such 
that their subjectivity is one accustomed to and acclimated to capitalism, not opposed to 
it (see Vaneigem, 2001).42 As Debord (1988, p. 7) puts it, “the spectacle’s domination has 
succeeded in raising a whole generation moulded to its laws”. We are not dealing here 
with the subject of false consciousness, therefore, but with a subjectivity constructed by 
spectacle: with subjects who consciously think of themselves as free, not as ruled. 
What this makes for, I argue, is subjects who are easily governable, insofar as they operate 
according to a logic of, ‘if it looks good, it is good’. What the spectacle breeds, therefore, 
is a dependence on and uncritical attitude in relation to representations, whose increasing 
visual sophistication, elegance and complexity do much to foster users with a sense of 
knowledge and control (Quattrone, 2017), a sense that they would be well advised to 
temper with a degree of doubt (Macintosh & Quattrone, 2010). This attitude is 
exemplified in the ascendancy in organisations of dashboards and performance 
measurement systems that operate according to Red-Amber-Green (RAG) codes. As 
representations of organisational performance, RAG charts tyrannise over the practices 
of organisations to the extent that the important thing is that the chart is green, not that 
the actual organisational practices to which the chart refers are ‘green’ (in the sense of 
meeting the criteria being assessed). Of course, such phenomena have been observed and 
studied now for some time (e.g. Power, 1999), but the essential point that distinguishes 
this thesis and other works that foreground the concept of the spectacle is the degree to 
which the visual form itself is specifically responsible for this ‘decoupling’ (separation) 
(Flyverbom & Reinecke, 2017). Therefore, the point is not simply to problematise the 
 
41 Exploitative, degrading and materially oppressive forms of capitalism are evidently still at work across the 
world. 
42 Although this itself is clearly not the case for those who are victims of the brutal regimes of austerity that 
accompany neoliberal political economies. 
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attitude of ‘if everything looks good, it is good’, rather, the important feature of this is 
that by virtue of its ‘aesthetic appeal’ (Ronzani & Gatzweiler, 2019) the representation 
itself has become the loci of attention, the point around which we coalesce to coordinate 
our action. We have then a social relation between people mediated by images. In other 
words, the problem is not of the content of the representation – the fact that it does not 
represent, that it is reductive and so on – but that the form of the representation has 
assumed primacy over the content of the thing represented, which, as we know, is a 
prototypical ideological condition (Žižek, 1997). The echo here of commodity fetishism 
(relations between people are misrecognised as relations between things) is clear. In a 
society of the spectacle, where representations structure more and more of our everyday 
lives, relations between classes are misrecognised as relations between images. 
What is perhaps more important than this, however, is that even if a subject was to find 
their social and political surroundings unpalatable (that is, if they find contemporary 
conditions at odds with their subjectivity) the means through which they might exercise 
critique of spectacular society are limited. Spectacles produced by those in power are one-
way, monologues, received in isolation, separated from the reality they represent. In this 
sense, they are the antithesis of dialogue (Debord, 1967b, p. 17), which is of course a 
cornerstone of a directly lived experience of democracy. The spectacle is untouchable, 
unchallengeable and incontestable. To return to my earlier illustration of Foucault’s 
‘spectacle of the scaffold’, we observed the possibility that the spectator, who formed part 
of an assembled mass of spectators, might reach out and intervene in the act of power of 
the state, that they might reject or confront it. In Debord’s mediated, represented 
spectacle, we find that the site of confrontation between power and the citizenry has been 
neutralised, separated into a one-way relation between an individual spectator and 
mediated images against which there is no immediate means of staging a protest or 
rejection. 
To draw this section to a close, I summarise the theoretical insights that I take from 
Debord. First, that the spectacle – mediated, single-sense, visual representations that 
separate image from practice – conceals the logic of domination of neoliberalism, 
operative at the level of relations between classes, as a relation between images. The 
spectacle is not a series of images, mere veils to be punctured, but is world-making and 
constitutive of subjectivity. Second, that a critique of the spectacle should not aim to 
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transcend the spectacle, but that it should be an immanent critique and aim to negate the 
claims of spectacle and reveal the contradictions and antagonisms that spectacles cover 
over within society. Third, that although today we may observe the phenomenon of the 
spectator-turned-producer, the spectacle continues to operate in a one-way, 
unanswerable, incontestable, untouchable fashion. It continues to expose isolated, silent 
individuals to its own rendering of the world that cannot be challenged insofar as the 
spectacle is the expression of the interests of the domination classes, classes who control 
the forces and relations of production. Fourth, that the spectacle has shaped subjectivities 
such that individuals are at home in the society of the spectacle and see it not as a prison 
to be escaped from, but as a salon to be stylised. As such, any critique of the society of 
the spectacle must aim not at ‘revealing’ the true consciousness of individuals currently in 
a state of false consciousness, but at constructing a critique of that society that they might 
recognise and identify with. 
I move now to the next chapter of this thesis, in which I set out discussions of 




Up to this point, I have engaged almost solely with literature and theory, setting out a 
series of positions on each and posing questions to be explored in empirical enquiry. 
Having now laid the foundation on which I build the empirical work of this study, in this 
chapter I set out the approach taken in conducting the research that answers the research 
questions posed earlier in this text (see section 1.1).43 The chapter is structured as follows: 
I begin by detailing my methodological position (5.1). Next, I provide a detailed 
description of the empirical context for this thesis (5.2). I close the chapter by setting out 
my method of analysis (5.3). 
5.1 ONTOLOGICAL, EPISTEMOLOGICAL AND PRACTICAL REFLECTIONS: EXISTING, 
KNOWING AND DOING 
What do we mean by methodology? To some, methodology is synonymous with method, 
in that it entails setting out the processes and procedures associated with the activity of 
research. Is this wrong? Perhaps it is, but I think what the preceding sentiment expresses 
is less ‘wrong’ than it is revealing of a positivistic methodological approach to research, by 
which I mean an approach that models research in the social sciences on the broad 
approach taken in the natural science: collect data, analyse with instruments, and publish 
findings. In this approach, ‘data’ is seen as inert, separate from the researcher. Instruments 
and methods are treated as ‘neutral’. Findings are regarded as ‘objective’ and ‘apolitical’. 
As will be clear by now, I do not adopt such an approach. To me, methodology in social 
science (accounting) research is a question of weltanschauung (worldview), which is to say 
that ‘the researcher’ and ‘the person’ are not separate entities that might be treated as 
distinct (i.e. ‘I am a researcher when I am researching and I am a person when I am not’), 
but that they are a whole and must be treated as such. I am always both person and 
researcher as my lived experience affects my research, and vice versa. Methodology is then 
less a question of setting out ones research method(s) and more a question of establishing 
what we mean by research. Our methodology relates to our perspective on what ‘counts’ 
as research, what is ‘worth’ studying, what research is for and what motivates our desire 
 
43 By way of a reminder, these are as follows. (i) What role is played by the particular aesthetic form of state 
transparency? (ii) How does state transparency shape the way that citizens think of themselves in relation 
to the state? (iii) What interest does the state have in transparency? 
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to conduct research in the first instance. Is the researcher a neutral figure in the 
production of the research? Can research be ‘good’ research – or can it even be research 
– if it is ‘political’? All of these are questions that are questions of methodology. As such, 
the answers we might give depend on where we are positioned in the kind of 
methodological schemas proposed by Burrell and Morgan (1979), Morgan and Smircich 
(1980), Chua (1986), and Cunliffe (2011), which codify methodological positions and state 
these in relation to one another with respect to issues of ontology (existing), epistemology 
(knowing) and practice (doing). 
In what follows, I set out my own methodological position, which is determined by my 
base of readings in critical theory and my own lived experience of the world. As such, my 
perspectives on each of the three questions of research – of existing, knowing and doing 
– are shaped by my commitment to conducting critical research. Indeed, of all the 
theorists I have called on in this thesis to structure and support my arguments the 
common thread running between them is a critical spirit, a concern for changing practice 
through theory, not merely for the pursuit of knowledge or engagement in thought for its 
own sake, but for the sake of changing society. Therefore, as much as the following should 
be read as a setting out of my own methodological weltanschauung, it might also be looked 
at as an answer to the question of what it means to be critical. 
Before proceeding, a word is needed on another dimension around which we might 
approach the subject of methodology, and that relates to the twin poles of research in 
accounting: the quantitative and the qualitative. What is often forgotten, and regrettably 
so, is that at root these poles are empirical categories by which we describe the kind of 
‘data’ we work with. In this thesis, I conduct research that is recognisably situated within 
the qualitative tradition. In its simplest form, this means that my object of research – my 
‘data’ – is not composed of numbers to be analysed statistically, but is of words and 
pictures. Or, strictly speaking, as I will come on to explain, my object of research is society 
itself (see Horkheimer, 1972, pp. 206-207). What such a categorisation should not invite, 
however, is the sense that I align with a common affinity for what constitutes research 
shared by all qualitative researchers, one that is strictly opposed to that of quantitative 
researchers. In other words, the labels of ‘quantitative’ and ‘qualitative’ in research should 
not establish a false unity of identity among those branded with either mark. To be sure, 
it is certainly the case that the majority of quantitative research in accounting is rooted in 
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a positivist methodology, but this by no means occludes the use of quantitative data 
sources in critical or interpretivist research (Bourdieu, 1990, pp. 135-141; Horkheimer, 
1972, p. 229). As Morrow and Brown (1994, p. 200) write: 
Despite its critique of positivism generally, critical theory has no basis for a priori 
rejection of any particular methods or techniques as such, even if some have 
pronounced misleading blanket rejections of “number crunching.” 
Likewise, the majority of qualitative research in accounting is based in the critical or 
interpretive traditions, but there of course exist positivistic studies within the qualitative 
bracket (see Prasad & Prasad, 2002, on “qualitative positivism” in organisational and 
management research). 
In sum, the point I wish to make here is that the kind of tribal identity divide established 
between the ‘quants’ and the ‘quals’ in accounting research can end up reifying and 
reproducing destructive academic boundaries along ultimately arbitrary lines. Sadly it 
seems to be the case that in accounting research we find what Adorno (1966, p. 35) 
remarks on in relation to the history of philosophy – “epistemological categories turned 
into moral ones”. What has been written up to now and what follows is not, therefore, 
the discourse of a qualitative researcher, but that of a critical one. 
I move now to set out my position in relation to the three interrelated pillars of my 
methodology, beginning with remarks on ontology (5.1.1), moving then to epistemology 
(5.1.2) and finally to practice (5.1.3).  
5.1.1. ONTOLOGY: EXISTING 
Ontology, though a category within the methodological formation, is a branch of 
scholarship in its own right. Ontology relates to the study of ‘being’, ‘reality’ and ‘what 
exists’. Therefore, perhaps the fundamental ontological question is: what exists? This 
question plays a determining role in the establishing of our methodologies, with the 
answer one gives being interwoven with our positions on epistemology and practice 
(Chua, 1986). As Burrell and Morgan (1979, p. 4) explain in Sociological Paradigms and 
Organisational Analysis (see also Morgan & Smircich, 1980), the answer to this question in 
the social sciences can broadly be polarised into two approaches. On the one hand, there 
are those who take a realist, objective approach – social reality is ‘out there’, it can be 
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‘discovered’ and it exists independently of our perception and consciousness of it. On the 
other hand, there are those who take a nominalist, subjective approach (now more commonly 
referred to as constructivist) – social reality has no existence outside of our perception 
and consciousness of it; i.e. without the reflective subject there is no social reality, reality 
is not discovered, but created. We now have two poles: one at which social reality is 
treated as an object that can be isolated from individuals and studied; the other at which 
there is no social reality without the thinking, perceiving subject and as such the study of 
social reality is inseparable from consciousness. At this point we must also consider a 
third position – intersubjectivity – which is neatly articulated in relation to the objective and 
subjective approaches to social reality by Cunliffe (2011). An intersubjective approach 
mediates between the binary opposition of the subjective and objective approaches, 
positing a social reality that is neither wholly constituted in the realms of consciousness 
nor wholly ‘out there’ independent of consciousness. In an intersubjective approach, 
social reality is considered as comprising of a dialectical relation between these: reality is 
determined by ‘out there’ material phenomena, but not wholly so (and vice versa for symbolic 
phenomena). As will be clear from readings of the earlier chapters of this thesis, I adopt 
an intersubjective approach to ontology. For instance, my remarks on neoliberalism and 
the state exemplify such an approach, as in both cases I take great care to emphasise the 
extent to which these phenomena exist as a union of material and symbolic features. 
As such, it is important at this stage to give more detail on the intersubjective approach 
to ontology. The intersubjective ontology can be thought of as emerging from the tension 
between the subjective and objective approaches to social reality, which can be illustrated 
usefully in reference to the dynamics of Marx’s critique of Hegel (see Antonio, 1981, pp. 
333-334). Crudely speaking, Hegel, who in Burrell and Morgan’s terms is the ‘German 
Idealist’, held that consciousness determines social being and that the nature of reality and 
being might be resolved in the ideal realm. In simple, though apposite terms, Hegel’s 
position and that of (German) Idealism in general is one in which our experience of reality 
is determined ‘in our heads’. As such, our experiences, problems and concerns might be 
‘fixed’ in the realm of the mind. By contrast, Marx, as Eagleton (1997, p. 11) explains, sees 
this equation as essentially reversed, that “‘social being’ determines consciousness, and 
not, as the Idealists would have it, vice versa” (see also Marx & Engels, 1970, pp. 40-95). 
In this respect, Marx was violently opposed to the idealism of Hegel, though perhaps 
more to the idealism of the ‘young Hegelians’, against whom Marx and Engels rage in a 
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substantial part of The German Ideology.44 But to propose Marx as wholly ‘objective’ and 
Hegel as wholly ‘subjective’ in their understandings of social reality would be incorrect. Or, 
as Horkheimer (2018, p. 119) puts it, this would be both “badly understood Marx” and 
“badly understood Hegel”. The union of Hegel and Marx in Hegelian Marxism, which I 
earlier referred to in reference to my coupling of Žižek and Debord and which also 
characterises a great deal of the Frankfurt School tradition, attests precisely to this point. 
What a Hegelian Marxism affirms, in ontological terms, is that social reality is determined 
not solely in symbolic or ideal terms, nor solely in physical or material terms, but that 
there is a dialectic between these, an active relation between subject and object. The 
dialectical approach to ontology – in which the empirical, material is contrasted against 
the symbolic, ideal, the appearance to the essence – is central to critical theory (see 
Marcuse, 2000, pp. 258-322). My answer to the ontological question of ‘what exists?’ 
therefore consists of affirming social reality as a dialectical product of the union of a 
concrete material reality and our ideal, sensory perception of that reality. 
Notwithstanding what has been written up to now, it must be said that for the critical 
theorist, ontology is a category to be wary of. Adorno, Habermas and Marcuse all eschew 
ontological vocabularies (How, 2003, pp. 149-155), as does Horkheimer (Aronowitz, 
2002, p. xiv). Indeed, in some ways, to speak of an ontology of critical theory is 
counterintuitive. Why is this so? As has been alluded to above and on numerous occasions 
prior to this point, in critical theory the concern with reality is one that remains grounded 
in a dialectical interplay between the material and ideal (or material and symbolic) realms 
of social reality. For the critical researcher, an excessive focus on ontology, as a study of 
what it means to be and exist, veers towards metaphysical idealism. To engage at length 
with ontological questions of being and existence, one risks residing wholly in the ideal 
realm and is thus ensnared in rumination over existential questions divorced from the basis 
of social reality in material, physical and practical conditions. Adorno’s The Jargon of 
Authenticity (1973) – and see also Negative Dialectics (Adorno, 1966, pp. 49-51) – is a text 
devoted to solely to a critique of existentialism, a critique levelled directly at Heidegger, 
whose Being and Time (1962) Adorno loathed for what he regarded as its mystification 
(rather than illumination) of contemporary conditions of domination and compression of 
 
44 In uncompromising terms, Marx and Engels (1970, p. 103) write that “Philosophy and the study of the 
actual world have the same relation to one another as masturbation and sexual love.” 
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social reality to an idealist, metaphysical notion of consciousness and self-experience 
divorced from the immediacy of historical, material conditions (Schroyer, 1973). 
Therefore, the point I wish to make here is that although I may have an ontological position, 
I maintain scepticism for the notion of ontology treated in isolation, devoid as it becomes 
of referent to the material conditions of social reality that I see as crucial to any 
understanding of that reality. 
5.1.2. EPISTEMOLOGY: KNOWING 
If ontology concerns the nature of existence and (social) reality, then epistemology is 
concerned with the nature of knowledge, of what we know about social reality and how 
we come to know it (Morgan & Smircich, 1980). Importantly, epistemology is bound up 
with the question of truth (or Truth). Of course, the question of epistemology is 
inseparable from that of ontology – what it means to exist or to be determines our 
perspective on what it means to know. Epistemology therefore plays a major role in 
establishing the research methods that we employ and, to step back somewhat, the 
research questions that we pose in the first instance. Thus, I propose that the fundamental 
epistemological question is perhaps best stated as three-fold: (i) what can we know; (ii) how 
can we know it; (iii) and what is truth? 
Thought of in simple terms, we might understand our epistemological perspective as what 
determines the answer we would give in order to complete the following statement: ‘I 
know this because…’ For some, the answer will be ‘because I measured it using statistics’, for 
others, ‘because I experienced it.’ The former implies a positivist epistemology, where 
knowledge is regarded as something objective, absolute and external to the researcher, 
knowledge is treated as a ‘thing’ that can be observed, discovered, analysed and added to 
a stock of ‘already knowns’. Knowledge is ‘true’, can be ‘proved’ and is ‘tested’ in relation 
to hypotheses. The latter implies an interpretivist epistemological position in which 
knowledge is treated as subjective, relative and internal to human experience; insofar as we 
may only see the world through human eyes, knowledge is treated as something that can 
never be observed from ‘outside’, but must be experienced from ‘inside’ the phenomenon 
in question. In the process of conducting research, knowledge is ‘created’, not found, 
insofar as a ‘finding’ or a ‘discovery’ evokes the notion of knowledge in the social sciences 
being akin to an archaeological finding of the natural sciences. 
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As a critical researcher, I find myself situated within neither the positivist nor the 
interpretivist tradition in epistemology. The question is: where am I? One way I might 
position myself is in relation to the “scheme for analysing assumptions about the nature 
of social science” proposed by Burrell and Morgan (1979, p. 3). Here, I would be situated 
at the centre of the dichotomy between “subjective” and “objective” approaches to social 
science, which are classified in relation to epistemology as “Anti-positivism” – 
“Positivism”. However, in what is a more sophisticated analysis than this, Chua (1986, 
pp. 620-621) proposes the critical epistemology as conceptually distinct from the ‘anti-
positivist – positivist’ dichotomy proposed by Burrell and Morgan. The nuance 
introduced here by Chua is essential. Those who are ‘anti-positivist’ are plainly not of one 
mind. Whilst critical research, as with interpretivist research, is indeed critical of, if not 
openly hostile towards positivism (see Adorno et al., 1969), it is also critical of the 
nihilistic, reactionary and conservative trajectory it perceives within interpretivism 
(Antonio, 1981), insofar as the absolute denial of absolutism found in pure interpretivism 
establishes a domain in which truth is relativized: 
To fundamental ontologists, relativism is the offense of bottomless thinking. 
Dialectics is as strictly opposed to that as to absolutism, but it does not seek a middle 
ground between the two; it opposes them through the extremes themselves, convicts 
them of untruth by their own ideas. 
(Adorno, 1966, p. 35) 
The critical epistemology is therefore deeply interconnected with the intersubjective 
ontology of critical theory. As such, knowledge is to be treated dialectically, neither solely 
in relativistic, subjective terms as a mere projection of the experiences of the researcher, 
nor as an absolute, objective and neutral being whose existence is independent of the 
researcher. This dialectical approach to research rose out of what Adorno and 
Horkheimer (1969) pronounce as an epistemological crisis that is the ultimate legacy of 
the Enlightenment, wherein the advances in knowledge for the sake of humanity made by 
the Enlightenment – the destruction of mythologies used to dominate and control – begin 
to consume and pervert themselves such that the Enlightenment brings forth not the 




In the most general sense of progressive thought, the Enlightenment has always aimed 
at liberating men from fear and establishing their sovereignty. Yet the fully enlightened 
earth radiates disaster triumphant. The program of the Enlightenment was the 
disenchantment of the world; the dissolution of myths and the substitution of 
knowledge for fancy. 
What men want to learn from nature is how to use it in order wholly to dominate it 
and other men. That is the only aim. Ruthlessly, in despite of itself, the Enlightenment 
has extinguished any trace of its own self-consciousness. The only kind of thinking 
that is sufficiently hard to shatter myths is ultimately self-destructive. 
(Adorno & Horkheimer, 1969, p. 3, 4) 
In light of this, the critical theoretical project at large is geared towards salvaging from the 
Enlightenment the emancipatory potential of knowledge put in service of humanity 
(Horkheimer, 1947). As such, critical theory does not aim at, on the one hand, producing 
a form of Absolute Knowledge that transcends reality and represents ‘things as they really 
are’ – we should recall here Žižek’s (1994b) discussion of the impossibility of assuming a 
‘God’s view’, ‘a view from nowhere’ – but at producing immanent knowledge, knowledge 
that is historically and contextually situated within society and in reference to empirical 
observations of that society (Antonio, 1981; Marcuse, 1972, pp. 10-11).45 Nor, on the 
other, does critical research adopt a wholly interpretive position in which the researcher 
humbly and piously offers what is ‘a mere interpretation of reality’, where the researcher is 
purportedly ‘neutral’ with regard to truth claims about that reality (Baker & Bettner, 1997; 
Horkheimer, 1972). Put differently, even though, as with interpretivism, critical research 
maintains that epistemological access to social reality is a process mediated by human 
interpretation, this does not preclude the capacity of rational thought to produce truthful 
interpretations of that reality. This is to say, critical theory retains a place for truth and its 
pursuit: 
Without thinking about truth and thereby of what it guarantees, there can be no 
knowledge of its opposite, of the abandonment of mankind, for whose sake true 
 
45 For instance, in their preface to the new edition of Dialectic of Enlightenment, Adorno and Horkheimer 
(1969, p. ix, emphasis added) write: “We would not now maintain without qualification every statement in 
the book: that would be irreconcilable with a theory which holds that the core of truth is historical, rather than an 
unchanging constant to be set against the movement of history.” That said, there are constants in society 
over historical periods, one of which is held by critical researchers to be “the basic economic structure, the 
class relationship in its simplest form” (Horkheimer, 1972, p. 234). 
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philosophy is critical and pessimistic – there cannot even be sorrow, without which 
there is no happiness. 
(Horkheimer, 1974, p. 80)46 
That said, the point that must necessarily be underscored here is that such truths remain 
partial, temporal and historically situated – they are not immutable, ahistorical, Absolute 
Truths – and therefore they must always be subject to critique and restatement in light of 
movements of history. And these truths are certainly not claims to reveal reality ‘as it really 
is’. As Žižek (2009, p. 6) reminds us, truth and reality are never whole, always partial – but 
instead efforts to illuminate specific logics and effects of domination operative in the 
contemporary social world. Crucially, I believe the latter, unlike the former, remains 
within the grasp of critical reason communicated through language (Adorno, 1973). 
In conclusion, we can return to the question posed at the beginning of this section, which 
was: (i) what can we know; (ii) how can we know it; (iii) and what is truth? My answer is that 
we can develop immanent, partial, historical and temporal knowledge about social reality 
(what) through the blending of empirical, concrete material enquiry and the abstractness 
of theory (how) and that this knowledge is true in reference to its specific historical and 
material context (truth). 
5.1.3. PRACTICE: DOING 
Where the preceding discussions of ontology and epistemology have focused on 
questions of existence, (social) reality and knowledge of that reality, I turn now to a 
consideration of the relation between that knowledge and practice. Such a consideration 
addresses the question of why we do research and to what ends we see that research in 
service of. As Chua (1986, p. 605) succinctly puts it, in this section I ask, “What is the 
purpose of knowledge in the world of practice?” 
To repeat a now familiar pattern of this chapter, we begin by considering the currents of 
thought that the critical researcher is positioned in relation to, the positivist and the 
interpretivist. For the positivist current, research is conducted in service to the existing 
 
46 It is also worth noting here Horkheimer’s (2018, p. 120) closing remark in his 1931 address to the Institute 
for Social Research: “May the guiding impulse of this Institute be the unchangeable will to unflinchingly 
serve the truth!” 
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state of things, not necessarily to preserve this precisely as it is, but to refine ‘the way 
things are’ (Horkheimer, 1972). In relation to accounting, this means that the task of 
accounting research is to focus energy on the ‘improvement’ of the capacity of accounting 
to produce ‘neutral, ‘apolitical’, ‘useful’ information for ‘decision-makers’ (Chua, 1986). 
For the interpretivist, research is a task that aims at developing explanations of the social 
world in order to better understand that world. In interpretivism at its purest there is no 
connection between the knowledge produced in research and practice as such. To make 
such a statement may seem extreme, but this certainly does not discount the value of 
interpretivist research in itself, only it is to say that in the view of the critical theorist, 
interpretivism, like positivism, stops one step too soon (Adorno et al., 1969, p. 67). 
For the final time, then, we now explore how the critical researcher is positioned in 
relation to these streams of research. A critical approach to research designates an attitude 
on the part of the researcher in which the aim is not a mere accumulation of knowledge, 
verification or refutation of existing theories, or descriptions and explanations of past or 
present conditions for the sake of merely advancing understanding. Hostile both towards 
pronouncements of undiluted ‘scientific objectivity’ and ‘neutrality’, a critical approach 
rejects the assertion that value judgements have no place in academia, regarding those 
who advocate such a ‘neutral’ position as promoters of the unequal and unjust status quo 
of social conditions. Critical researchers regard the adoption of a so-called ‘non-partisan’, 
‘value-free’ position as a mischievous fiction (Neimark, 1990).47 A critical approach takes 
as its aim the change of conditions in practice – how we live and work every day – through 
efforts in research and study (Cooper, 1997, 2002). In short, critical research, on the one 
hand, aspires to change the status quo of the society that positivism seeks to preserve and 
refine and, on the other, aspires to act in practice where interpretivism resides in the realms 
of thought: 
The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change 
it. 
 
47 Nietzsche’s remarks are of interest to us here, in that we might read them as a critique of interpretivism: 
“Do most modern historians perhaps reveal in their writing greater confidence in life and in their ideals? 
Their loftiest pretension is now to reflect what they see, repudiating all teleology; they will have nothing more 
to do with ‘proving’; they disdain playing the judge, thus showing their good taste – they neither assert nor 
deny; they ascertain, they ‘describe’. All this is to a high degree ascetic, but at the same time it is to a much 
greater degree nihilistic; let us make no mistake about this!” (Nietzsche, 1887, pp. 139-140). 
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(Marx & Engels, 1970, p. 123) 
Those who have the theory in their heads have it there in its totality and act according 
to that totality. 
(Horkheimer, 1972, p. 240) 
But if as a critical researcher I am to speak of action and change in the world of practice, 
what is it that I set out to change? Once more, let us consider the remarks of Horkheimer 
(1972, p. 246, emphasis added), where he argues that, 
However extensive the interaction between the critical theory and the special sciences 
whose progress the theory must respect and on which it has for decades exercised a 
liberating and stimulating influence, the theory never aims simply at an increase of 
knowledge as such. Its goal is man’s emancipation from slavery. 
But can we today – in the precise historical and material conditions in which I sit writing 
this text – truly speak of slavery? Is this not a callous undermining of both actually existing 
forms of contemporary slavery and of historical forms of slavery about which I can never 
truly understand the horror of? The point I wish to underline here is that if we are to 
speak of slavery, it must be carefully stated that such ‘slavery’ relates precisely to the specific 
form of social servitude and subservience produced by capitalism, or today, neoliberalism. 
The ‘slavery’ I write of is therefore more appropriately restated in the terms of doxic 
submission to ‘things as they are’ – or, in ideological terms, as domination that is not 
perceived as such, domination that is misrecognised. The point is not, therefore, that we are 
literally slaves, but that we are interpellated by neoliberal ideology to the extent that the 
present appears as natural and self-evident, not as the product of a historically contingent 
struggle in the intersecting realms of the social, political and economic. 
And what of emancipation? Of course, we have engaged with this idea already in this 
thesis, where I wrote that many people are ‘at home in’, or at least have no deep-seated 
desire to radically overhaul, present social, political and economic conditions (see ‘(iv) The 
Political Status of the Subject of Ideology’, section 4.1.2). The question of the ‘emancipatory 
subject’ marks a distinct point of departure in the project of critical theory with particular 
strands of Marxism that preceded it, particularly the currents of ‘orthodox’ Marxism that 
saw history as unfolding according to a series of incontrovertible, inevitable laws. As 
Antonio (1981, p. 337) explains: 
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Critical theorists do not have faith in an inevitable emancipation arising from either an 
armed confrontation between the proletariat and bourgeoisie or from a scientific 
‘revolution’. Instead, they are deeply concerned with the pacification of the working 
class and with the functioning of science and technology as instruments of 
domination.48 
In this thesis, I am specifically concerned with the workings of technology in society, a 
category in which I of course include accounting technologies. This must not be mistaken, 
however, as a reactionary tirade against domination by technologies tout court, in which 
such technologies are demonised as intrinsically or essentially malevolent. To be critical does 
not see one opposed to developments in technology in-and-of themselves. On the 
contrary, critical theory, as with the Marxist thought with which it is bound up, welcomes 
developments in the forces of production (see Eagleton, 1997, pp. 40-41) and directs its 
critique toward the relations of production in which such technologies sit and the unequal 
social relations that they in turn sustain and reproduce. Therefore, critical theory would 
not deny the development and advancement in the meeting of human needs made 
possible by the bourgeois, capitalist epoch, but today opposes the extent to which the 
irreparable antagonisms within this mode of political economy produces crass social, 
political and economic inequalities and that capitalism now, perversely, works to oppress 
through prosperity (Marcuse, 1972).49 The result, as Žižek (1994b, p. 1) poses, drawing 
on Frederic Jameson, is that today 
nobody seriously considers possible alternatives to capitalism any longer, whereas 
popular imagination is persecuted by the visions of the forthcoming ‘breakdown of 
nature’, of the stoppage of all life on earth – it seems easier to imagine the ‘end of the 
world’ than a far more modest change in the mode of production, as if liberal 
capitalism is the ‘real’ that will somehow survive even under conditions of a global 
ecological catastrophe… 
As such, the task of the critical theorist is to make the case that things might be otherwise 
– to invert Margaret Thatcher’s infamous pronouncement, that there is an alternative, that 
 
48 Those who affirm the inevitability of emancipation could perhaps be accused of taking the words of Marx 
and Engels in The Communist Manifesto (1848) rather too literally. It should not be forgotten that as a political 
manifesto, this text was purposively polemic and provocative. 
49 I argue that capitalism is itself built on a series of contradictions that cannot be reconciled within a capitalist 
mode of political economy. This makes futile the present calls for a ‘responsible capitalism’ or a ‘cleaned-
up capitalism’. More precisely, capitalism – today in neoliberal form – is built upon a series of irreconcilable 
antagonisms, a notion which crucially preserves the place for struggle and opposition rather than asserting a 




a society arranged along more just and equitable lines than the present neoliberal one can 
exist (Brown, 2015). For me, the purpose of knowledge in the world of practice is, 
however ambitious this may sound, to work towards such a society. This thesis is an 
important step on the way to fulfilling this ambition, in that it constitutes a methodological 
and theoretical foundation for my future efforts in research. With this foundation in place, 
I move on to introduce the empirical context within which I investigate the research 
questions posed earlier in this thesis. 
5.2. EMPIRICAL CONTEXT 
As a critical study, I see my research as embedded in the society about which this research 
is conducted. As such, society at large forms the overarching context of this thesis. But 
to say this is clearly to specify an impossible task – one simply cannot set about studying 
‘society’ as a whole. What can be done, however, is to study society in smaller, 
approachable phenomena: we can ‘study the big in the small’. I begin this section, 
therefore, by setting out this schema of ‘the big’ and ‘the small’, which I break into four 
interrelated levels whose scale narrows progressively from the first to the last. By ‘scale’, 
I mean here the extent to which one can easily study the phenomenon in question. This 
can be illustrated neatly by borrowing an example from the natural sciences: one cannot 
study ‘global warming’ as a whole, but can do so in the observation of empirical 
phenomena at a ‘smaller level’ – e.g. focusing specifically on empirical measurements of 
sea levels over time. 
In this thesis, first I begin at the broad social level with the phenomenon of the global 
zeitgeist of ‘transparent’ states under neoliberalism. Second, I descend from this global, 
international phenomenon to a local, national one, to the level of the open government 
movement, as a whole, in the UK. Third, a specific function, unit, field or department of 
government must be designated for study, which in this thesis is the prison system of 
England and Wales. Last, I specify an empirical phenomenon to be studied within this 
‘local’ context, which is the suicide and two particular representations of suicide made 
visible in transparency (the first, in ‘Prisons data’, the second, in ‘Fatal Incident reports’). 
It is at this point important to note that the focus of this study is to explore and research 
transparency in and of its own right, not specifically to research transparency in the 
context of prisons. To place the emphasis on transparency, as opposed to prisons, is by 
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no means to detract from the importance of the particular underlying material context of 
this study, but is to reiterate that my aim is to reflect on the roles and influences of 
transparency in society as a whole. Nonetheless, it is methodologically important that I 
provide a justification of my selection of suicides in prisons as the empirical focus for my 
study of transparency. The following section takes up this task. 
5.2.1. WHY PRISONS? WHY SUICIDE? 
In discussion up to now, I have by and large remained at the broad social level. As such, 
my interest in and concern with ‘the big’ of this thesis – the global zeitgeist of transparent 
states under neoliberalism and the materialisation of this in the UK – has been given 
considerable attention. It is therefore important at this point to set out my reasoning for 
selecting the specific context of prisons and the suicide as the ‘local’ focus of this text. 
Why not choose to study the transparency of a phenomenon in the context of a university, 
a megaproject or a corporation? And why, given the context of prisons, choose to study 
suicide specifically? Put simply, it is necessary at this point to address two questions: why 
prisons and why suicide? In what follows, I set out my answer to each. 
Before doing so, I wish to acknowledge what is perhaps a peculiar feature of the empirical 
context of this thesis, namely, the decision to focus on prisons in England and Wales 
rather than those in Scotland, where I live and study. My opting to focus on England and 
Wales concerns the scale and form of the network of transparency produced on prisons 
there in comparison to that produced on prisons in Scotland. In contrast to the extensive 
and varied network of online transparency on prisons produced by the MoJ and HMPPS, 
far less material is made available online concerning prisons in Scotland, with the vast 
majority of the material that is available being presented in the traditional form of annual 
reports. Given my interest in exploring the increase in forms of accounting that are 
‘visualised’ and constituted in ‘live’ and ‘dynamic’ dashboards and data-hubs, the rich 
source of this sort of material published on prisons in England and Wales represented a 
more stimulating case in both empirical and theoretical terms than the Scottish context. 
Now, ‘why prisons?’ What makes prisons particularly suitable as an empirical context in a 
study of transparency is that accounting, as a technology of visibility, is tasked with 
representing a space purposefully designed to be opaque. As an institution designed with 
the explicit purpose of walling off its inhabitants from wider society – and vice versa – 
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prisons are intrinsically institutions of the opaque. In this respect, the selection of the 
prison is bound up with the methodological and theoretical positions I adopt in this thesis, 
particularly as concerns the notion of negation. Insofar as a strategy of negation entails 
thinking-in and investigating contradiction (Marcuse, 1968), there is perhaps no more 
suitable empirical site for a study of transparency that takes up the style of negation than 
the prison. Transparency at its purest promises total visibility; the prison, as an institution 
designed to be opaque, is the antithesis of such a notion. In other words, the very opacity 
of prisons makes them precisely suited to a critique of transparency, insofar as claims 
about ‘opening up’ and ‘casting light on’ can be most provocatively and fruitfully critiqued 
in places of extreme darkness and opacity. 
Beyond this theoretical justification of ‘why prisons’, I also wish to add that a study of 
prisons is related to my own concern with broader issues of inequality and injustice in 
society. Overwhelmingly, research demonstrates that prisons incarcerate a grossly 
disproportionate share of the weakest and most vulnerable people in society (Houchin, 
2005), primarily those who are homeless, mentally ill, poor, addicts, or those who were 
abused as children (Coyle, 2016). In this sense, prison increasingly supports, stands in for, 
or replaces the array of social services subjected to a sustained assault in the regimes of 
austerity seen under neoliberalism (Wacquant, 2009b, 2010a, 2014). I consider it an 
important task of the critic – or here we might say intellectual – to endeavour to give a 
voice to those most oppressed in society. 
Now, ‘why suicide?’. To begin, I offer an answer similar to that given in relation to the 
question of ‘why prisons’. A suicide is surely one of the darkest traumas in humanity, but 
a suicide in prison is particularly dark, and thus we are here presented with an opportunity 
to exercise a negation of the claim of transparency to make such a dark moment visible 
to us. But in a second, vitally important respect, my concern with the transparency of 
suicide and my decision to select it for study relates to my argument that we, as living, 
thinking subjects, cannot know what suicide is ‘really like’.50 In this respect, it is futile, if 
not spectacularly crass, to endeavour to ‘more faithfully represent’ a suicide, for how could 
we ever know what suicide is ‘really like’? It is not my intention in this thesis to be drawn 
 
50 Suicide is, as such, an intrinsically philosophical problem. Camus (1979, p. 11) famously writes, “There is 
but one truly philosophical problem and that is suicide.” 
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into a domain of philosophical realism and representationalism in which transparency is 
reproached for ‘not representing the way things really are’ (McKernan, 2007). Rather, I 
seek to investigate the social relations – more specifically, the subjectivities – produced 
and shaped by transparency. If I were to engage with transparency of the suicide in a 
theoretical register of representation, I would become ensnared in problems of realist 
philosophy and consciousness that would constitute grounds for a thesis in its own right 
(see Nagel, 1974). More than this, to engage in such reflection would be, for me, an 
endeavour of excessive relativity and existentialist idealism that would do little to 
contribute to changing the conditions in society that play a part in the occurrence of such 
an act.51 What the transparency of suicide represents, therefore, is a case that is particularly 
suited to a study of the way in which objects of ideology structure our understanding of 
reality, rather than misrepresenting ‘things as they really are’; the latter implies that we 
could know what it is like to commit suicide, which I maintain that we cannot. 
A final note is needed here with regard to the study of suicide. As will later be shown, 
deaths in prison, by suicide or other means, are, by law, required to be investigated by an 
independent authority. The law also requires this investigation be made “open to public 
scrutiny” (Why does the Ombudsman investigate deaths?, 2019). In this respect, although the 
material that I will later present as ‘data’ is extremely sensitive, referring as it does to the 
names of those deceased, it is freely available for public access. However, this does not 
mean that I am at ease with the practice of treating as ‘data’ what ultimately refers to the 
end of a life – to me this is and will always remain problematic. 
Having here provided a justification of my choice to study prisons and suicides in prisons, 
I now move on to set out an array of archival, historical, statistical, and theoretical 
materials in order to give a contextualising overview of suicides in prisons in England and 
Wales. 
5.2.2. SUICIDES IN PRISONS IN ENGLAND AND WALES 
In order to develop my knowledge and understanding of suicides in prisons in England 
and Wales, it was necessary to begin my research by developing a holistic understanding 
of the field of prisons as a sub-field of the state, the historical development of the prison 
 
51 For example, less pressing than the question of ‘is this suicide ‘faithfully represented?’ would be, ‘how did 
a programme of austerity contribute to its happening?’ 
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system and the contemporary conflicts and struggles within the system. To do so, I 
conducted an extensive archival review of academic articles, newspaper articles, 
government documents, the National Archives, speeches by politicians, statements made 
on prisons in the House of Commons (Hansard), independent reports by prison charities 
and prison reformers, documentaries on prisons in the UK and books written by ex-
prisoners, prison governors and prison reformers. I also attended a number of lectures 
on prison reform hosted by the Howard League for Penal Reform and by the Glasgow 
Centre for Population Health and visited exhibitions on prisons in Glasgow at the 
Kelvingrove Art Gallery and Museum and at the People’s Palace and Winter Gardens. In 
addition to this, I conducted a series of informal, unrecorded interviews, with: a former 
Secretary of State for Justice in Scotland, a former prison governor (now an Emeritus 
Professor of Prison Studies) a prison governor and leading academic at a prestigious UK 
university, a former finance and administrative director of a private prison, a prison 
manager, three prison officers, two prison administrators, a former prisoner who is now 
the CEO of a prison reform charity, a leading Professor of sociology and criminology, 
and a journalist specialising in matters of criminal justice. I also conducted a one-day site 
visit to a prison in England on the personal invitation of a prison governor where I spent 
the day discussing prison working and living practices with staff in the prison office space 
and grounds. 
Drawing on these insights, in what follows I set out an overview of: (i) prisons in England 
and Wales; (ii) suicides in prisons in England and Wales; (iii) living and working conditions 
in prisons in England and Wales; and, (iv) prisons, class rule and repression. 
(i) Prisons in England and Wales52 
As of 1st July 2019, in England and Wales there are 117 prisons and Young Offender 
Institutions (YOIs), 13 of which are operated by the private sector, the remaining 104 
being operated by Her Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service (HMPPS). There are a 
further four prisons in England and Wales, one of which is an ‘Immigration Removal 
Centre’ operated by HMPPS and three ‘Secure Training Centres’, of which two are 
 
52 Prisons are a devolved matter in the government of the UK, with Scotland and Northern Ireland both 
operating their own prison systems (Sturge, 2019). Unless otherwise stated, all figures quoted here refer 
solely to England and Wales. 
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operated by the private sector, the third by HMPPS (Transparency Data: Prisons and their 
resettlement providers, 2019). HMPPS is an executive agency of the Ministry of Justice (MoJ), 
a ministerial department of the UK Government (Organisations: Her Majesty’s Prison & 
Probation Service, 2019). Executive agencies are operationally independent from ministerial 
control. Elected government ministers are responsible for setting the policies to be 
implemented by executive agencies, but have no authority to intervene in operational 
matters of delivery. 
As of 26th July 2019, the prison population of England and Wales stood at 83,042 (Monthly 
Bulletin – July 2019, 2019). To place this figure in historical context, it must be noted that 
the prison population has, over the last 10 years, been relatively stable. In 2008, the 
average year end population stood at 82,572, though in 2012, reached an historic year high 
of 86,634. Over a longer period, however, the current population is at a historically high 
level, with the average year end prison population of 1978 being 41,796 (for all year end 
population figures, see Safety in Custody Statistics, England and Wales: Deaths in Prison Custody 
to December 2018, Assaults and Self harm to September 2018, 2019). This increase in population 
has been described by some as attributable to a recasting of welfare issues as problems of 
social order and penal control (Garland & Sparks, 2000), whilst others have linked this 
punitive upsurge to the development of a globalised and hegemonic neoliberal political 
economy (Wacquant, 2009a). 
Placing the current rate of imprisonment of England and Wales in international context 
sees England and Wales (as with Scotland) atop the league tables for rate of imprisonment 
in Europe, with 174 and 166 prisoners per 100,000 head of population (respectively) as 
at the most recent count (Sturge, 2019, p. 4). Whilst this compares poorly with 
imprisonment rates elsewhere in Europe (for instance: Northern Ireland, 77 per 100,000, 
Sweden, 59 per 100,000, Norway, 63 per 100,000 and Germany 78 per 100,000), 
imprisonment rates internationally are far higher, with the United States having a rate of 
imprisonment of 655 per 100,000 head of population.53 
(ii) Suicides in Prisons in England and Wales 
 
53 Unless otherwise indicated, prison population rate statistics are drawn from ‘World Prison Brief: Highest to 




In 2018, there were 92 “Self-inflicted” deaths in prisons in England and Wales, which 
represented an increase from the 70 deaths recorded in 2017, but a still substantial 
decrease from the historic high of 123 in 2016 (Safety in Custody Statistics, England and Wales: 
Deaths in Prison Custody to December 2018, Assaults and Self harm to September 2018, 2019). 
Over a longer historical period, it can be observed that the number of suicides in prisons 
has, broadly, tracked the increase in the prison population. What must be noted here is 
that the rate of suicide in prison far exceeds that observed outside of prison, with a recent 
MoJ statistics bulletin calculating the risk of suicide (“self-inflicted mortality”) in prison 
as “over six times more likely (620%) than self-inflicted mortality relative to the general 
population [of England and Wales], with the true population difference between 480% 
and 783%” (Safety in Custody Statistics, England and Wales: Deaths in Prison Custody to December 
2018, Assaults and Self harm to September 2018, 2019). This is a finding consistent with a 
broader international research programme conducted by the World Health Organisation 
(Preventing Suicide in Jails and Prisons, 2007, p. 3). 
It must be acknowledged that the simple comparison of rates of suicide within and outside 
prison is neither a straightforward or unproblematic procedure (Lloyd, 1990). However, 
such an acknowledgement should not discourage us from recognising that even in 
conditions of absolute luxury, being locked up for many hours of the day, every day, for 
a period of years, would drive most of us to absolute despair and into suicidal thoughts. 
In other words, irrespective of the actual recorded rates of suicide in prisons, we must 
remember that the very act of locking a human being in a cell is itself an act of great 
inhumanity, particularly so when those incarcerated typically suffer from multiple mental 
and physical health issues and a range of problems with substance abuse and addiction. 
(iii) Living and working conditions in prisons in England and Wales 
The Government is failing in its duty of care towards people detained in England’s 
prisons. 
Too many prisoners remain in unsafe, unsanitary and outdated establishments. 
Violence and self-harm are at record highs. Most prisons exceed their certified normal 
accommodation level and a quarter of prisoners over the last two years have lived in 
overcrowded cells. Staffing shortages have forced overstretched prisons to run 
restricted regimes, severely limiting not only opportunities for prisoners to engage in 
purposeful activity, but access to health and care services both in and outside prisons. 
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Too many prisoners die in custody or shortly after release. Whilst deaths, including by 
suicide, in prisons have fallen slightly since their peak in 2016, so-called natural cause 
deaths, the highest cause of mortality in prison, too often reflect serious lapses in care. 
We are also concerned about the increase in deaths during post-release supervision 
and reports of people being found unresponsive in their cells. Every suicide should 
be regarded as preventable and it is unacceptable that those known to be at risk face 
unacceptable delays awaiting transfer to more appropriate settings. 
(House of Commons Health and Social Care Committee: Prison Health, 2018, p. 3) 
Prior to this section, I offered a short series of statistics in order to give a very brief, 
schematic overview of the scale of the prison system in England and Wales and the 
problem of suicides within it. However, I would argue that an excessive reliance on 
statistics and figures is itself a part of the failure to confront the crisis facing prisons. The 
words of the former Chief Inspector of Prisons, Nick Hardwick, capture precisely this 
sentiment: 
There is a danger of the politicians over-analysing the figures and miss[ing] what is 
under their noses on the wings […] people being held in deplorable conditions who 
are suicidal, they don’t have anything to do and they don’t have anyone to talk to. 
(Cited as in Coyle, 2016, p. 11) 
Beyond considerations of statistics and the immediate material conditions of 
imprisonment, it must also be emphasised that living and working conditions inside 
prisons are a reflection of the social, political and economic climate outside of prisons 
(Coyle, 2008; Stern, 1993) and of the organisational culture and practices within prisons 
(Bennett, 2014, 2016). I want here to briefly discuss the former, that is, how conditions 
inside prison are a function of political-economic conditions. 
In recent years, prisons, as with all public services across the UK, have been subjected to 
a prolonged period of financial austerity, a part of what former Prime Minister David 
Cameron pronounced as “the age of austerity” (Cameron, 2009). The severe spending 
cuts imposed under austerity mean that prisons are underfunded, understaffed and 
overcrowded, resulting in a dramatic deterioration in working and living conditions for 
staff and prisoners (Life in prison: Living conditions, 2017; Prisons in the UK are stretched past 
their limit, 2016; Tonybee, 2018). In practice, this means that prisoners spend increasing 
amounts of time in their cells rather than in purposeful activities – education, exercise, 
apprenticeships, and so on (Preventing prison suicide, 2016). Recent research has shown that 
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some prisoners (including children) are held in their cells or solitary confinement for as 
many as twenty-three hours per day (Grierson, 2020). 
Aside from the rise of suicides noted previously, in recent years incidents of self-harm, 
assaults on prisoners, assaults on staff and use of legal highs or illegal drugs have all 
reached record highs (Prison: the facts: Bromley Briefings Summer 2017, 2017; Travis, 2016b). 
This despite warnings from prison reform campaigners that such a rise would be the 
inevitable consequence of reducing budgets without a corresponding reduction in 
prisoner numbers (Breaking point: Understaffing and overcrowding in prisons, 2014). In a further 
expression of the pressure placed on prisons, a number of large prison riots have broken 
out in recent years (Travis, 2016a) – and continue to do so (Hymas, 2019) – marking a 
return to the instability and tensions that resulted in the infamous 25-day Strangeways riot 
of 1990 (Evans & Willgress, 2016). As a result “prisons are routinely and increasingly 
resorting to draconian punishments in a counter-productive attempt to regain control” 
(Out of control: punishment in prison, 2017). 
The deterioration of the living and working conditions in prisons cannot be dissociated 
from the deterioration of the material conditions of the establishments in which staff 
work and prisoners are held. Old prison buildings from the Victorian era are outdated 
and badly in need of renovation (Brown, 2018). However, in the majority of cases, the 
prisons built to replace their Victorian predecessors are ‘super-jails’ with operational 
capacities of over 1,000 inmates (Travis, 2014, 2017). This is despite well-established 
evidence and consensus among penal reform groups, criminologists, criminal justice 
experts and former prison governors (James, 2015; Woolf, 1991) that smaller, local 
prisons, with a capacity not exceeding 400 places, are the best route to delivering a more 
manageable, humane and decent prison estate (Grimwood, 2014). 
(iv) Prisons, class rule and repression 
The preceding sections have provided an overview of prisons, both in statistical and 
narrative terms, briefly describing the scale of prisons in England and Wales, the problem 
of suicide in prisons, and the living and working conditions in those prisons. What these 
sections do not consider, however, is who we find in prisons. In other words, though it is 
important we know how many people are in prisons, the knowledge that there are at 
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present over 80,000 people in prisons in England and Wales does not tell us who these 
people are and why they are there. 
As a function of my methodological positioning in critical theory, I want here to 
emphasise that prison serves to enforce and perpetuate class rule in society and that the 
high prison population can be read as a symptom of a society built around a capitalist 
class antagonism (Marx & Engels, 2010; Rusche & Kirchheimer, 1939). Prisons represent 
a key repressive apparatus of the capitalist state (Althusser, 2014; Olin Wright, 1973), 
acting as an instrument of social control that affects and is directed towards the 
disciplining and exclusion of the poorest in society. This said, and as Garland (1991, p. 
133, emphasis added) notes, I am mindful to acknowledge that “if the Marxist argument 
is to be sustained, it must recognize – as many Marxists now do – that the criminal law’s 
class functions are combined with genuine social functions, such as the prohibition of 
violence and the punishment of predatory criminals.” Indeed, it is with such 
acknowledgement that Horkheimer (1974, p. 145) wrote that, “It is true enough, of 
course, that social freedom is never achieved without force. Numerous unsavoury 
activities are required if society is to be held together, including the maintenance of 
prisons and the production of murderous weapons. To do away with these would be to 
give up life itself.” 
Crucially, though, it must be emphasised that the assertions made in Marxist and other 
critical theories of society are not, however, mere theoretical pronouncements: they are 
repeatedly borne out in empirical studies of prison populations. Overwhelmingly, the 
prison population in England and Wales (Crewe, 2009; Jewkes, 2007) – as in Scotland 
(Coyle, 1991; Houchin, 2005), the UK as a whole, the US (Garland, 2001; Wacquant, 
2008, 2009a, 2009b), Europe and beyond (Wacquant, 2012) – is disproportionately made 
up of the materially dispossessed in society. Stated in simpler terms: the poor. An extract 
from Roger Houchin’s 2005 study, Social Exclusion and Imprisonment in Scotland, provides a 
particularly clear picture of the relation between poverty and imprisonment: 
There is a near absolute correlation between the level of social deprivation of local 
government wards, clustered in groups bounded by decile scores on the Scottish Index 
of Multiple Deprivation (SIMT) and the imprisonment rate for that group. That 
correlation holds true throughout the range from the most prosperous communities 
to the most deprived. 
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The imprisonment rate for men in Scotland was 237 per 100,000. The imprisonment 
rate for men from the 27 most deprived wards (those with SIMT scores >70) was 953 
per 100,000. The imprisonment rate for 23 year old men from the 27 most deprived 
wards was 3,427 per 100,000. 
(Houchin, 2005, p. 77) 
The criminalization of poverty, whether that be historically in the form of the Poor Law 
of the 19th century or today in the arrest and imprisonment of the homeless, serves to 
maintain and reproduce a capitalist system in which (lack of) property sees one excluded 
from (capitalist) society. This exclusion in turn locks prisoners into cycles of re-offending, 
whether that be because they are unable to secure employment post-release or because 
they become chronically dependent on and addicted to drugs and alcohol after serving 
sentences in the deplorable conditions of overcrowded and underfunded prisons. For 
such people, whose past almost always involves some or other form of extreme violence 
or trauma in childhood or adolescence (McGarvey, 2017), now struggling with addiction, 
depression, and with poor or no qualifications or educational skills (vast numbers of 
prisoners either cannot read, or read at levels at or below that expected of an eleven year 
old child (The Centre for Social Justice Green Paper on Criminal Justice and Addiction, 2010, p. 8)) 
the notion of rehabilitation is mere “myth and ceremony” (Wacquant, 2010b). As Andrew 
Coyle, ex-prison governor and Emeritus Professor of Prison Studies at the University of 
London, sagely put it when I interviewed him early in my research: ‘If you want to 
rehabilitate people, then don’t put them away in the first place.’54 
A final note is needed here. What the above should not do is establish a crude and unfair 
syllogistic formula linking class, poverty and imprisonment (i.e. ‘prisons are 
overwhelmingly populated by poorer people’ and ‘prisoners have been convicted of 
criminal offences’, therefore ‘all poor people are criminals’). Nor should it undermine the 
importance of understanding the relations between imprisonment and gender, ethnicity, 
sexuality and so on. Rather, it should instead affirm and make the case for class analysis 
of prisons as an important and productive lens for understanding and further enquiring 
into who is in prison and why they are there. 
 
54 This interview was not recorded. The quote referenced here is from my own written notes. 
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In this section, I have set out (i) a statistical outline of prisons in England and Wales; (ii) 
an introduction to the issue of suicide in prisons; (iii) an overview of living and working 
conditions in prisons; and, (iv) a reading of prisons as a repressive apparatus of class rule. 
With this, I bring this section to an end, and move on to give an overview of the extent 
accounting literature on prisons. 
5.2.3. PRISONS AND ACCOUNTING 
There is a small literature in accounting which has investigated the empirical context of 
the prison. This literature is situated within the wider critical literature that reflects on the 
roles of accounting in furthering the ends of capitalism and neoliberalism. As such, 
privatisation is a core theme running throughout the extant literature on accounting and 
prisons. Specifically in relation to developing our understanding of accounting 
technologies and forms, the extant literature on prisons and accounting consists of 
examinations of the role of accounting as an instrument of management control and 
accounting as an ideological device in public and political discourse. 
Studies have, therefore, reflected on and critiqued the capacity of accounting to mask 
ideological ends of privatisation and promulgate a myth of private sector efficiency and 
effectiveness (Cooper & Taylor, 2003, 2005), whilst also illuminating the deleterious 
effects of privatisation on prison living and working conditions for staff and prisoners 
(Taylor & Cooper, 2002, 2008). For instance, in their study of HMP Kilmarnock (a 
privately operated prison in Scotland), Taylor and Cooper (2008) draw attention to the 
incentive for the private operator to pressure staff into omitting or under-reporting 
incidents of assault or violence by prisoners on staff. Staff were pressured in this way 
because such incidents led to the operator incurring “penalty points” and “fines”, both of 
which would reduce the profit made on the contract: 
According to PCOs [Prison Custody Officer], the failure to report or the downgrading 
of incidents including assaults and discoveries of drugs, weapons or other banned 
items, or the falsification of statistics in order to prevent the prison from incurring 
fines, were systemic. Many examples could be cited but the following incident is 
perhaps the most shocking: 
this was when I finally said ‘I’m out of here’. A personal alarm went off and I bolted 
up to it – it was at the long-term houseblock, and it was an officer, XXX, who had 
had a pen plunged into his neck … he was actually staggering down the stairs, on his 
own, holding a bandage with blood pouring out of it. I read a couple of weeks later 
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that the assault was nothing, he was barely scratched they had definitely downgraded 
that. How serious an assault can you get? (PCO1) 
(Taylor & Cooper, 2008, p. 23) 
Such findings resonate with and justify the concerns raised by Andrew (2007) that private 
operators’ pursuit of profit is inimical with the act of depriving a citizen of their liberty. 
In addition to this, other research has critiqued the primacy of accounting narratives of 
‘efficiency’ and ‘cost effectiveness’ in discourse in place of sincere reflection over the 
causes and implications of incarceration (Andrew, 2011; Andrew & Cahill, 2009) and has 
interrogated the position of accounting in policy-making spheres, in which it is perceived 
as a technical, apolitical, neutral language communicating a series of uncontroversial, 
objectively determined truths (Andrew, 2010; Andrew & Cahill, 2017). 
Research has also critiqued the prevalence of accounting as accountability in prisons, 
drawing attention to the pitfalls of the decoupling of everyday organisational practices 
from their representation in reporting practices (Andrew, Baker, Cooper, & Tweedie, 
2019) and raising concern with the ethical and moral issues that wholly technical 
accountability obscures (Andrew, 2007).55 The proliferation of accounting technologies in 
the management of prisons has also been examined and positioned in relation to 
privatisation and the accompanying rise and spread of New Public Management in 
government institutions (Mennicken, 2013). Finally, it must also be noted that the 
literature on prisons in accounting is ‘critical’ not only in the sense of its perspective on 
society in the realm of ideas, but also in that a number of contributions made to this 
literature have gone on to influence practice (Andrew & Baker, 2018; Cooper & Taylor, 
2002). 
In this thesis, I add to this literature by considering the way in which accounting, in the 
mode of transparency, makes the prison visible to the citizenry. As such, I move away 
from a dominant concern of the extant literature – i.e. privatisation and its effects on the 
internal operations of prisons – and explore the relation between the roles of accounting, 
prisons and the operation of democracy (see Armstrong, 2007, p. 13). Furthermore, in 
taking the stress off privatisation and focusing on the state, I seek to emphasise the way 
 
55 Although not in the accounting literature, Coyle’s (2007) reflection on prisons and technical accountability 
is also an excellent piece on this matter. In addition, see Bennett (2014). 
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in which neoliberalism does not operate solely in the mode of economic privatisations of 
hitherto state-owned or state-delivered services and functions, but that it also remodels 
the political subjectivity of the citizenry in accordance with patterns of thought and modes 
of reasoning derived from capitalism: 
Neoliberalism governs as sophisticated common sense, a reality principle remaking 
institutions and human beings everywhere it settles, nestles, and gains affirmation. Of 
course, there are dust-ups, including protests and political altercations with police, 
over the privatization of public goods, union busting, benefits reductions, public-
service cuts, and more. But neoliberalization is generally more termite-like than lion-
like… its mode of reason boring in capillary fashion into the trunks and branches of 
workplaces, schools, public agencies, social and political discourse, and above all, the 
subject. 
(Brown, 2015, pp. 35-36) 
In the next section of this chapter, I reflect on the place of prisons in the contemporary 
social, political and economic context of neoliberalism. 
5.2.4. PRISONS AND NEOLIBERALISM 
Is there a specific or necessary relation between prisons and neoliberalism? I want to begin 
this section by refuting the idea that ‘prison’ itself could be branded a ‘neoliberal’ 
phenomenon. Put simply, there is no ‘neoliberal’ essence to prisons. Those who are 
imprisoned remain, as has been the case throughout history, the poor, the mentally ill, the 
homeless, and so on. In this respect, prisons under neoliberalism continue to form part 
of a repressive apparatus of class rule, as I set out in a previous section (section 5.2.2, part 
iv). Might we stop here, then, and say that the conditions and uses of prisons under 
neoliberalism are the same as those we would find in capitalist, socialist, authoritarian or 
totalitarian regimes? 
Whilst I maintain that there is nothing necessarily or intrinsically neoliberal about 
incarceration as such, I want to use two vignettes to illustrate features of imprisonment 
that I argue are distinct under neoliberalism. First, at the symbolic level, how there is an 
economization of the notion of rehabilitation that displaces more traditional moral, 
religious and conservative tropes. Second, at the material level, how prisons, whilst being 
subjected to a sustained programme of austerity, increasingly deputise or replace the 
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institutions either abolished or privatised that would formerly have been responsible for 
those now ‘criminalised’ by incarceration. 
(i) The economization of the discourse of rehabilitation under neoliberalism 
Q2 Chair: How would you encapsulate the overall purpose of the thrust of the 
Government’s prison policy? 
Michael Gove: In a sentence, it is about turning prisoners from liabilities into assets. 
(Oral evidence: Prison reform, 2016) 
I never want us to forget that it is the victims of crime who should always be our 
principal priority. And I am not unrealistic or starry-eyed about what prisons can 
achieve. Not everyone shows remorse, and not everyone seeks redemption. But I also 
strongly believe that we must offer chances to change, that for those trying hard to 
turn themselves around, we should offer hope, that in a compassionate country, we 
should help those who’ve made mistakes to find their way back onto the right path. 
In short: we need a prison system that doesn’t see prisoners as simply liabilities to be managed, but 
instead as potential assets to be harnessed. 
(Cameron, 2016, emphasis added) 
To begin, it must be acknowledged that if we are to speak of an ‘economization’ of penal 
discourse under neoliberalism we must first recognise that the use of financial or 
economic metaphors in this space is by no means novel. Indeed, the notion of ‘paying 
back a debt to society’ has figured as a symbolic anchor in the discourse of punishment 
throughout history. For instance, in The Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche (1887, pp. 49-50) 
writes of how the economy of punishment centres on “the contractual relationship 
between creditor and debtor”, and that in punishment “the creditor is granted by way of 
repayment and compensation a certain pleasure, a sense of satisfaction – the satisfaction of 
being able to wield, without a scruple, his power over one who is powerless”. Likewise, 
in Discipline and Punish, Foucault (1977, pp. 232-233) discusses the notion that a person is 
imprisoned to ‘pay their debt’ to society in what constitutes an “economico-moral” 
repatriation. Therefore, an economization of the terms of penal discourse in general is by 
no means novel – contemporary public discourse on prisons has long been conducted in 
a language of costs, efficiency and value-for-money (Andrew, 2010). However, what is 
novel is the expression of the specific notion of ‘rehabilitation’ itself in economic terms. 
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Hitherto, dominant penal discourses on ‘reform’ or rehabilitation have been structured 
and expressed in either pseudo-religious or overtly religious terms, with the notion of 
rehabilitation being closely bound up with religious ideals, particularly those of 
Christianity (Coyle, 1994, p. 14).56 The moralising, religious rhetoric of ‘rehabilitation-as-
repentance’ sees the task of the prison as impressing upon the individual the moral or 
ethical injuriousness of their actions; the prison sentence is then an opportunity to 
‘correct’ (hence, ‘corrections’ or ‘correctional’ institutions) the path of the prisoner and 
set them onto the ‘right’, ‘God-fearing’ course. 
What we can observe in the remarks cited at the beginning of this illustration (Cameron, 
2016; Gove, 2015; Oral evidence: Prison reform, 2016) is an instance of Wendy Brown’s (2015) 
assertion that in neoliberalism social, political, moral and ethical dimensions of life are 
increasingly expressed in the language of markets – in “market speak” (Brown, 2006). Or 
that, in Foucault’s terms, in neoliberalism the individual is conceptualised as a unit of 
human capital who, as an ‘entrepreneur of the self’ thinks of life as does an investor who 
seeks to maximise their return on capital (Cooper, 2015b; Foucault, 2008). This serves to 
empty the notion of rehabilitation of any reference to or anchoring in the laudable, though 
flawed, ideals of justice, forgiveness, remorse and morality. If we are to apply the logic of 
rehabilitation as a market process, in a neoliberal society a prisoner is ‘rehabilitated’ if they 
are economically productive, or (if we are to use the terms proper to recognition of an 
‘asset’) if they are ‘an entity from which future economic benefit will flow’. Thus, where 
both Foucault and Nietzsche assert that the moral content of punishment or 
‘rehabilitation’ takes on the form of an economic transaction, in neoliberalism, rehabilitation 
takes on the structure of an economic transaction in both form and content, where the 
prisoner is to ‘pay their debt to society’ not by repenting from their ‘sinful’ and ‘immoral’ 
ways, but by becoming an asset in society. 
(ii) The rightward tilting of the state under neoliberalism 
My son was not a criminal; he was in prison because there was no alternative place of 
safety. 
 
56 Religious approaches to punishment were not always structured as efforts to ‘reform’: “The old Holloway 
prison, built in 1852, had above the gate the encouraging sentiment: MAY GOD PRESERVE THE CITY 
OF LONDON AND MAKE THIS PLACE A TERROR TO EVIL DO-ERS” (Stern, 1993, pp. 45-46). 
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(Care Not Custody, 2010, p. 4) 
British compassion for those who are suffering has been replaced by a punitive, mean-
spirited, and often callous approach apparently designed to instil discipline where it is 
least useful, to impose a rigid order on the lives of those least capable of coping with 
today’s world, and elevating the goal of enforcing blind compliance over a genuine 
concern to improve the well-being of those at the lowest levels of British society. 
(Alston, 2018, p. 3)57 
At the material level, and recalling my earlier conception of the state as collection of fields 
distributed across two hands (Bourdieu, 1998c, 2004) – the Left (the social, protective) 
and the Right (the economic, coercive) – I argue, following Wacquant (2012, p. 74), that 
under neoliberalism there is a “double rightward skewing of the structure and policies of 
the state”. In practice, this means that the material resources of the state are channelled 
toward Right hand (coercive, repressive, and penal) functions and services and away from 
those of the Left hand. However, and to ensure that my theory remains informed by 
empirical observation, it must be noted that unlike in the formative years of neoliberalism 
– where in the UK then Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher specifically targeted social 
functions of the state for abolition or roll-back, whilst strengthening and expanding the 
‘law and order functions’ (Carter, Klein, & Day, 1992, p. 79) – the recent austerity 
measures in the UK have been applied across the state, with cuts to police funding in 
particular attracting considerable public attention (see O’Hara, 2015). 
Specifically with respect to prisons, cuts to budgets come at a time where prisons are 
under greater pressure to deal not only with an excessive total population, but also with a 
population of prisoners with a variety of mental and physical health issues, disabilities, 
and addictions (Bennett, 2016; Coyle, 2016), problems which a depleted social welfare 
infrastructure is unable to combat due to present budgetary pressures and a legacy of 
recent reconfigurations of the architecture of the state – e.g. privatisation of social 
housing, closing of mental health institutions, privatisation of care for the elderly. Indeed, 
Coyle (2005, pp. 60-81) explains that much of the additional stress loaded onto the prison 
system, prior to any reductions in spending imposed under austerity, can be traced to the 
closing of dedicated mental health institutions without establishing the necessary 
 
57 Excerpt from Statement on Visit to the United Kingdom, by Professor Philip Alston, United Nations Special 
Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights (2018). 
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community-based support services intended to replace these infamous ‘asylums’.58 As 
Wacquant (2012, p. 74) puts it, “mentally ill patients get ‘deinstitutionalised’ with the 
closing of hospitals and ‘reinstitutionalised’ in jails and prisons after transiting through 
homelessness” (see also Wacquant, 2009b, 2010a, 2014). 
The broader point that I wish to stress here is that in a neoliberal society the structural 
material and symbolic inequities of a capitalist class system are glossed over by the liberal 
myth of the wholly autonomous, free-thinking, rational individual (Brown, 1995). In the 
putatively equal society of neoliberalism, where material inequalities introduced from birth 
are ignored, the most economically and socially vulnerable in society are told that they 
must ‘fend for themselves, just like everyone else’. If the disadvantaged and marginalised in 
society fail to fulfil this fallacious and disingenuous task, they are regarded not as victims 
of exceptional macro-economic conditions nor of being deserted by a government who 
clings to the “trope of ‘individual responsibility’” (Wacquant, 2010a), but as “failed 
entrepreneurs” (Cooper et al., 2016) who have ‘made bad choices in life’. For these people, 
there is little hope of meaningful, material support from a withering state social safety, 
but instead the promise of stigmatisation, struggle and hardship and the looming prospect 
of criminality and incarceration in an underfunded and overcrowded prison system. 
A final word is needed here. I do not wish to imply that all those who are in prison are 
mere ‘victims of circumstance’ – in Giddens’ terms, that they are determined wholly by 
‘structural’ factors in absence of any individual ‘agency’ (Giddens, 1984, 1990). To do so 
would be inconsistent with my theoretical and methodological perspective and, more 
broadly, my own worldview. I see the relation between structure and agency as a dialectical 
one, that is, where individuals have agency within structure, where structure and agency 
are ‘mutually dependent’. Put differently, I argue that we are neither wholly determined 
by our circumstances, nor are we wholly the products of our own agency. Though it is 
regrettable, prisons are a necessary part of a society as we have come to know it, insofar 
as there are a few who out of sheer malevolence commit horrifying crimes and must be 
incarcerated for the safety and security of the many. However, at present it is surely the 
case that far too many of those in prison are not such people (Jewkes, 2007), but rather 
 
58 Institutions which Coyle by no means romanticises: “very few people regretted the passing of the large 
mental hospitals, which frequently mirrored penal institutions” (Coyle, 2005, p. 62). 
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are those who are products of a political economic system that imprisons along class lines, 
a system that literally, as Wacquant (2009b) puts it, ‘punishes the poor’. With this, I move 
on to discuss the specific methodological challenges that I encountered in researching 
prisons. 
5.2.5. CONTEXT-SPECIFIC METHODOLOGICAL CHALLENGES 
The question of ‘access’ earlier raised in this chapter was posed in epistemological terms, that 
is, in terms of our capacity as researchers to access and develop knowledge of social reality. 
With respect to this thesis, the question of access in practical terms was fundamental in its 
shaping and evolution. As an institution, the prison is of course designed explicitly in 
order to restrict those held inside from accessing the world outside, and vice versa. Given 
that the prison is an instrument of the state, part of the repressive machinery of the state 
– in both a material and a symbolic sense – access to prisons is strictly controlled and 
regulated. 
Having resolved to study prisons as the empirical context for my thesis on the 
transparency of the state, at the beginning of my research I was confronted with the 
question and challenge of if, and how, I was to secure physical access to the site of the 
prison. In the early stages of my research, it was my intention to conduct an empirical 
study that followed the theoretical course set by Roberts (2018), that is, to investigate how 
demands for external transparency affects internal organisational practice – i.e. to examine 
how having ones conduct made visible to distant others affects that conduct. Of course, 
such a study is reliant on securing access to and conducting empirical work inside 
organisations and I therefore began working towards securing access to prisons. 
However, in the course of doing so, I reflected on how I might proceed if I were not to 
be granted access into prisons. At this same time, I also began to encounter repeated 
references to prison ‘transparency’ in speeches by politicians, contributions to parliament 
and government documents. Similarly, I found a vast array of prison ‘data’ presented in 
online government archives, data-hubs and dashboards. Consequently, I came to develop 
an intense interest and curiosity as to how prisons could ever be made ‘transparent’ to 
those of us who have neither seen or visited a prison nor experienced the harsh material 
reality of life in prison. The absurdity of making open and transparent a social space and 
function that is so expressly constituted in service of opacity struck me as a clear and 
obvious contradiction, and a site therefore ripe for negating claims of transparency. 
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Put in another way, my motivation for studying the object of transparency itself – rather 
than the practices and social reality that lies ‘behind’ transparency – developed out of an 
experience of its opposite. The question I asked myself was this: ‘What can I know about 
prisons if am not granted access to prisons?’ Put theoretically (in Debord’s terms): ‘What 
can I know about the reality of prisons from representations without having directly lived 
prisons?’ My focus and interest therefore shifted away from seeking to interrogate the way 
in which demands for external transparency affected internal (organisational, institutional) 
conduct, and towards examining how external transparency shapes external (social, 
political) perceptions of the prison as an arm of the state. 
Thus, the nature of my interest in transparency and the shape of my research as a whole 
evolved in accordance with the specific institutional and epistemological challenges 
associated with gaining access to and conducting research in the strictly controlled space 
of the prison. This in turn came to alter the theoretical perspective of my study, 
particularly with respect to my theorisation of the notion of ideology and the role and 
limits of representation in transparency. For me, the very opacity and inaccessibility of 
the prison, something that undoubtedly began as a challenge associated with my original 
research intentions, grew to develop and evolve into an opportunity to ask new questions 
and explore new empirical and theoretical terrain in the study of transparency. I now 
move on to discuss the method I employed to study transparency, the data I collected and 
how I analysed that data. 
5.3. METHOD: ARCHIVAL RESEARCH 
Although I utilised a range of methods in what I earlier referred to as ‘mapping the field’ 
of prisons (semi-structured interviews, attending events, lectures and seminars on prisons, 
visiting a prison, and so on), the primary research method I employ in this thesis is 
archival. More specifically, I juxtapose two archival records of a common phenomenon – 
the suicide in prison – in order to examine and critique the nature of the transparency of 
the state. Archival research is particularly suitable for studies rooted in critical theory 
insofar as the study of archives opens up space for a critical reappraisal of ‘official’ or 
‘dominant’ narrative and interpretations of history (e.g. Fleischman et al., 2013; 
Fleischman & Tyson, 2004; Walker, 2008, 2010). As discussed in the section preceding 
this one, the archival nature of my research was influenced and determined by the 
challenges associated with accessing the strictly regulated site of the prison. 
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What I refer to here as ‘archival research’ is not archival in the sense implied in positivistic 
accounting research (where the archive and its materials are treated as data and the goal 
of research is to establish generalizable patterns in that data) or in historical accounting 
research (where the accounting historian identifies, analyses and critiques the uses and 
abuses of accounting in historical case studies), but archival in the sense that I reflect on 
archival materials in their social, political and economic context (see Cooper & Morgan, 
2008). In addition, I also infuse my reading of archival materials with my critical 
theoretical perspective, which means that in my reading of archives I am sceptical of the 
notion that archives simply and unproblematically record ‘what happened’, but rather see 
archives as an expression of power, values and interests in the struggle to represent past 
events (Sy & Tinker, 2005). 
Of course, archives are never ‘the whole story’. The material held in archives offers a 
limited, historical, partial and contextual view of social reality (Schwarzkopf, 2012). As I 
will later note in my analysis, what is not included in archives is quite often just as 
interesting and important as what is. This is especially true given the ‘official’ nature of 
archives. Archives are typically produced by and presided over by powerful institutions in 
society with their own interest in the preservation of particular materials and the 
destruction or suppression of others (Stan, 2010). Furthermore, much like facts and 
numbers, archives do not ‘speak for themselves’ – my reading of an archive is conditioned 
by my own weltanschauung and by my own lived experience. It is imperative that we remain 
mindful of these points when conducting archival research. 
It must also be acknowledged that the digital nature of the archival material collected and 
analysed in this thesis is vitally important. Moss (2009) argues that the nature of archival 
research has been radically altered in the digital age. Featherstone (2006, pp. 595-596) 
strikes at the core of this matter in his remarks on the shift from spatial, physical archives 
to decentralised, digital ones: 
With the digital archive we see a move away from the concept of the archive as a 
physical place to store records, so that culture depends upon storages (libraries, 
museums, etc.), to that of the archive as a virtual site facilitating immediate transfer. 
The notion of immediate data access and feedback replaces the former data separation 
(the file in the box on the shelf) which created the differences out of which an archive 
order was constructed and reconstructed. The digital archive then should not be seen 
as just a part of the contemporary ‘record and storage mania’ facilitated by digital 
technologies, but as providing a fluid, processual, dynamic archive, in which the 
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topology of documents can be reconfigured again and again. The digital archive then 
presents new conceptual problems about the identity, distinctiveness and boundaries 
of the datum and the document. Like the earlier shifts in the balance between life and 
form, the shifts in the digital archive between flows and classification take us to the 
heart of the questions about the constitution, formation and storage of knowledge in 
the current age. 
Intriguingly, it intuitively seems as though data collected from physical archives – where 
one walks the aisles of a physical space in a place specifically designed to preserve 
documents and artefacts – is somehow ‘more real’ than data collected online, in 
‘cyberspace’. We have here a problematic of perception and form – that is, regardless of 
whether archives are paper-based documents that have been ‘digitalized’ or are ‘born 
digital’, their constitution in digital form influences the way we relate to and interact with 
their material (Zhang, 2012). Would the data I collected for this thesis necessarily be ‘more 
real’ if I had travelled to a physical place to collect it? If I had travelled to the Ministry of 
Justice in London to collect ‘hard’, paper copies of precisely the same materials that I 
gathered online, would these be ‘more real’ than their digital counterparts? I would argue 
that such material would not be more real, but it is interesting to note that we are likely to 
feel as though such data would be more authentic than that drawn from an online source. 
In Benjamin’s terms, what is at play here is the way in which the act of knowing is bound 
up with the mode of perception (see also Althusser, 2008, pp. 173-179). 
In addition to change in the mode of access to and situation of the archive in a specific 
space-place, we must also reflect on the curious ontological and metaphysical character 
of data collected from digital archives. The temporal aspect of online, digital data sits 
uneasily with the historical essence of the archive; this is particularly the case with 
‘interactive’, ‘dynamic’ data-hubs and dashboards that offer ‘live’, ‘real-time’ 
representations of organisations and institutions. The very notion of archiving implies 
preservation, fixity and stability over time. In ‘cyberspace’, such characteristics are by no 
means guaranteed. Indeed, this is indicated in the conventional practice that we use in 
academic research when citing material from online sources, noting the Uniform 
Resource Locator (URL) with the accompanying detail, ‘Accessed: dd/mm/yyyy’. This 
practice attests to the capacity for information held online to be edited without trace, to 
be relocated without notification or to be erased. Furthermore, in this thesis, the data I 
collected includes ‘screenshots’ of a data-hub and a digital archive that are updated and 
repopulated with new information. Unlike, for example, a traditional financial account or 
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annual report, for which there is a final, completed version that does not change and 
refers to a specific historical moment – i.e. ‘Statement of financial position as at’ or 
‘Statement of Profit or Loss as at’ – these archives are regularly updated and do not make 
a specific reference to a point in time as a historical anchor. As Žižek (1997) points out, 
one of the disorienting and disquieting aspects of ‘cyberspace’ is the absence of material 
limits and closures. In this sense, online archives and data-hubs are continually updating 
objects whose existence is always provisional and conditional – there is no ‘final version’ 
as such. This means that as soon as I ‘screenshot’ this object, I impose a character of fixity 
on an object that is designed to be dynamic and updating. I move on now to explain how 
I set about collecting the data for this study. 
5.3.1. DATA COLLECTION 
Before describing the process of data collection I undertook for this thesis, I want to enter 
a brief note on the nature of what ‘counts’ as data. In The Arcades Project (1999) – Walter 
Benjamin’s study of the emergence of ‘the arcade’ in Paris as a phantasmic, capitalist space 
– Benjamin endeavoured to “collect the ‘trash of history’” (1999, p. 945), which in practice 
entailed studying not only what capitalism vaunted in the windows of these new and 
glittering palaces of iron, marble and glass, but in also studying what it cast aside, literally 
studying the ‘garbage’ of capitalism. Likewise, in The Pervert’s Guide to Ideology (2012), Žižek 
conducts a similar procedure as we see him stroll through the ‘airplane graveyard’ of the 
Mojave Desert in Southern California: he narrates, here “we see the other side of capitalist 
dynamics” (see also Žižek, 1997, p. 52). And in a final example, in The Plague of Fantasies 
Žižek (1997, p. 3) famously develops a thesis around the operation of ideology worked 
up from an analysis of the design of toilets. The point I wish to draw out here is that what 
we might consider to be ‘data’ can vary in the extreme in critical research (Harvey, 1990). 
What is crucial is that this ‘data’ is analysed in accordance with the logic of dialectical 
thought, as discussed in the preceding section on ontology, epistemology and practice. 
Therefore, we might say that critical theory is not ‘fussy’ when it comes to data and, 
furthermore, that we might learn a great deal from what is considered as trivial or mere 
waste. And set against such a backdrop, it is surely clear that there is much to be learned 
from the images of transparency that are produced today by the state, especially when 
these images represent events and places of great trauma and emotion. 
170 
 
For this thesis, I collected data on two forms of transparency on suicide in prison that are 
made publicly available in digital form: 
- ‘Prisons data’, produced by HMPPS (https://data.justice.gov.uk/prisons). 
- ‘Fatal Incident reports’, produced by the Prisons and Probation Ombudsman 
(PPO) (https://www.ppo.gov.uk/document/fii-report/). 
I gathered supplementary information from a third source: 
- ‘Statistics at MoJ’ (https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/ministry-of-
justice/about/statistics). 
For the ‘Prisons data’ data-hub, I gathered screenshots of the section of the data-hub 
pertaining to ‘Self-inflicted deaths’. I then gathered data on the statistics underlying this 
specific section of the data-hub from the ‘Statistics at MoJ’ online archive in MS Excel 
Spreadsheet format. 
For the ‘Prison and Probation Ombudsman’ online archive, I collected screenshots of the 
archive interface and downloaded a sample of ‘PPO reports’ and ‘Action Plans’ in PDF 
format. I also collected screenshots of the archive and MS Excel Spreadsheets of the 
statistics underlying the archive. In order to select a sample of ‘PPO reports’ and ‘Action 
Plans’, I first set the archive filter to show only deaths where the cause is classified as 
‘Self-inflicted’. From the resulting list of cases displayed, I selected a sample of cases for 
analysis. To do this, I began by restricting my sample to deaths for which there is a 
downloadable PDF of the ‘PPO Report’ and ‘Action Plan’. Whereas the ‘PPO Report’ is 
available for all deaths recorded on the archive, the ‘Action Plan’ is not. An ‘Action Plan’ 
is not published for any of the deaths listed prior to February 2013 and is also not 
published in a selection of cases thereafter. After restricting the population in this way, it 
comprised of 190 deaths. From this population, I selected a sample of cases for reading 
and detailed analysis. I selected these cases purposively, as opposed to employing a 
random sampling method. I opted for a purposive method of sampling, where the 
researcher takes an active role in selecting the cases for analysis, because of the small 
sample size and the qualitative nature of the analysis conducted (Miles & Huberman, 
1994). Furthermore, I deemed a purposive method of sampling to be most appropriately 
aligned with my theoretical and methodological grounding in critical theory (Morrow & 
171 
 
Brown, 1994) – as part of my intention in research is to illuminate and lay bare conditions 
of domination, I sought to identify cases that would best contribute to this aim. 
Given that the data I collected is freely and publicly available, I was not obliged to take 
steps to anonymise it. However, in this regard, I chose to take steps to anonymise the data 
I collected from the ‘Prison and Probation Ombudsman’ online archive. Despite the 
extremely sensitive nature of the data held in the archive, as of the 1st of March 2015 the 
name of the deceased is no longer anonymised in ‘Fatal Incident reports’. Reports 
pertaining to deaths of children – in England and Wales, a child is someone has not 
reached their 18th birthday (Children and the law, 2019) – are always anonymised, with the 
child referred to in terms such as ‘Child X’, ‘the girl’, ‘the young person’, ‘the male trainee’, 
and so on. I anonymised the data I collected by replacing the names listed with 
pseudonyms (e.g. I replace the name ‘Mr David Brown’ with ‘Mr G’). Whilst replacing 
names with pseudonyms confronts part of the ethical concern associated with research in 
such an emotive, sensitive context, it does not address the whole matter. The data 
presented in this thesis is inevitably and unavoidably sensitive and although I have taken 
steps to mitigate this there remains, to my mind, an irresolvable ethical issue associated 
with using suicide investigations as data. Though it does not absolve me from 
responsibility to act with sensitivity and care with this data, I believe that my intention in 
research – to work towards a more equitable and just society in which crass excesses of 
power and inequality are exposed and corrected – makes my use of this data justifiable. 
I want to close this section by emphasising the fundamentally political nature of data 
collection; political in the sense that data collection implies a decision by the researcher 
over what is included and what is excluded, what is put in and what is left out. This notion is 
best encapsulated in Wacquant’s shrewd remark that all data collection is intrinsically 
“data production”, insofar as it is “bound up with the theoretical construction of the 
object” of research (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 29). Akin to the thesis of Hines 
(1988), Wacquant beautifully captures the notion that in collecting data we selectively 
construct a bank of empirical material shaped to suit our own interests, ends and 
theoretical perspectives. I move on now to the final section of this chapter in which I set 
out the steps I took to analyse the data I collected. 
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5.3.2. DATA ANALYSIS 
At the heart of the data analysis in this thesis is the central theoretical principle in critical 
theory: contradiction (Marcuse, 1968). Having collected data on two examples of 
transparency on suicide produced by the state, in my analysis I set these representations 
in opposition, juxtaposing one against the other to criticise and contrast the kind of 
‘transparency’ that they each offer. I therefore structure my analysis in two steps: 
- First, I describe and analyse the form and content of transparency on the suicide 
in prison as presented in ‘Prisons data’. I analyse the data collected by criticising 
it on a representational plane, arguing that a messy and dark reality is concealed 
by the pristine and ordered appearance of transparency. I show that the visual 
form and statistical and textual content of ‘Prisons data’ works to obscure, rather 
than illuminate, the phenomenon in question. 
- Second, I describe and analyse the form and content of transparency on the suicide 
in prison as presented in ‘Fatal Incident reports’, juxtaposing this against the 
transparency of ‘Prisons data’. I propose that a more rich, textured and nuanced 
account of suicide could act as a counterweight or complement to the reductive, 
statistical depiction critiqued in the first step. Remaining within a representational 
frame of ideological analysis I demonstrate how the transparency offered by ‘Fatal 
Incident reports’ remedies certain aspects of the deficiencies of transparency set 
out in the first step of my analysis. 
In the discussion chapter that follows the analysis chapter, I apply the post-
representational theory of ideology I developed in sections 4.1 and 4.2 to conduct an 
analysis of the two examples of transparency selected for this study. I pose their common, 
essential character neither as misrepresentations, nor as more or less complete depictions 
of social reality, but as spectacles. Using theoretical concepts and themes developed from 
my readings of Debord and Žižek, I analyse the spectacular nature of the two examples 
of transparency studied in this thesis and argue that a theory of transparency as spectacle 
offers a more fruitful and productive means of understanding and critiquing modern, 
digital transparency than does a critique founded in representational terms. 
Whilst the preceding remarks in this section have described the broad structure and 
movements of my analysis, it is also important for me to describe the specific procedures 
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taken to analyse the material collected. I conducted all the analysis in this thesis manually, 
that is, without the aid of qualitative data processing software. I decided that manual 
analysis was most appropriate for this research given the particularly sensitive nature of 
the material under analysis. I considered it especially important to introduce more rather 
than less humanity in this emotive context of research. Analysing the data collected 
manually allowed me to remain ‘close’ to the data – i.e. ‘getting to know’ the data itself, 
rather than merely interpreting the outputs of a software process. This manual procedure 
was made possible on account of the small sample size selected for research. Furthermore, 
I considered the nature of my analysis, informed as it is by a specific theoretical 
perspective and particular reading of ideology, to be incompatible with the use of a generic 
data-processing package. 
As well as ‘immersing’ myself in the data by spending time exploring, browsing and 
interacting with the two examples of transparency in their online, digital form, I also 
printed the material to be analysed on A3 sheets of paper, making annotations and 
marking points of interest in pen. I repeated this procedure, revising and updating my 
analysis in a different coloured pen in order to trace the development of my analysis over 
time. Repeating my analysis brought forth new insights as my theoretical lens developed, 
especially my readings of Debord and Žižek matured. 
Before we proceed to the next chapter, I wish to enter three short notes on the task of 
data analysis. First, although I have set out my analysis in a logical, procedural form, the 
actual process of analysis undertaken did not and could not follow a strict, ‘step-by-step’ 
chronological, linear process as such. The key point to underscore here is that I regard 
the procedures of data collection and data analysis as deeply interconnected. As soon as 
I first viewed the materials that would later be collected and analysed, I began to apply 
my own reading and interpretation to these materials. To suggest that I could somehow 
‘switch off’ such prior framings and ‘take a cold, hard, objective look at the data’ runs 
against the methodological positioning of this study (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). 
Second, I want to emphasise that the analysis conducted in this thesis is dialectical insofar 
as I maintain that representations, be they representations in language (textual) or in 
images (visual), are bound to empirical referents. This ‘referential’ link – or as Adorno 
(1973) would put it, the dialectical mediation between subject and object – is lost in 
analytical procedures such as content analysis or discourse analysis where the text itself is 
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the object of analysis and is not analysed as it ‘refers to’ an underlying empirical reality 
(How, 2003, pp. 150-151). I argue that representations must be set in a broader social, 
political and economic context so that they might be understood and analysed most 
productively. Put differently, in the provocative terms of Bourdieu (2014b, p. 15), 
“Discourse analysis, which studies discourse without studying the social conditions of 
production of this discourse, does not understand anything.” 
Finally, I want to reiterate the nature of the analysis conducted by the ideology critic. I do 
not argue that my analysis in this thesis reveals ‘the way things really’ are or ‘the truth as 
it really is’ – such an assertion would contradict the epistemological positioning of this 
thesis. Rather, in my analysis I conduct a contemporary critique of ideology in which I 
aim to illuminate the logic of domination that is inscribed in ideological objects, such as 
transparency. The intention of my analysis is not to bring forth a more accurate, more 
complete rendering of the suicide in prison – to set the world ‘the right way up’ – but to 
demonstrate the way in which the ideological form of the representation of the suicide in 
prison structures our perception of the state and how we think of ourselves in relation to 





As explained in the previous section, my analysis, and therefore the structure of this 
chapter, proceeds in two steps: in the first I analyse ‘Prisons data’ (6.1) and in the second, 
‘Fatal Incident reports’ (6.2). 
However, before proceeding with my analysis, I believe it is important that the particular 
examples of transparency on suicide in prisons I have gathered be set within the universal 
context of the kind of transparency materials presented across a range of state functions 
as part of the wider open government initiative (e.g. transparency on healthcare, transport, 
utilities, central government administrative functions, and so on). To this end, a small 
selection of the kind of transparency materials made available to citizens through open 
government is now presented below. 
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It is worth here very briefly remarking on these examples, both in terms of the sheer scale 
of the machinery of transparency at work as part of open government and in relation to 
the level of analysis at which the content of transparency operates. Firstly, on scale. With 
each state function, at national and local levels, producing their own forms of 
transparency on performance, the volume and depth of material that accrues is quite 
staggering. In so many ways, this precisely affirms what Tsoukas (1997, p. 827) wrote of 
in his seminal piece on “the temptations and the paradoxes of the information society”: 
an “overabundance” of “objectified, commodified, abstract, decontextualized 
representations”. In terms of content, this vast pool of transparency presents us with 
information that typically (although not exclusively) reduces transparency to one or other 
form of quantification. With few exceptions, then, in open government, transparency is 
quantification and commodification of performance. Transparency on water consists of 
price comparisons of tap water to premium branded, bottled water (figure 4); transparency 
on trains is a simple measure of how many trains arrive on time (figure 5); and, 




Having introduced an illustrative sample of the style of transparency materials generally 
available to citizens as part of open government, I now move on to present and analyse 
the specific transparency materials I collected on prisons and suicides in prisons, 
beginning first with ‘Prisons data’. 
6.1. “PRISONS DATA”59 
6.1.1. DESCRIPTION 
‘Prisons data’ is a data-hub produced by HMPPS that provides a visual overview of audit 
and performance ratings, targets, scores and statistics from prisons in England & Wales. 
A reproduction of the data-hub is reproduced below. 
Figure 9. ‘Prisons data’, standard view on accessing data-hub (i) 
 
Source: https://data.justice.gov.uk/prisons.  
 
59 See: https://data.justice.gov.uk/prisons. Unless otherwise indicated, all quotes in this section are drawn 
from this source. 
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Figure 10. ‘Prisons data’, standard view on accessing data-hub (ii) 
 
Source: https://data.justice.gov.uk/prisons. 
The data-hub is populated by “data extracts”, “snapshots drawn from live IT systems at 
fixed points in time to ensure consistency of reporting”. Although data extracts are drawn 
from live systems, additional information on the data-hub notes that “these databases are 
dynamic and where updates to data are made subsequent to the taking of the extracts, 
these updates will not be reflected in figures produced by the extract. For this reason, 
current figures are unlikely to precisely match those shown here.” In other words, the 
data-hub is populated with information that was considered ‘live’ ‘as at’ a particular point 
in time.  
The audit and performance ratings, targets, scores and statistics presented by the data-
hub cover six areas: ‘Public protection’, ‘Safety & order’, ‘Reform’, ‘Life after prison’, 
‘Offender management’ and ‘Additional data’. An overview of each of these areas can be 




Figure 11. ‘Reform’ 
 
Source: https://data.justice.gov.uk/prisons. 
Each area has a linked heading that when clicked leads to further information in which 
the ratings, scores and statistics are presented in non-aggregate form, i.e. displayed by 
prison-by-prison. To illustrate this, I provide a step-by-step example of navigating 
through the data-hub, focusing on ‘Self-inflicted deaths’.  
Clicking on the ‘Safety & order’ link from the hub homepage, we are taken to a new page 
on which we find information on, for example, ‘Assaults on staff per 1,000 prisoners’, 
‘Incident Reporting System data quality audit’, and ‘Rate of self-harm incidents’. By 
selecting either the ‘Self-inflicted deaths’ heading or the ‘Self-inflicted deaths detail’ link, 
we reach a page displaying statistics of self-inflicted deaths in prison from the period 2000-
2001 to 2017-2018. A series of charts details different aspects of these deaths: a year-by-
year bar graph plots the above time period using blue rectangular boxes to represent the 
total number of deaths by year; a map of the UK, accompanied by a scrollable column, 
matches deaths to prisons, using blue markers to signify where deaths occurred and grey 
markers to signify where no deaths occurred; a second bar-graph, plotting individual 
prisons alphabetically, represents where each death took place, again using blue 
rectangular boxes to represent the total number of deaths, this time by prison. The step-
by-step process described here is presented below.  
185 
 
Figure 12. Navigating to ‘Safety & Order’ (i) 
 
Source: https://data.justice.gov.uk/prisons. 






Figure 14. Navigating to ‘Self-inflicted deaths’ 
 
Source: https://data.justice.gov.uk/prisons/safety-and-order. 






Figure 16. Navigating to ‘Self-inflicted deaths’, further statistics (ii) 
 
Source: https://data.justice.gov.uk/prisons/safety-and-order. 
Underlying the interactive, colour-coded representations of suicide in ‘Prisons data’ is a 
network of ‘unformatted’ source statistics, held in MS Excel Spreadsheets, from which 
the data-hub is populated. A link to this network of statistics is provided at the bottom of 
the data-hub page. Clicking on the link to ‘Safety in custody statistics (quarterly)’, we are 
taken to a page displaying a quarterly update of safety in custody statistics, “released by 
the MoJ and produced in accordance with arrangements approved by the UK Statistics 
Authority” (Safety in Custody quarterly: update to March 2019, 2019). From here, navigating 
the network of ‘Justice System Transparency’ in which a vast array of audit and 
performance ratings, rankings, targets, scores and statistics are presented for activities 
across the justice system, we are able to access a MS Excel Spreadsheet of ‘Deaths in 
prison custody 1978 to 2018’ (Safety in Custody quarterly: update to September 2018, 2019). 
Within this extensive spreadsheet, made up of 20 individual tabs, we can navigate to a 
series of detailed statistics on ‘self-inflicted deaths’ in prisons, three examples of which 




Figure 17. ‘Self-inflicted deaths in prison custody by method since 1999, England 
and Wales’ 
 
Figure 18. ‘Self-inflicted deaths in prison custody: Ligatures used in hanging/self-
strangulation since 1999, England and Wales’ 
 
Figure 19. ‘Self-inflicted deaths in prison custody: Ligature points used in 








In my remarks here, I focus on analysing the way in which the content and form of ‘Prisons 
data’ masks the brutal, material reality of suicide in prison. In other words, I focus on 
what is hidden and obscured by the representations of transparency. 
Before doing so, it is important to analyse, immediately, the usage of the expression ‘self-
inflicted death’, as opposed to suicide, which is common to both ‘Prisons data’ and ‘Fatal 
Incident reports’. The distinction between the terminology of ‘suicide’ and ‘self-inflicted 
death’ is by no means trivial or arbitrary. It is surely the case that self-inflicted death is the 
less emotive terminology of the two. Certainly, to speak of suicide is humanising, and 
raises questions of who the person was and why they took their own life. But to speak of 
self-inflicted death immediately frames this death in terms of blame – it points the finger at 
‘who did it’. In the thoroughly individualised political economy of neoliberalism, each 
individual is regarded as responsible for their own fate, as an ‘entrepreneur of the self’ 
(Cooper, 2015b; Foucault, 2008). As such, no attempt is made to develop a broader 
explanation of suicide as determined by myriad social, political and economic factors. 
Instead, ‘self-inflicted death’ is regarded as the product of a series of ‘bad life choices’ 
made by the individual, the logical end-point in a sequence of procedural events. Whilst I 
do not argue that individuals are merely the wholly determined products of their material 
surroundings and circumstances (Giddens, 1990), it is surely callous to apportion all the 
blame to some of the most vulnerable and deprived people in society who have been 
locked up for years in violent and overcrowded prisons. To say that ‘you did this to 
yourself’ obliterates any consideration of the structural-material factors that contributed 
to a suicide. 
Now, to the question of the visual representation of suicides in ‘Prisons data’, their form. 
What is easily forgotten when looking at the glossy interface of the ‘Self-inflicted deaths’ 
section of the data-hub is that the blue bars of the graph that show the total number of 
suicides in prison year-by-year are each the aggregation of the deaths of individual people. 
Each bar on the graph is made up of imperceptible tranches, thin, pale blue lines that 
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represent the deaths of individuals. When aggregated together, these form a block of 
suicides for the year in question. The individual and their humanity is eviscerated in this 
charming, dazzling user interface. Precisely one seventy-ninth of the blue bar representing 
the 79 suicides in prisons in the period of April 2014 to March 2015 refers to the death 
of a human being. But the death of this human being does not ‘magically’ transform into 
a section of this bar – much has to happen before this vile tribute is callously bestowed 
on them. First, the cellmate of that prisoner must be cared for – but this may not happen, 
because of chronic under-staffing and overcrowding in the prison system. As such the 
cell will be locked and a new prisoner will appear to fill the place of the old, and all too 
soon. Before this, though, the cell will need cleaning. A prison officer will do this, if they 
have time. They will clean out any possessions, they may need to clean away the blood of 
that prisoner. The body of the prisoner must also be removed. This may be done by the 
police. By the time the police arrive, the body will likely be in rigor mortis – that is, 
absolutely rigid, stiff – and will be carried out by two police officers from whereon it will 
be taken to a morgue. The other prisoners and the staff of the prison, officers, 
administrative, medical, educational, and so on, will all be advised of the suicide. The 
family and friends of the prisoner, if they have any family or friends, will be notified by a 
representative of the prison. Of course, this chain of events is rather schematic, but the 
point I wish to stress is that a wealth of humanity is compressed into pixels on a data-hub 
– and to what end? The suicide is preserved on our computer screens, representing it as 
if it were a curiosity in a museum or a historical artefact archived and stowed in a glass 
display cabinet. 
We must also here reflect – in the dialectical spirit of critical theory – on what information 
is not included as part of ‘Prisons data’. What is left out? What is hidden by the content of 
the visual representation of the prison and suicide in ‘Prisons data’? Lauded though ‘data-
hubs’ and ‘dashboards’ are for allowing us to see ‘what’s going on’ in organisations and 
institutions, these instruments fail to capture the aura of the prison, the dread and tension 
that hangs in the air of the halls of the prison. The cool, sterile, pristine world of the data-
hub bears little or no relation to the anxious, oppressive, miasmic environment of the 
prison. For instance, former prison governor Andrew Coyle (2016, p. 8) writes of how 




The stench pervaded the whole prison and was no respecter of persons. As a new 
assistant governor and one of the few persons who wore civilian clothes I quickly 
learned that the suits which I wore to work had to be kept separate from all my other 
clothes at home and to be cleaned regularly to minimise the prison smell which 
saturated them. 
Likewise, Stern (1993) writes of how the prison is a place steeped in great suffering and 
tragedy, locked in a deep-rooted malaise. And yet all of this vanishes into a bright sheen 
of data points that presents the prison as an aggregate of audit and performance ratings, 
targets, scores and statistics. Further still, whilst it does little to capture the essence of life 
and death in prison, ‘Prisons data’ also leaves out crucial information relating to the 
budgets and spending on prisons. Whilst an array of data captures a series of alarming 
trends in prisons, no information is provided to inform the user of the data-hub of the 
financial state of prisons. Indeed, the user who does not of their own accord commit to 
staying informed about the state of prisons and prison policy in England and Wales will 
find no information explaining that prisons have been subjected to a strict and sustained 
programme of budgetary austerity over the last decade (Bennett, 2016). Therefore, when 
considering, for instance, that the rate of self-harm incidents in prisons has increased 
steadily from 310 incidents per 1,000 prisoners in the period from April 2010 to March 
2011 to 699 incidents per 1,000 prisoners in the period from April 2018 to March 2019, 
it is imperative that such statistics are read in the social, political and economic context of 
neoliberalism and austerity. However, furnished only with the data that is set out in 
‘Prisons data’, all one can do is remark that prisons are ‘out of control’ and puzzle as to 
how conditions have deteriorated so drastically in recent years. 
In a similar vein, ‘Prisons data’ also excludes important information pertaining to class. 
Whilst the age, gender, sexuality, ethnicity, religion, and nationality of prisoners are 
meticulously recorded and represented in statistics for the prison population as a whole, 
there is no indication or measure of the economic situation of prisoners. For instance, 
following the links at the bottom of the ‘Prisons data’ page, we can navigate to further 
statistics on the prison population, in which we find detailed analysis of the population. 
The Offender Equalities Annual Report 2018/19 presents statistical breakdowns of the prison 
population in reference to the proportions of prisoners who are from ‘Black, Asian or 
Minority Ethnic’ (BAME) backgrounds, whether prisoners are male, female, or 
transgender, if prisoners identify with a particular religion, and if prisoners are 
192 
 
heterosexual or ‘Gay/Lesbian/Bisexual or Other’ (Her Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service 
Offender Equalities Annual Report 2018/19, 2019). A similar report that statistically profiles 
suicide in prisons in relation to prisoner characteristics also neglects the provision of any 
economic perspective on imprisonment and suicide (Statistical Notice: Self-Inflicted Deaths in 
Prison Custody in England and Wales between 1978 and March 2014, 2015). In practice, this 
means that any class analysis of prisons – unlike analyses concerned with (the important) 
issues of relations between imprisonment and age, gender, sexuality and so on – has to 
make do with estimations, projections and partial samples of the prison population. This 
in turn prevents a clear picture from emerging of the repressive role of prisons in 
perpetuating class divisions. 
Not only does ‘Prisons data’ leave out crucial information in its rendering of the suicide 
in prison, it also misrepresents relations between humans as relations between things. When 
applied to environmental, biological, chemical, and physical problems (e.g. monitoring a 
series of climatic variables such as temperature, air pressure, wind speed, sea level) or 
monitoring multiple processes in a complex setting (e.g. monitoring air-traffic in an 
airport or the interrelated processes of a megaproject) data-hubs and similar technologies 
of data representation, like dashboards, are in their element. Here, these powerful tools 
can be put to use to optimize and refine processes in organisations and institutions.60 In 
such settings, data-hubs, quite properly, treat things as things. 
Problems arise when such technologies are applied in social settings. When rendered in the 
data-hub, the prison and the suicide within prison become ‘just another data set to be 
optimised’. That the prison is a site of great sadness, of physical and mental ill-health, of 
strife, desperation, fear, cruelty, anger, of depression, that these are contained within the 
prison is deemed absolutely irrelevant. Insofar as these things escape rational 
measurement they are rendered as a kind of error term, ‘noise’ or ‘junk’ data. Thus, they 
are excluded, pushed outside as ‘externalities’, and the prison is rendered reductively in 
terms of what can be rationally measured in material reality. The prison is ‘purified’, 
represented as an array of risks to be mitigated and processes to be refined. Thus, the 
 
60 It would be remiss of me not to point out that in a political economy operating under capitalist relations 
of production, technologies like dashboards and data-hubs – which I loosely bracket as part of the forces of 
production – are overwhelmingly put to use in order to generate profits and return on capital, not social 
good. In a political economy structured along different relations of production these forces could be channelled 
into creating social (for-use) rather than private (for-profit) wealth (Eagleton, 1997). 
193 
 
representation of suicide in the data-hub is distinct from the visual representation of the 
airport (Quattrone, 2017), the megaproject (Ronzani & Gatzweiler, 2019), or the financial 
market (Pollock & D’Adderio, 2012). Once more, all of these treat things as things: planes, 
tunnels and stocks cannot be dehumanised. However, in social situations, like in the 
representation of a suicide in prison, the data-hub or dashboard treats humans as things. 
And where humans, imprisoned or not, are treated as things, we know that the stage is set 
for horrific atrocities to be committed and terrible pain to be inflicted by apparently banal, 
mundane administrative means (Fleischman et al., 2013; Funnell, 1998; Oldroyd et al., 
2008; Tyson, Fleischman, & Oldroyd, 2004). As a form of representation that partakes in 
this liquidation of humanity, the data-hub allows the vulnerable individuals under its gaze 
to be erased. 
Before moving on to analyse ‘Fatal Incident reports’, I also want to provide a brief analysis 
of the statistics that underlie ‘Prisons data’, of which I reproduced three examples earlier 
in this section (see figures 17, 18, and 19). These statistics are the ‘ugly’ face of 
transparency, in both form and content. First, in terms of form, the appearance of these 
statistics, when set against the sheen of the ‘Prisons data’ data-hub, is pared back and 
austere, being restricted only to black and white tables. There is a palpable sense of an 
‘anti-aesthetic’ at work here. Second, in terms of content, these statistics delve into the 
mundane practicality of suicide, listing the ‘method’ of suicide, the material used to 
construct a ligature and the ligature point used.61 We can learn much about these statistics 
simply by considering the way in which they are accessed. Links that lead, indirectly, to 
these statistics are accessed at the bottom of the data-hub, in greyed-out, small printed 
text, away from the main body of the data-hub, as I show below. This is by no means 
trivial or arbitrary. Changes and variances in layout, typography, scale and colour are all 
features used by designers to draw our attention towards certain features and away from 
others (Greenwood et al., 2019, p. 809). 
  
 
61 Hanging is by far the most common method by which prisoners commit suicide. 
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Figure 20. ‘Data sources and more details’ 
 
Source: https://data.justice.gov.uk/prisons. 
The point here is simple, but is no less important for that. In a classic ideological strategy 
of misdirection and obfuscation, the glossy, shiny appearance is foregrounded, with the 
ugly, brutal features being smuggled into the background (as Adorno (1973, p. xxi) 
remarks, “It is nothing new to find that the sublime becomes the cover for something 
low”). Far more so than the variety of audit and performance ratings, targets, scores and 
statistics presented in the aggregated, colour-coded, interactive display of ‘Prisons data’, 
the ‘raw’ underlying statistics, presented in an unformatted MS Excel spreadsheet, have 
an undeniable shock effect. On first accessing these statistics, I was astonished at the 
specificity of details that were recorded. For instance, is it not strange that we can know 
that of the 89 people who died by committing suicide in 2002, 14 used shoelaces as 
ligatures, or that of the 78 people who died by committing suicide in 2014, 5 hung 
themselves from light fittings? What social purpose do such statistics serve, other than to 
horrify their reader? 
We must ask at this point: is the brutality of the ‘underlying’ statistics an ‘improvement’ 
on the pristine, ‘cleaned-up’ appearance of ‘Prisons data’? On the one hand, we might 
reasonably say yes, insofar as there is little attempt made here to beautify or ‘dress-up’ 
these statistics as anything other than the desperate state of affairs that they are. And yet, 
on the other, we might (and must) say no. Recalling my reading of Žižek (1989, p. xxiv), 
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specifically in relation to his remarks on the notion of an ‘escape’ from or ‘end’ to ideology 
as “an ideological idea par excellence!”, it is crucial that we are not lured into the trap of 
perceiving these statistics as ‘non-ideological’ or ‘neutral’ merely because they appear in a 
more restrained livery than do their foregrounded counterpart. By “framing 
unconcealment”, mystery can, paradoxically, be deepened (Valdovinos, 2018; Žižek, 1997, 
pp. 129-133). To be sure, parsimony in design and austerity in formatting themselves form 
a kind of ‘anti-aesthetic’ with the capacity to influence the way we see and what we choose 
to believe. The authority of accounting itself is indeed founded on such principles, with 
its consistent, ordered format and monochromatic appearance lending it a potent aura of 
objectivity, facticity and sobriety (Cooper et al., 1994; Gallhofer & Haslam, 1991). The 
very fact that the underlying statistics are presented in black and white makes an appeal 
to us to treat these as ‘official’ and ‘honest’ (Gallhofer & Haslam, 1996, p. 40; Preston et 
al., 1996) and to likewise regard the matter of prisons, in a moral, political sense, as black 
and white, as a simple matter of in or out, right and wrong, true and false. 
If the range of audit and performance ratings, targets, scores and statistics represented in 
‘Prisons data’ and the data that underlie it represent the suicide and prison in reductive, 
instrumental and functional terms, obscuring the harsh material realities of life and death 
in prison, would we benefit from a more nuanced, detailed and textured account of the 
suicide? As a critical accountant well versed in the perils of reductionism and obfuscation 
common in numerical systems of representation, the logical step here is to move away 
from performance scores, audit ratings, statistics and figures and into the realms of 
language and narrative in order to provide a ‘fuller’ and more ‘rich’ representation of 
prison and suicide. With this in mind, I move on now to consider the representation of 
suicide as set out in ‘Fatal Incident reports’. 
6.2. “FATAL INCIDENT REPORTS”62 
6.2.1. DESCRIPTION 
‘Fatal Incident reports’ is an archive of reports produced by the Prisons and Probation 
Ombudsman (PPO) of investigations into deaths in prisons. The PPO is “is appointed by 
and reports directly to the Secretary of State for Justice” and is “wholly independent” of 
 
62 See: https://www.ppo.gov.uk/document/fii-report/. Unless otherwise indicated, all quotes in this 
section are drawn from this source. 
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the services of the MoJ, including HMPPS. The PPO is sponsored by, though 
operationally independent of, the MoJ (see Strategic Plan: 2019-21, 2019, p. 3). As part of 
the commitment of the British Government to the European Commission on Human 
Rights, Article 2 of the Human Rights Act 1998 requires that “there should be an 
independent and effective investigation into all deaths caused by the State (through use 
of force or failure to protect life). Article 2 also states that the investigation should be 
reasonably prompt, open to public scrutiny and involve the next of kin of the deceased” 
(Why does the Ombudsman investigate deaths?, 2019). As such, the PPO conducts independent 
investigations into all fatal incidents in prisons. These investigations are subdivided into 
categories, death by: ‘Homicide’, ‘Natural causes’, ‘Other non-natural’, ‘Self-inflicted’ and 
‘Unclassified’. 
The archive represents each death in a standard sized, grey box. This box contains 
information detailing: the name of the prison at which the death took place, the date on 
which the report was published, the date of death, the cause of death and the gender and 
age of the deceased. Each box also contains two links, one to a ‘PPO Report’, which 
provides access to the PPO’s full report on the investigation into a death of a prisoner, 
the other to an ‘Action Plan’, a document produced by the establishment at which the 
suicide took place that sets out the recommendations given by the PPO to the 
establishment, their response to these recommendations, and a record of when these 
recommendations were implemented and by whom (Learning from PPO investigations: 
Making recommendations, 2013). As of 1st March 2015, the name of the deceased is included 
in the report, whilst other names continue to be anonymised. 
Atop the archive is a ‘Filter/Sort’ function, which allows users to arrange the archive 
according to: ‘Location’, ‘Cause’, ‘Gender’, ‘Age’ and ‘Establishment’. The results can then 
be sorted according to ‘Website date’ and ‘Date of death’. After using the filters to search 
for a particular type of case, the archive page ‘refreshes’, repopulating the screen with a 
new set of grey boxes, which can then be sorted into an order either by date of publication 




Figure 21. ‘Fatal Incident reports’, standard view on accessing archive (i) 
 
Source: https://www.ppo.gov.uk/document/fii-report/. 
Figure 22. ‘Fatal Incident reports’, standard view on accessing archive (ii) 
 
Source: https://www.ppo.gov.uk/document/fii-report/. 
For each case, both the PPO Report and the Action Plan are provided in PDF format. 
The PPO Report is written up in a formal, precise register, noting dates and exact times 
of events, and is structured with an executive summary, a detailed account of the 
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investigation process, background information, key events and findings. A reproduction 
of a PPO report is presented below. Where necessary, I have superimposed black boxes 
on the report in order to preserve the anonymity of the person to whom the report refers. 
The full source URL for the following figures (figures 23, 24, 25, and 26) has been 
removed as this would compromise the anonymity of the reports. All reports were 
downloaded from: https://www.ppo.gov.uk/document/fii-report/. 
Figure 23. ‘PPO report’ (i) 
 




The Action Plan is structured as a table, in a form resembling that of an internal audit, 
with entries input under headings for: ‘Recommendation’, ‘Accepted/Not Accepted’, 
‘Response’ and ‘Target date for completion and function responsible’. A reproduction of 
an Action Plan is presented below. Again, as with the PPO report, I have superimposed 
black boxes on the report in order to preserve the anonymity of the person to whom the 
report refers. 
Figure 25. ‘Action Plan’ (i) 
 





As I set out in my opening comments in this chapter, I purposefully selected contrasting 
and opposing examples of transparency on suicide in prison in order to interrogate the 
representational problems associated with transparency. Where a common lament around 
the nature of transparency is that it is ‘all just numbers’ – performance metrics, rankings, 
ratings, scores and so on – it is important that we investigate forms of transparency that 
are not numerical or statistical to ascertain whether such forms are indeed more revealing 
and insightful than their numerical, statistical counterparts. 
In this regard, ‘Fatal Incident reports’ is certainly a suitable anti-thesis (or, ‘negation’) to 
‘Prisons data’ in terms of content. Nonetheless, it is immediately evident when accessing 
‘Fatal Incident reports’ that the user interface to this digital archive – its form – has been 
carefully stylised, just as that of ‘Prisons data’. Eschewing the strict formalism of the 
reports contained within the archive – both the ‘PPO reports’ (the detailed investigation 
into the suicide) and the ‘Action Plans’ (the actions and recommendations proposed in 
response to the suicide) are rendered in plain, monochromatic form – the user interface 
of the archive itself is presented in a blend of cool and dark greys and a muted orange 
colour. More interesting than this, however, is the effect given by the layout of the archive 
itself. The rows upon rows of uniform, light grey boxes, each bearing a series of 
inscriptions (the publication date of the investigation, the date of death, the cause of 
death, the gender of the individual, the age of the individual, and a link to the ‘PPO report’ 
and ‘Action Plan’) bear a striking resemblance to the rows of tombstones in a cemetery, 
each etched with a series of details about the deceased person. In a sense, the uniform, 




Figure 27. Digital tombstones 
 
Source: https://www.ppo.gov.uk/document/fii-report/. 
What is also curious about the form of the ‘Fatal Incident reports’ archive is its ‘endless’ 
nature. There is no strict, fixed ‘end’ to the archive as such. Scrolling to the bottom of the 
archive at any point sees it ‘reloaded’ with a new series of rows. 
Figure 28. Loading of new rows (i) 
 
Source: https://www.ppo.gov.uk/document/fii-report/. 





Akin to the endless’ feeds of Instagram and Facebook, the ‘endless’, ‘infinite’ scrolling of 
the digital interface of ‘Fatal Incident reports’ furnishes the user with the bizarre and 
unsettling sense that there is an infinite number of deaths to be surveyed. With respect to 
this specific object of the archive, the boundlessness of cyberspace creates an unsettling 
effect where we lose our sense of scale and depth (Žižek, 1997). Why are we denied a 
view of the archive as a whole? It is worthwhile reflecting on this. In a physical archive, 
or a library, if we wish to research or ‘find out’ something about a subject, we confront a 
bounded system where a code and physical space together form a knowable, fixed terrain. 
For instance, we might say, ‘All records that are held on the subject of x are to be found 
at location a.b.c., which corresponds to four rows of shelves in aisle y’. In other words, we 
can survey a subject as a whole. With the ‘endless’ scrolling of ‘Fatal Incident reports’, there 
is always the sense that the whole is elusive, that something is hidden, that there is more 
to be seen. 
Now, to the question of the content of ‘Fatal Incident reports’. As earlier indicated, the 
currency of ‘Fatal Incident reports’ is words, not figures. Do we find, therefore, a more 
comprehensive and complete representation of the suicide? This is certainly the case. 
Without exception, readings of ‘PPO Reports’ are difficult, shocking, and harrowing. 
These reports set out, in methodical, rigorous detail, the (immediate) events leading up to 
the suicide of a prisoner and the act itself. Below are a sample of anonymised excerpts 
from ‘PPO Reports’.63 
A nurse responded to the officer’s call. She collected the emergency bag and 
defibrillator and arrived at Mr P’s cell five minutes after the code blue. When she 
arrived, Mr P was lying on his back on the floor. He was not breathing and had no 
pulse, his eyes were fixed and glazed, and he displayed signs of rigor mortis. Another 
nurse arrived and they decided that resuscitation was not appropriate as rigor mortis 
was present, and it would have been futile and degrading for Mr P. Paramedics arrived 
at 5.12am and pronounced Mr P dead at 5.32am. 
(PPO 1, p. 14) 
Nurse C recorded that Mr F said that Satan spoke to him and told him to harm 
himself. Mr F said he had thought of ways to kill himself and spoke about hanging. 
Nurse B recorded that it was hard to follow Mr F’s train of thought and to assess his 
 
63 Excerpts from ‘PPO Reports’ are cited as ‘PPO 1’, ‘PPO 2’, and so on. Excerpts from ‘Action Plans’ are 
also cited in this way, as ‘AP 1’, ‘AP 2’, and so on. 
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mental capacity. She made an appointment with the visiting psychiatrist for [dd/mm], 
and recorded Mr F’s comments in the ACCT document.64 
(PPO 2, p. 13) 
At about 2.20am on [dd/mm], Mr B was found hanging by a sheet attached to his cell 
door. He had barricaded the door with his mattress and a chair, tied his hands and 
feet and filled his mouth with a plastic bag containing tea bags, sugar sachets and milk 
cartons. Staff and paramedics tried to resuscitate him but he was pronounced dead at 
3.24am. 
(PPO 3, p. 5) 
Mr V died on [dd/mm/yyyy], from complications arising from acute pneumonia and 
dehydration while a prisoner at HMP X. He was 28 years old. I offer my condolences 
to Mr V’s family and friends.  
During his time in custody, Mr V’s behaviour deteriorated significantly and rapidly 
following his move to the prison’s segregation unit where he refused all treatment, 
food and fluids (although he ate a little fruit and drank some water and milk) and 
would not engage with the mental health nurses and healthcare staff who saw him 
regularly. This caused Mr V’s condition to deteriorate significantly, leading to his 
death. 
(PPO 4, p. 3) 
Mr Q died on [dd/mm/yyyy], after taking an overdose of medication for high blood 
pressure, at HMP Y. He was 74 years old. I offer my condolences to Mr Q’s family 
and friends. 
(PPO 5, p. 3) 
Ms K was kneeling on the floor by the side of her bed. She had a dressing gown cord 
around her neck attached to the window bars. Officer D used her fish knife to cut the 
ligature and, together with Nurse A, moved Ms K to the floor. Both nurses said that 
Ms K was cold to the touch and displayed clear signs of rigor mortis in her limbs. 
Nurse A began performing CPR. Nurse B prepared the defibrillator but as the battery 
was low, another machine was collected from the office in [Location Z]. Nurse B tried 
to insert an airway, but Ms K’s jaw was too stiff to do so. Officer C used the ‘ambu 
bag’, a manual resuscitator, to give two breaths after each round of thirty 
cardiopulmonary chest compressions. 
 
64 An ACCT (Assessment, Care in Custody and Teamwork plan) is a file that is ‘opened on a prisoner’ if 
they present a risk of suicide or self-harm (Learning from PPO Investigations: Self-Inflicted deaths of prisoners on 
ACCT, 2014). An ACCT remains open for as long as prisoner is considered at risk of committing suicide 
or self-harm. An ACCT is closed once a prisoner is believed no longer to present a risk of committing 
suicide or self-harm. 
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(PPO 6, p. 32) 
The above excerpts are intended to establish a sense of the degree to which the ‘PPO 
Reports’ record suicide in prison in grim detail. Set alongside the faceless rendering of 
suicide in ‘Prisons data’, ‘PPO reports’ explicitly refer to the human beings that populate 
the prison system. The brutal contents of many of these reports is in stark contrast to the 
sheen of the data-hub in which there is a sterile absence of human figures. And yet it is 
also the case that ‘PPO reports’ and their ‘Action Plan’ counterparts are narrated in a 
clipped, bureaucratic, managerial, and audit-inflected register. In so many ways, these 
documents epitomise the typical response of organisations and institutions in an ‘audit 
society’ (Power, 1999). Indeed, the relation between transparency and audit (see Power, 
1994, pp. 18-21) is one that has been explicitly drawn upon as a rhetorical device, with 
former Minister for the Cabinet Office, Sir Francis Maude, and former Prime Minister, 
David Cameron, both evoking the imagery of an “army of armchair auditors” empowered 
to hold government to account by transparency (Cameron, 2010b; Maude, 2010). 
Thus, the point I wish to stress here is that we should not misrecognise ‘PPO reports’ and 
‘Action Plans’ for humanist efforts to ‘lay bare’ the conditions of the prison system or to 
provide a ‘rich and full account’ of the suicide. To be clear, I do not wish to imply that 
those who produce these reports have any sort of malevolent or expressly ill-intention, 
but I want to draw attention to the way in which these reports are rooted in the 
assumptions and norms of an audit culture that serves to individualise, responsibilise and 
apportion blame to prisoners and prison officers, nurses, governors, educators and so on, 
without any consideration of the wider social, political and economic context in which 
these individuals live and work. The following excerpts illustrate this. 
We consider that, in deciding to close the ACCT, staff placed too much weight on Mr 
N’s assertions that he would not harm himself and not enough weight on his risk 
factors (which remained unchanged) or his behaviour which suggested he required 
mental health support. 
(PPO 7, p. 20) 
Recommendation: The Governor and Head of Healthcare should ensure that staff 
identify and manage prisoners at risk of suicide and self-harm in line with PSI 64/2011 
and PSI 07/2015. First night procedures should recognise the additional 




(AP 1, p. 1) 
Recommendation: The Governor should ensure that all staff are reminded that if they 
discover an obscured observation panel, they should immediately ask the prisoner to 
remove the obstruction and they should take appropriate action if the prisoner does 
not respond. 
Accepted. 
Response: Communication via Staff information notices and briefings will be 
circulated In line with PSI 75/2011 Residential Services, where there is a requirement 
to ensure the wellbeing of prisoners. 
Completed. 
Head of Residential/Head of Safer Prisons. 
(AP 2, p. 3) 
This was Mr J’s first time in prison; he was convicted of sexual offences and 
understood that his access to his children might be restricted. He had self-harmed and 
had suicidal thoughts just before arriving in prison, and his escort record indicated 
that he was at risk. It was the right decision of an officer to begin ACCT procedures 
after his assessment of Mr J in reception. 
Prison Service Instruction (PSI) 64/2011 contains guidance and mandatory 
instructions on managing prisoners at risk of suicide and self-harm. It requires ACCT 
case reviews to be multidisciplinary where possible and says that, for the first case 
review, a healthcare representative must attend. A SO [Supervising Officer] chaired 
what he described as a case review, but it was not in line with the requirements of a 
multidisciplinary case review set out in PSI 64/2011. Only he and Mr J attended the 
case review. He did not invite anyone from the healthcare team to attend the review, 
so did not learn of Mr J’s outstanding mental health referral. 
(PPO 8, p. 14) 
PSI 64/2011 requires caremaps to reflect the prisoner’s needs, level of risk and the 
triggers of their distress. Caremaps should aim to address issues identified in the 
ACCT assessment interview and later reviews, and consider a range of factors 
including health interventions, peer support, family contact and access to diversionary 
activities. Each action on the caremap must be tailored to meet the individual needs 
of the prisoner, be aimed at reducing risk and be time bound. 
Ms H’s caremap contained numerous entries but they were confusing and hard to 
follow. It was not clear which actions had been achieved and which were outstanding. 
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Not all of the decisions taken at reviews were properly reflected in the caremap, 
particularly those about meeting Ms H’s mental health needs. 
(PPO 9, p. 21) 
Recommendation: The Governor should ensure that the system to record cell bells is 
fully operational at all times. When there is a fault, this should be reported 
immediately, via the appropriate reporting system, to ensure there is no delay in fixing 
faults. 
Accepted. 
(AP 3, p. 4) 
As demonstrated above, each suicide is assessed through a prism of risks, protocols, 
forms, training, rules, regulations, and so on. Thus, if ‘Prisons data’ is dehumanising and 
clinical, then we might well say that ‘Fatal Incident reports’ is individualising and bureaucratic, 
rendering the suicide as an object of audit and a function of (non)compliance to the rules 
and regulation of prisons. It is important here to analyse these reports through the lens 
of class, in particular emphasising how it is that prison officers (in the language of a class 
analysis, ‘the workers’, i.e. labour) are repeatedly responsibilised for the dark and tragic 
events in prisons. These reports make no references to the immediate organisational 
context in which prison officers operate, which means omitting the profoundly damaging 
impact of austerity on prisons in England and Wales. 
As well as responsibilising individual prison officers, ‘Fatal Incident reports’ also serve to 
perpetuate the notion that each individual suicide is the outcome of a series of particulars 
(a missed audit form, an incorrectly filed record, a late observation, a faulty call bell) rather 
than as the expression of systematic, universal features – overcrowding, under-staffing, 
under-funding, and so on. In other words, if in the case of ‘Prisons data’ we observe what 
Tsoukas (1997, p. 830) might call extreme “information reductionism” (of course, all 
representations are reductions, but this is not to say that some representations cannot 
leave out more than others), in ‘Fatal Incident reports’ we observe the representation of 
what are symptoms of broader structural, systematic contradictions and antagonisms (the 
fundamentally oppressive nature of incarceration, exacerbated under conditions of 
austerity) as the root causes of the suicide in prison. Put critically, the practice of displacing 
accountability onto objects (e.g. an obscured cell observation panel, a faulty call bell, a 
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loose bedpost, and so on) could be considered through (Žižek’s reading of) Marx’s notion 
of commodity fetishism (introduced earlier, in section 4.1.2). In each case, the object 
misrepresents a problem of the universal-social (austerity, the imprisonment of the poor, 
over-populated prisons) as a problem of the particular-organisational (if ‘x’ had been 
fixed, ‘y’ would not have happened). Whilst this may be objectively ‘true’ (e.g. if the 
observation panel for the cell had not been obscured, then a prison officer could have seen 
the prisoner hanging from a ligature and intervened more quickly), this ‘fetishized’ form 
of transparency nonetheless acts to obscure the broader social context in which such 
events take place, and thus serves to misrepresent social relations as relations between 
things. 
Once more, as in the previous commentary on ‘Prisons data’, we must also here reflect 
on what is not included in ‘Fatal Incident reports’. Firstly, as I have alluded to already and 
as with ‘Prisons data’, we find no reference to financial information concerning levels of 
spending or staffing cuts to spending in the prison where the suicide took place. This, of 
course, is crucial knowledge. As prison officers explained to me when I visited a prison 
in England, to carry out observations on a prisoner who is deemed at risk of serious self-
harm or suicide necessitates dedicated and sustained attention from at least one prison 
officer. Austerity saw the number of prison officers fall drastically, and in so doing greatly 
increased the stress on remaining prison officers in carrying out day-to-day tasks in 
addition to the emergency task of ‘suicide watch’. Research conducted by the Howard 
League for Penal Reform using official Ministry of Justice statistics “shows that there were 
only 14,170 officer grade staff working in prisons run by the state at the end of June 2014. 
There were more than 24,000 at the end of August 2010” (Public-sector prison officer numbers 
cut by 41 per cent, 2014). Such a striking figure does not begin to tell of the damaging loss 
in skills, knowledge and ‘prison craft’ of senior, experienced prison officers (Coyle, 2009). 
Also excluded from ‘Fatal Incident reports’ is any detail concerning the background of 
prisoners beyond that which records any illnesses, mental health issues or disorders. For 
example, we find the following kind of descriptions of prisoners in the early pages of the 
reports: 
On [dd/mm/yyyy], Mr X was remanded to HMP Z. It was not his first time in prison. 
He had bipolar disorder, depression and anxiety, for which he was prescribed 
medication. He had a significant history of substance misuse, both alcohol and drugs. 
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(PPO 10, p. 1) 
Mr A was a 47 year old [Country] national. He was remanded to HMP A on 
[dd/mm/yyyy] for possession of an offensive weapon and affray. He had a history of 
suicide and self-harm, chronic back pain and depression. 
(PPO 11, p. 1) 
On [dd/mm/yyyy], Mr L was remanded into custody at HMP B, charged with 
robbery. He had a long custodial history and had been in custody at [HMP B] before. 
When he arrived there, he raised no concerns about his well-being but was identified 
as requiring alcohol and drug detoxification, and disclosed that he had recently been 
in a psychiatric hospital. He was prescribed the medication he had been receiving in 
the community (including anti-psychotic medication). 
(PPO 12, p. 1) 
On [dd/mm/yyyy], Mr G was remanded to HMP C for dangerous driving. It was not 
his first time in prison. He had been diagnosed with schizophrenia in [yyyy], and had 
last been monitored under suicide and self-harm prevention procedures, known as 
ACCT, in [yyyy]. 
(PPO 13, p. 1) 
Overwhelmingly, PPO reports begin as illustrated above, that is, listing a series of mental 
or physical health disorders or illnesses, learning difficulties, disabilities, or detailing 
differing forms of addiction. In the very few examples selected above, we find prisoners 
with bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, psychosis, and chronic addiction – all conditions 
that warrant specialist psychiatric care, not imprisonment. As was discussed earlier in this 
thesis (see section 5.2.2, especially part iv), it is typically the case that the ill-health or 
addictions of prisoners are products of or related to serious trauma or violence in 
childhood or adolescence. In neglecting to provide detail of such circumstances – perhaps 
by detailing whether a prisoner had been in care as a child, whether they were homeless 
or unemployed prior to entering prison, or whether they were themselves victims of some 
serious physical or sexual abuse earlier in their lives – prisoners appear in these reports as 
if they are simply damaged and dangerous outcasts, rather than people who have complex, 
messy, and, in many cases, tragic pasts. 
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6.3. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In the two movements of my analysis, I focused attention almost exclusively on how the 
two examples of transparency selected for study in this thesis – ‘Prisons data’ and ‘Fatal 
Incident reports’ – represent the object of transparency (the suicide in prison) to the subject 
(the citizen). In doing so, I said relatively little on how it is that the subject perceives that 
object, though of course my own analysis is developed out of an interpretive perception of 
transparency. Instead, I juxtaposed one form of transparency with another, posing a 
transparency of numbers audit and performance ratings, measures and statistics against 
one of narrative. Although these examples of transparency are markedly different and 
represent their object in contrasting representational lexicons, it is my ultimate contention 
and synthesis that the social relations produced by these examples of transparency are 
precisely the same, that they are spectacular. The discussion chapter that follows this is 





In this chapter, I discuss the implications of the analysis of the empirical material I 
presented above. I begin by making the case to move beyond a representationalist 
theoretical perspective for the critique of transparency (7.1), moving on to theorise state 
transparency as spectacle (7.2). 
7.1. DEPARTING FROM A REPRESENTATIONAL CRITIQUE OF TRANSPARENCY 
To a critical accounting scholar, the series of reproductions of transparency on suicide set 
out in the preceding chapter, which on the one hand display prisons and suicide in 
reductive, statistical and numerical terms, and on the other, in a narrative written in a 
bureaucratic, functional, managerial, audit register, could be said to epitomise the worst 
excesses of the capacity of accounting to mystify and obfuscate systems of domination 
and to dehumanise the vulnerable and weakest in our society. Yet on another, we might 
also say that these representations do go some way towards laying bare the horror of 
prisons. In particular, one cannot fail to be struck by the level of brutal, gruesome detail 
in both the ‘PPO reports’ and the austere statistics underlying ‘Prisons data’ (as opposed to 
the glossy, pristine façade of ‘Prisons data’ itself). We might even hope that such reports 
and statistics could go some way to igniting radical spirits or informing critical studies of 
the prison system. Certainly, it would be most foolish to disregard numbers, calculation 
and statistics (particularly descriptive ones) on epistemological grounds, which I maintain 
can and should play a role in critical studies of organisations and society. 
These are certainly not trivial insights and it is by no means true to say that ‘we know all 
of this already’, but I want to depart from the representational ideological-critical lens that 
such analysis is formulated through. For if it is extended and unfolded, the logical 
conclusion in such analysis is that ‘the problem’ with the representations of transparency 
considered in this thesis is that they ‘misrepresent’ the prison and suicide. Posed in this 
way, ‘the solution’ would then be one expressed wholly within the lexicon of 
representation – i.e. if the problem lies not with the material reality of prison and the 
social, political, economic, moral, and ethical dimensions of imprisonment, but with the 
representation of the prison, then the solution rests solely with producing more ‘faithful 
representations’ of prisons. As critical and interpretive accounting scholars have 
demonstrated, the quest for ‘faithful representation’ is a deeply political, value-laden one 
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– and it is a quest that is doomed to fail, for in representation something is always ‘left 
out’, the representation is always partial, never complete. 
A function of my grounding in the works of Debord and Žižek, my concern in this thesis 
lies not with demonstrating that the reality behind the representation is obscured or 
misrepresented, but instead with questioning and criticising the shape of the social relations 
produced by transparency as it exists today. To be sure, this does not mean that I disregard 
or am not concerned with the objective, material reality of life and death in prison. Rather, 
I am concerned that a preoccupation (or we might say fixation, even obsession) with the 
representational (in)capacities of accounting and transparency to capture ‘the way things 
really are’ locks us into a terrain of analysis in which we are divided across a continuum 
in which we tip into a naïve realism at one end and a hyper-realism at the other 
(McKernan, 2007), both of which are at root conservative with respect to organising 
material change in the world in practice (Adorno, Benjamin, Bloch, Brecht, & Lukács, 
1977, p. 124). Or, as Žižek (1997, p. 169) puts it, writing specifically in reference to our 
analysis and perception of the lines between representation and reality in ‘cyberspace’: 
one should avoid both traps, the simple direct reference to external reality outside 
cyberspace as well as the opposite attitude of ‘there is no external reality, RL [Real 
Life] is just another window’. 
I also return at this point to a pivotal, earlier reference made to Žižek (1989, p. 3), in 
which he explains that in the “interpretive procedure” of both Marx and Freud, 
the point is to avoid the properly fetishistic fascination of the ‘content’ supposedly 
hidden behind the form: the ‘secret’ to be unveiled through analysis is not the content 
hidden by the form (the form of commodities, the form of dreams) but, on the 
contrary, the ‘secret’ of this form itself. 
How does this relate to our current predicament? I argue that we must endeavour to apply 
such a procedure to our study of transparency. In other words, the point I wish to make 
here is that we should not lock ourselves into a “fetishistic fascination” with the “‘content’ 
[the reality of the suicide] supposedly hidden behind the form [the representation of 
transparency]” (Žižek, 1989, p. 3, additions in square brackets). As Žižek explains, in so 
doing, we always end up finding what we expected to find – i.e. a darker, messier, more 
brutal, more complex reality lurking beneath the pristine and glossy official one. With 
respect to the suicide in prison, this is surely the case. However, if instead we proceed from 
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a position in which we acknowledge that the representations of transparency (i) remain 
anchored to an objective, true empirical referent (the undeniable material reality of the 
suicide) and that (ii) any representation of an object will inevitably be subjective, 
incomplete, partial and will ‘leave things out’ (Žižek, 1994b), then what is most fruitful 
and productive is not a critique of how the representation fails to capture ‘the way things 
really are’ (an impossibility, in any case), but instead a critique of the social relations that 
are brought into being by the representations themselves. In other words, it is not just 
that the form or content of the representations of transparency are problematic, although 
this may indeed be the case, but it is the nature of the social relations created by the 
representations of transparency that warrant our attention. It is my contention that 
transparency creates ‘spectacular’ social relations, ones in which citizens are engaged as 
spectators who are shown the appearance of a world they cannot change, who are captivated 
by representations that keep them isolated and alienated, sat alone at a computer screen. 
In the remainder of this section, I flesh out this argument and develop my argument by 
employing the theoretical concepts and themes that I set out earlier in my discussion of 
Debord and The Society of the Spectacle (section 4.2.2.). 
7.2. THE SPECTACLE OF TRANSPARENCY 
The spectacle is not a collection of images; it is a social relation between people that is 
mediated by images. 
(Debord, 1967a, p. 7, emphasis added) 
I now focus attention on the social relations of transparency, that is, the experience of 
interaction between the state and the citizen constituted in transparency. There is today a 
zeitgeist of transparency, with transparency being regarded as a cornerstone of democratic 
values and practices. However, I have now on numerous occasions expressed the 
assertion that the relations produced by transparency as it exists today are spectacular, in 
Debord’s sense. Here, I substantiate this assertion with analysis, setting out my arguments 
as to why transparency is spectacular. I do so along three lines, analysing the spectacle of 
transparency as: first, an experience of isolation; second, as a one-way monologue of and by 
the state that is incontestable and unanswerable; and third, as a wholly visual experience, 




Spectators are linked solely by their one-way relationship to the very centre that keeps 
them isolated from each other. 
(Debord, 1967a, p. 16) 
First, on transparency as isolating. To begin, it should be reiterated that transparency 
isolates its objects from their social, political and economic context (Debord, 1988, p. 28). 
My concern in this section is not with isolation in this sense, however, but with the 
isolating effect of transparency on citizens. A central theme of Debord’s notion of the 
spectacle is the paradox that technologies of communication (literally, ‘to make common’) 
designed to ‘bring us closer together’ can have the opposite effect of driving us apart into 
separation and isolation. Such a theme, that contemporary society is scarred by isolation, 
separation and alienation as a product of the proliferation of ‘communication 
technologies’ is one found elsewhere in critical theory, being articulated also Adorno and 
Horkheimer (1969, pp. 221-222), who write on “Isolation by Communication”, and 
Marcuse (1972, pp. 9-10) on domination by “Technology rather than Terror”. 
Both examples of transparency on the suicide in prison are of course accessed online, in 
‘cyberspace’. Whilst transparency can be accessed on any device with an internet 
connection, I have predominantly accessed it from a PC (Personal Computer) or a laptop. 
As with the tablet and the mobile phone, both of these devices are designed – functionally 
and ergonomically – with the individual user in mind. In the default configuration of a 
computer, there is one mouse or track-pad, one keyboard, and one screen. Any academic 
who has ever co-authored a paper knows of the difficulty of attempting to work on one 
document on the same computer at the same time: whilst one person sits at the controls, 
the other observes, interjecting and commenting, but is not engaged in the physical 
activity of writing (typing). The simple point is this: the computer is designed to address 
us as individuals. 
Why is this significant? The point I wish to stress here is that although in transparency we 
see (objectively) the same content – i.e. when you and I access ‘Prisons data’ on different 
computers, the same ‘homepage’ appears – we see the same content in (objectively) 
different places, in isolation from one another. By its very reproducibility in digital form, 
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transparency can be accessed anywhere and thus there is no need for the establishment 
of a place or space in which we come together to view the content of transparency. The 
essential detail here is not, therefore, the content or form of what is represented, but 
instead how what is represented is seen. Irrespective of what is seen, those who see in 
isolation – on their own, in an office or in a room in a flat, apartment, house etc. – are 
controllable and of no threat to the status quo. 
Returning to the themes I earlier set out in my discussions of the ‘spectacle of the scaffold’ 
and the mysterious aura of The Castle, we should recall that the assembled masses, 
summoned by the state to bear witness to its power at the scaffold, by the very fact of 
being gathered together as a mass in witness to such violence, began to see themselves as 
on the side of the condemned and against the sovereign: they began to develop radical, critical, 
and politicised subjectivities. So too is the effect of total state opacity, as in the case of the 
mysterious, faceless bureaucracy. The mystery and the unknown are powerful animators 
for the formation of frightened and ruled subjectivities as we ask ourselves, ‘Who could 
be watching me?’, ‘What happens to people in there?’, ‘Who is in control?’ Transparency 
dulls this formation of subjectivity by charming us with a democratic play of appearances 
designed to make us think of ourselves as ‘auditors of the state’, ‘informed citizens’, and 
‘empowered members of society’. Where Adorno once remarked that “If a worker no 
longer notices that he is a worker, this has important implications for theory” (Adorno & 
Horkheimer, 2011, p. 2), so too we can say here that if we no longer ‘notice’ or think of 
ourselves as subjects of and subject to the power and authority of a ruling, dominant state, 
this has important implications for politics and society. 
As well as isolating us, is it not also the case that when we are not on our own that the 
spectacle continues to capture attention and energy, isolating and disrupting 
communication even when we are together? The prevalence of mobile phones atop dining 
tables in restaurants signifies the extent to which society has become obsessed with 
‘staying connected’ in the digital world whilst neglecting connections in the immediate 
material one. As Debord (1988, p. 19) puts it: 
For the agora, the general community, has gone, along with communities restricted to 
intermediary bodies or to independent institutions, to salons or cafes, or to workers 
in a single company. There is no place left where people can discuss the realities which 
concern them, because they can never lastingly free themselves from the crushing 
presence of media discourse and of the various forces organized to relay it. 
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Of course, a riposte here might be made that the newspaper or the book is no less isolating 
than the computer, the mobile phone or the tablet. Yet consider how often someone 
stops a conversation to look at their phone, and how normal this has become, in 
comparison with how often someone stops a conversation to produce a book from their 
pocket and read two-or-three pages. Unlike paper-based counterparts, on whom one has 
to concentrate, screen-based, digital technologies devour thoughtless attention. This should 
by no means be read as a reactionary critique of such technologies – advancement here 
has made many things possible. Rather, my point is that we should not uncritically accept 
all technological advancement as necessarily implying social advancement, that we must 
also reflect on what is lost in such developments (Žižek, 1997). 
As an isolating phenomenon, the spectacular form of transparency is ‘anti-collective’ or 
‘anti-demos’ in the sense that transparency is addressed to the lone user who sits at a 
computer screen: 
Imprisoned in a flattened universe bounded by the screen of the spectacle that has 
enthralled him, the spectator knows no one but the fictitious speakers who subject him 
to a one-way monologue about their commodities and the politics of their 
commodities. The spectacle as a whole serves as his looking glass. 
(Debord, 1967a, p. 118) 
Mass social movements – which are by no means universally progressive or desirable 
(Adorno, 1982) – pose a genuine threat to the dominance of the state. Therefore, the state 
has always been and remains extremely hostile, suspicious and wary of collectives and 
organised mass movements. By contrast, isolated, passive individuals are eminently 
controllable (Brown, 1995, p. 195). Once established, the most oppressive and violent of 
state orders have always sought to repress collective action by restricting the numbers that 
people can gather in (excluding, of course, the staging of mass ‘rallies’ at which the leader 
agitates and fires up their supporters). But, as Debord (1988, p. 34) shrewdly points out, 
“Spectacular democracy approaches matters with great subtlety, very different from the 
straightforward brutality of the totalitarian diktat.” In spectacular society, the state does 
not say, ‘You cannot do this or that’, instead, it says, ‘Do this, do that’ (Žižek, 2002). 
Nowhere is a restriction placed on gatherings of more than two or three people – such a 
brutal, blunt anti-democratic action would immediately be recognised as tyrannous even 
by those most uninterested in the fate of democracy. But does evoking the idea of an 
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‘army of armchair auditors’ empowered by transparency not yield the same effect, 
discouraging collective, organised, and mass action? The ‘army’ of auditors is not an ‘army’ 
at all, but a disaggregated array of isolated individuals at home, looking alone at computer 
screens. The point is this: people need not stand up, never mind leave their homes, to 
engage in ‘democracy’. 
And if the spectacle of transparency insulates the state from the demos by isolating and 
individualising them, it also does so by the very nature of the one-way relation established 
in transparency, which I now move on to discuss. 
(ii) One-way 
The spectacle presents itself as a vast inaccessible reality that can never be questioned. 
Its sole message is: “What appears is good; what is good appears.” The passive 
acceptance it demands is already effectively imposed by its monopoly of appearances, 
its manner of appearing without allowing any reply. 
(Debord, 1967a, pp. 9-10) 
A crucial feature of what makes transparency spectacular is its inaccessibility, 
incontestability, and unanswerability (Debord, 1988). The relation between the citizen and 
transparency is not one of dialogue, in which one speaks to the other and the other speaks 
back. Instead, there is a one-way relation between the state and citizen, one in which the 
state presents a representation of reality to the citizen, which the citizen receives without 
means or right of reply. The representations that we see in ‘Prisons data’ and ‘Fatal 
Incident reports’ are not challengeable or contestable – they simply appear. What makes 
this especially problematic is the purportedly ‘democratic’ nature of the framework within 
which such representations are constituted. The promise of the ‘democratic’ open 
government movement that places transparency at its core is that in transparency citizens 
are given the opportunity to share in the power of the state and that they are afforded the 
resources to hold the state to account for its actions. An understanding of the spectacular 
nature of transparency, its constitution wholly in terms of an incontestable appearance, 
lays bare the spurious nature of such a promise. There are no infrastructures or processes, 
in either a physical or a virtual sense, linking the transparency of ‘Prisons data’ or ‘Fatal 
Incident reports’ with an associated forum of critique, contestation or debate over what 
is shown there. If democracy, in a weak sense, entails the possibility for each citizen to at 
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least ‘have their say’ over how they are ruled, then in the spectacle such a possibility is 
wholly absent: 
The spectacle plays the specialized role of speaking in the name of all the other 
activities. It is hierarchical society’s ambassador to itself, delivering its official 
messages at a court where no one else is allowed to speak. 
(Debord, 1967a, pp. 12-13) 
What is accomplished by this dissociation of transparency from a framework of critique, 
contestation or examination? First, and as I have alluded to already, the state is insulated 
from critique in the sense that anger, indignation or frustration at what is shown in 
transparency cannot be vented at those responsible, for the relation between those in 
power and those who are subjects of that power has been replaced by a play of 
appearances. Thus, there is no realm of direct confrontation between myself and the state 
in transparency, but rather a mediated one between myself and the computer screen in 
which I see only a glittering representation of the state. Consider, in opposition to this, 
the material, direct site of contestation established in ‘the spectacle of the scaffold’ 
(Foucault, 1977). As I earlier discussed, part of what saw these gruesome, excessive 
displays of state power and authority vanish from practice and into history was the extent 
to which they began to pose a threat to the state by furnishing the assembled crowd with 
anger at the crass excess of power represented in the brutal, sadistic torture and execution 
of criminals. In transparency, the state withdraws from this threatened, exposed position 
and conceals in sanitised, sterilised representations the brutality and violence that was 
formerly directly lived. The site, event or moment where I may develop my sense of self 
as ruled, as a subject of and subject to the authority of the state, is lost. 
Beyond this, the incontestability and unanswerable nature of what is represented in 
‘Prisons data’ and ‘Fatal Incident reports’ also has the effect of establishing in advance 
the terms of any potential discourse on prisons, unlikely as this may be to materialise. In 
other words, to engage with the data of transparency is to be engaged in a debate in which 
the terms have been set and the rules fixed before a word has been uttered: 
Like a factitious god, it engenders itself and makes its own rules. 
(Debord, 1967a, p. 14) 
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The very fact that ‘Prisons data’ presents data points of audit and performance scores and 
ratings reduces debate to concerns with the ‘improvement’ of such scores and ratings. 
‘Solving the problems’ of prisons then becomes a question that can be posed exclusively 
in terms of instrumental rationality: ‘We need less staff sickness absences and more 4-
rated prisons’. Likewise, the audit and bureaucratic register in which ‘Fatal Incident 
reports’ are produced draws our attention to all the small things that could have been 
done differently – an extra suicide observation per hour, the re-writing of a report – rather 
than questioning the broader social, political and economic context in which prisons 
reside. To be clear: the point here is not that such representations obscure ‘the way things 
really are’ in prisons, but rather that the spectacular representations of transparency set 
the terms of the discourse on prisons by shaping how we think about prisons, how see 
prisons, and what we think is ‘wrong’ with prisons. In this sense, the spectacle of 
transparency, as a form of ideology, is constitutive and world-making (Žižek, 1989). Put 
in different terms, we might say that in presiding over the form and content of 
transparency on prisons, the state constructs a position from which we cannot see the 
issue of prisons in any way other than how it is presented to us – we see things one way: 
The flow of images carries everything before it, and it is similarly someone else who 
controls at will this simplified summary of the sensible world; who decides where the 
flow will lead as well as the rhythm of what should be shown, like some perpetual, 
arbitrary surprise, leaving no time for reflection, and entirely independent of what the 
spectator might understand or think of it. In this concrete experience of permanent 
submission lies the psychological origin of such general acceptance of what is; an 
acceptance which comes to find in it, ipso facto, a sufficient value. Beyond what is 
strictly secret, spectacular discourse obviously silences anything it finds inconvenient. 
It isolates all it shows from its context, its past, its intentions and its consequences. 
(Debord, 1988, pp. 27-28) 
Once we have seen the problem of prisons in a particular way – or rather, once we have 
looked at it in the way it was made visible by the state – it becomes exceedingly difficult 
to extricate ourselves from the confines of this framing. Of course, it is the task of the 
critical theorist to keep the idea of an alternative alive, to argue that the way things are is 
not the way things have to be. With this, I move to the final category of my analysis, in 




The spectacle inherits the weakness of the Western philosophical project, which 
attempted to understand activity by means of the categories of vision, and it is based 
on the relentless development of the particular technical rationality that grew out of 
that form of thought. 
(Debord, 1967a, p. 11) 
One of the defining features of the zeitgeist of today is the prevalence of the screen in our 
lives, which has led some to write of the ‘screen society’ (Knorr Cetina, 2009, 2016; Knorr 
Cetina & Bruegger, 2002b). I am not concerned here with the way in which such screens 
portray increasingly sophisticated representations of the material world, but with the 
nature of the sensory experience of transparency as it is constituted in a wholly visual 
form. 
Although it is a visual metaphor, I want to challenge the idea that transparency is 
something that can or should be experienced wholly in the realm of the visual. To return 
for a third and final time to my analysis of Foucault’s spectacle, here we find what I have 
described as a form of directly lived, or visceral, corporeal transparency (section 3.2.). The 
sensory experience of the spectacle of the scaffold is one in which the citizen is immersed 
in the overall visceral nature of the power of the state. Perhaps with the exception of taste, 
all other senses are stimulated and activated by the spectacle of the scaffold. There is the 
repulsive and horrific sight of the execution; the raucous sound of the crowd, the 
statement of the executioner and the cries of ‘the condemned’; there is the tactile 
interaction among citizens or the struggle and riotous violence between rebellious citizens 
and the authorities; and there is the smell of the event, likely being one thick with the 
aromas of burning sulphur or tar, these being frequent elements of choice in the torture 
of ‘the condemned’. 
Now, in contrast to this, let us consider, in an (objective) sensory capacity, the experience 
of the spectacle of transparency. To begin, there is the visual, which is the primary sensory 
interaction between myself and transparency. I see transparency always through the 
screen. Next, to sound. Transparency is silent, there being not a single piece of 
transparency data collected over the course of this study that is constituted in aural form. 
Even where the data I collected was originally spoken (e.g. speeches given by government 
ministers), in the digital archives of open government, this has been transcribed and 
appears without sound. The sounds I experience when accessing transparency are the 
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same ones that I would hear if I were using my computer to write an email. And if 
transparency is not to be heard, neither is it made to be touched. The tactile interaction I 
have with transparency can be described only in terms of my typing and clicking in order 
to navigate and browse the networked representations of transparency I see in front of 
me on the flat computer screen. Likewise, transparency makes no appeal to smell or taste. 
Hence, the point I wish to stress here is that transparency as constituted in ‘Prisons data’, 
‘Fatal Incident reports’ and the open government movement at large is a wholly visual 
phenomena – it can only be looked at: 
Fragmented views of reality regroup themselves into a new unity as a separate-pseudo world 
that can only be looked at. 
(Debord, 1967a, p. 7) 
What is the significance of the distinction between the spectacle in Foucault’s sense – a 
raucous, visceral, heightened sensory experience – and that of Debord’s – a silent, wholly 
visual experience devoid of appeals to our sense of touch, smell and taste? Where the 
former describes a corporeal, holistic experience of the authority of the state, the latter 
signifies a frictionless, apolitical, passive relation between state and citizen constituted 
wholly in the realms of appearances, a relation that has been reconstituted as aesthetic. 
To be precise, when I speak of an aesthetic relation between the state and the citizen I am 
arguing that in transparency the way we conceive of, react to, feel and think about the 
state is determined wholly by the way the state looks, its “self-portrait” in transparency 
(see Debord, 1967a, p. 13). In this sense, the citizen – or spectator – may approach 
transparency as they would an extremely rare or revered work of art displayed in a 
museum, looking at it from a distance but not interacting with or getting close to it. Those 
who are allowed to handle the great works of art are experts in conservation, caring for 
these works, lovingly restoring and preserving them with gloved hands and soft touches. 
So it is with society. Those who are permitted to step beyond the rope and touch the 
canvas of society are those with least intention to change it. They are the connoisseurs of 
the past, whose interest lies in keeping objects – whether these be paintings or society – 
as they are. 
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My relation to the state, if I consider transparency as if it were a work of ‘high art’, is one 
in which I may look but not touch or criticise but not change. I may feel one way or another 
about transparency, but just as with works of ‘high art’ that adorn the walls of galleries 
across the world, I may only interpret it, never change it. As with the ‘masterpieces’ that 
hang on the walls of The Louvre in Paris or The National Gallery in London, transparency 
represents a static, fixed object (society) whose present condition is to be preserved. Society 
– as with Las Meninas, The Water Lily Pond and Girl with a Pearl Earring – is to be 
carefully insulated from change, it is to be conserved. Thus, as Debord (1988, p. 21) writes: 
We have dispensed with that disturbing conception, which was dominant for over two 
hundred years, in which a society was open to criticism or transformation, reform or 
revolution. 
Again, the fallacious promise of transparency is that citizens will be empowered and will 
participate in shaping and changing the society in which they live in a democratic exercise. 
Instead, in the spectacle of transparency, citizens are mere spectators whose attention is 
directed towards glittering representations of a world that can only be looked at, not 
changed. 
To bring this chapter to a close, I want to reiterate the essential features of the spectacle 
of transparency. First is the isolation of transparency: as spectators, citizens are isolated from 
one another and see partial representations of objects isolated from their social, political 
and economic context. Second is the one-way nature of transparency: transparency is not a 
discourse or a dialogue, it is an unanswerable, incontestable one-way communication to the 
spectator by the state. Furthermore, the unanswerability and incontestability of 
transparency implies there is one way to see the objects of transparency. Third is the visual 
aesthetic experience of transparency: the experience of transparency is one in which the 
visual dominates and where spectators are shown representations of a world that is to be 
preserved as it is, a world they cannot change. 
I move on now to the concluding chapter of this thesis, in which I articulate my 
contributions to the literature and address the limitations, practical implications, and 




In this thesis, I explored the contemporary phenomenon of the transparent state, the state 
that purports to ‘throw open its doors’ to be inspected by its citizens. I posed a series of 
three research questions, asking: (i) What role is played by the particular aesthetic form of 
state transparency? (ii) How does state transparency shape the way that citizens think of 
themselves in relation to the state? (iii) What interest does the state have in transparency? 
To investigate these questions, I juxtaposed the ‘transparent state’ against other state 
forms – the apparition of the state in brutal, violent form or the secretive, opaque state, a 
mysterious and impenetrable bureaucratic machine. I argued that in transparency the state 
constructs an appearance of democracy – a spectacle. This spectacle of transparency, rather 
than revealing the inner workings of the state or laying bare its mechanisms for the 
inspection and scrutiny of a politicised demos, structures and shapes the citizens 
perception of the state as an object to be looked at, refined and optimized, not critiqued 
or challenged. In this respect, transparency, which at first appears as a radical and 
democratic idea and practice, is transfigured into a conservative one, a mechanism for 
preserving and securing the status quo in society. Developing my theorisation out of a 
synthesis of the related works of Slavoj Žižek (1989, 1994b, 1997), on ideology and Guy 
Debord (1967a, 1973, 1988), on spectacle, I explored state transparency by analysing various 
forms of transparency on suicides in prisons in England and Wales. 
In this study, I make three key contributions to the accounting literature. The first of these 
is to argue for the introduction of a role for the aesthetic in the study of transparency. As 
a visual metaphor that lays claim to revealing ‘things as they are’, it is perhaps surprising 
that hitherto the particular aesthetic form of transparency has not been investigated in the 
literature. Therefore, building on the literature on the aesthetic form of accounting 
(Cooper et al., 1994; Gallhofer & Haslam, 1991, 1996) and on more recent calls for an 
appreciation of the way in which the visual (or aesthetic) form of accounting plays a crucial 
role in the uses to which it is put and the influence it has in organisations and society 
(Davison, 2015; Espeland & Stevens, 2008; Mennicken & Espeland, 2019; Quattrone, 
2009, 2017), I argue that the particular aesthetic form of transparency, as a wholly visual 
and digital experience, contributes to its social function as constructing perceptions of the 
state rather than revealing its inner workings. This is to say that contrary to how state 
transparency may appear – as the realisation and manifestation of a project to ‘govern by 
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numbers’ (Rose, 1991) – the crucial aspect of transparency is its aesthetic form, not its 
calculative content. 
The second contribution of this thesis is to consider the subjects of transparency, that is, 
how transparency addresses its users. Reversing the (typical) concern in the literature for 
the way in which demands for internal organisational conduct to be made visible to external 
others in transparency affects the conduct and subjectivity of those inside organisations 
(Roberts, 2009, 2018), I reflect on how transparency affects those to whom it is addressed. 
In the case of state transparency, this is the citizen. I propose that transparency 
interpellates citizens not as the active, writhing collective of a critical and politicised 
demos, but as an individualised, fractured and isolated mass of passive spectators for 
whom transparency is the visual representation of a society that can only be looked at, 
not challenged or contested. In so doing, transparency disrupts and stultifies the 
formation of radical, critical and politicised subjectivities, dulling our sense of self as ruled 
and under the authority of a capitalist state. 
The third contribution of this thesis builds on the previous two, and is articulated in 
response to the coupling of transparency with the idea and practice of democracy 
(Gallhofer et al., 2011; Power, 1994). If realised, the alluring promise of transparency is 
to hold those in power to account by rendering their conduct visible (Quattrone, 2016a; 
Roberts, 2009). I assert than in state transparency this alluring emancipatory ideal is 
subverted and reconstituted in the form of a constraining, domineering practice. I 
propose that in transparency we find the construction of a democratic appearance, a mask 
for the state that projects an appearance of democracy, empowerment and participation 
whilst bringing about no material change in the power relation between state and citizen. 
As such, we find in transparency an object that secures and reinforces the domination of 
the state in the form of the very object in which we expect to find the roots of a radical 
challenge to and critique of to the status quo. 
In the remainder of the conclusion, I develop each of these contributions in more detail 
(8.1), before discussing the methodological limitations of this thesis (8.2), addressing the 
practical implications associated with my findings (8.3), proposing potential avenues for 




The three main contributions of this thesis are (critical) theoretical. In what follows in this 
section, I set out these contributions in greater depth. 
8.1.1. THE AESTHETICS OF STATE TRANSPARENCY: THE ART OF GOVERNMENT 
The first contribution of this thesis is rooted in the literature on the aesthetic or visual 
form of accounting. Drawing on the insights offered by this literature – which 
demonstrate how the particular aesthetic form of accounting numbers and practices 
contribute to the power of accounting in organisations and society – I claim that state 
transparency must be understood as an aesthetic object, not a calculative practice. Put 
differently, I argue transparency is the art of government, in the sense of being a visual 
representation of government. This assertion is made in relation (or rather, in opposition) 
to the seminal work of Nikolas Rose (1991) in ‘Governing by Numbers: Figuring out 
Democracy’. 
The accounting literature on the state has described the role played by accounting 
technologies in what Foucault (2008) argued was a broader, historical change to the ‘art 
of government’ under neoliberalism (see Humphrey et al., 1993; Miller, 1990; Rose, 1991). 
When Foucault speaks of the ‘art of government’, he does so in order to evoke the notion 
of a shift in the nature of the exercise of power over populations in ‘territories’ from an 
absolutist, monarchic power to a calculated and reasoned application of power, where the 
use and exercise of power is a delicate, constructive and calculating art rather than a brutal, 
destructive force of raison d’état (see Foucault, 1991, 2008). To posit transparency as ‘the 
art of government’ is to enter into a realm well defined in the accounting literature in 
which a whole array of ‘calculative practices’ are invested in the activity of ‘shaping 
populations’ ‘at a distance’, both in organisations and in society at large (Miller, 1990, 
1992; Miller & Napier, 1993; Miller & O’Leary, 1987; Miller & Rose, 1990; Rose, 1991; 
Rose & Miller, 1992). As I set out earlier, recent work in the accounting literature 
(Mehrpouya & Salles-Djelic, 2014, 2019) has placed transparency within this notion of 
governing, interpreting transparency through a Foucauldian lens of governmentality and 
neoliberalism. 
On first inspection, it would indeed seem that transparency is the archetype of the notion 
of the ‘art of government’ theorised by Foucault and developed in the accounting 
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literature, especially by Rose (1991, p. 691) when he writes of the “pedagogy of numeracy” 
and “public habitat of numbers” needed to sustain “modern, mass, liberal forms” of 
democracy. However, I do not here write of transparency as the ‘art of government’ in 
the sense implied by Foucault or in those works in the accounting literature that take up 
this notion of his. To be sure, when we are dealing with the internal operations, practices 
and processes of the state, I find the notion of power as exercised through an ensemble 
of calculative practices entirely convincing and resonant with the nature of the state today. 
However, when we are considering the external projection of an appearance of the state – 
as we are in transparency – I consider the notions of calculation and numeracy to be less 
appropriate as descriptors for the nature of the relation between the state and its citizens. 
Instead, I make the claim that the relation between the state and citizens that we find in 
transparency is not one of calculation – of “calculating selves” (Miller, 1992), of citizens who 
are “numerate and calculating”, who “calculate about power” (Rose, 1991, p. 673) – but is 
one of aesthetics in which citizens see representations of the state that they relate to as they 
would a work of art in a museum. I argue that the essential feature of transparency is not 
its calculative, accounting content but is its glossy, pristine digital form and in its manner 
of appearing without an associated framework of democratic discourse or contestation. 
Like a work of art hung on a museum wall, transparency is made to be looked at, not 
touched and not changed. To theorise transparency as the art of government therefore 
means to see transparency not as a project of calculation, but as one of appearance. Thus, 
when we are dealing specifically with the appearance of the state portrayed in 
transparency, I restate the ‘governing by numbers’ thesis as ‘governing by appearances.’ 
Furthermore, considering transparency as the art of government helps to stress the extent 
to which we find in programmes of state transparency not the revealing of ‘inner workings’ 
of the state, but the production of an image of the state. When an artist paints a picture, she 
starts not with a dark canvas, working backwards to reveal the finished article; rather, she 
starts from a blank canvas, working to craft and construct the finished article. And so it is 
with transparency, insofar as it represents a project to craft and construct how we see the 
state, not revealing or opening up the state to our scrutineering gaze. Thus, if transparency 
is conceptualised as the art of government, it becomes interesting to think about the kind 
of appearance of the state projected to the citizenry in transparency. Insofar as 
transparency is produced by the state, about the state, we can think of transparency as the 
idealised ‘self-portrait’ of the state, one in which the state presents itself as in control, 
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organised and efficient. Each example of transparency presents an appearance of the state 
to the citizenry. Transparency is, in a sense, the face of the state as it wishes itself to be 
seen. If we look at transparency in this way, that is, if we relate to transparency by focusing 
on the aesthetic form it projects rather than calculative content it details, we can learn 
much about the way the state sees itself. I argue that we can see something of the zeitgeist 
in the way that the state portrays itself. 
In this respect – and here I am recalling Žižek’s (1989) remarks – we can learn a great deal 
not from looking behind the mask that ‘conceals reality’, but from the very appearance of 
the mask itself. In other words, we can learn much simply by looking at the appearance 
of transparency. Such a logic articulates well with recent calls for a greater appreciation of 
how the aesthetic, or visual form, of technologies of accounting and quantification are 
implicated in their seductive appeal as tools of governing (Mennicken & Espeland, 2019; 
Ronzani & Gatzweiler, 2019). For example, the images of the state projected in the former 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics were colourful and bold portraits of strength, unity 
and power and of the contribution made by individual workers to the utopian (dystopian) 
project of state-administered Communism. Likewise, the war posters and social 
propaganda of the Nazis cultivated a striking aesthetic of deep colours and strong 
postures, appealing to the dream (nightmare) of a Nazi empire. Similarly, British and 
American army recruiting posters made an aesthetic appeal to the individual with glorified 
images of war and combat. Common to such representational forms is both the grand 
notion of a powerful, ambitious and glorious state, and the embodiment of the state in 
the form of the human being (whether in the depiction of a leader, worker, or soldier). 
It is this that has vanished today in the appearance of the state we find in transparency, 
where the state is disembodied, represented as an array of carefully co-ordinated, 
organised, colour-coded charts and graphs. The state is portrayed as faceless. In this sense, 
transparency acts to stultify perceptions of the state as a ruling force in society. The sharp, 
bold colours of transparency construct a view of the world lacking in any nuance or doubt. 
Transparency is an expression of what is, the way things are. The state presents itself not 
in a dream-like mode, espousing a vision of a utopian (or dystopian) future, but a 




8.1.2. THE SUBJECTS OF STATE TRANSPARENCY: SPECTATING, NOT PARTICIPATING 
The second contribution I make in this thesis is to develop the theorisation of the subjects 
of transparency. That is, how we think about those to whom transparency is addressed – 
citizens. In mainstream discourse and theorisation on transparency, the citizen is cast as 
a rational, free-thinking, autonomous agent who uses transparency in its various forms to 
‘make informed decisions’. The related initiatives of open government and state 
transparency are built upon precisely this notion of the democratic citizen (“democratic 
subjectivity” (Rose, 1991, p. 682)), whereby the claim is that by accessing a digital network 
of transparency citizens can furnish themselves with greater knowledge and 
understanding of the activities of the state and can use this to participate in ‘changing 
society for the better’. 
In the critical and interdisciplinary accounting literature, and in the related field of 
organisational studies, the notion of the calculating and empowered democratic citizen 
whose actions and decisions are informed by transparency has been challenged. Attention 
has been drawn to the disciplining and controlling functions fulfilled by programmes of 
transparency (Mehrpouya & Salles-Djelic, 2019; Roberts, 2009, 2018), the impossibility of 
transparency (Macintosh & Quattrone, 2010), the difficulty for the individual citizen to 
become “well-informed” out of the “data tsunami” of transparency (Birchall, 2014, 2015), 
and to the excessively optimistic notion of the engaged and interacting citizen who acts 
to help solve the problems of society (Kornberger et al., 2017). Nonetheless, in this 
literature too, transparency is still discussed in terms of its potential as “emancipatory” 
(Gallhofer et al., 2011), “democratizing” (Brun-Martos & Lapsley, 2017) and 
“empowering” (Power, 1994) for those outside of organisations and institutions. 
Transparency remains an alluring and enticing route ‘to hold organisations to account’. 
My theorisation of state transparency as spectacle – where transparency is accessed by 
isolated and separate individuals in a mediated, private form – challenges this conception 
of transparency as an emancipatory, democratising and empowering practice in which 
citizens engage and participate in democracy. I claim that in the spectacle of transparency, 
citizens are interpellated not as empowered, democratic actors, but as passive, hypnotised 
spectators, whose relation to democracy and the state is not one of participation and 
interaction, but a sterile one in which they are shown sanitised representations of a world 
they cannot change. Just as spectators at a concert see a carefully choreographed, 
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rehearsed and polished performance in which they adopt the role of the enthralled and 
passive consumer, so too the spectators of transparency are presented with a pre-
packaged, stylised and idealised representation of the state. The manicured form of 
transparency attests to this: by the time a spectator accesses transparency, the picture of 
the state they see has been carefully designed and rendered to portray a glittering picture 
of order. 
And not only does the ‘packaging’ of transparency contribute to its spectacular nature. As 
was stressed in the discussion section (7.2), the social relation established between the 
state and the citizen in transparency is one-way. This one-way relation further quashes the 
myth of the democratising character of transparency insofar as there is no associated 
mechanism or architecture for engagement through which the citizen might intervene or 
share in the making of decisions about how the power of the state is exercised. Truly 
democratic relations are necessarily and essentially common, i.e. they are characterised by 
a sharing of power and a sphere in which the terms of that sharing can be debated and 
contested. Thus, running counter to the notion of accounting as stimulating and enabling 
“action at a distance” (Robson, 1992), we might here say that in transparency we find 
accounting mobilised as a representational instrument used to establish in-action at a 
distance. 
If the subjects of transparency are mere spectators of a highly sanitised, beautified and 
engineered spectacle, then the possibility that transparency might act as a powerful or 
radical democratic practice is defunct. In the accounting literature, the notion of making 
conduct visible to distant others is of course associated with regimes of accountability and 
discipline (Hoskin & Macve, 1986, 1988; Roberts, 1991). However, the disciplinary effects 
of transparency are only effective if those to whom conduct is made visible are able to 
exert authority or control over the subjects of the disciplinary gaze (Foucault, 1977). The 
spectator who sees the state in an isolated, one-way digital representation is utterly devoid 
of the capacity to exert any semblance of authority or control. As such, in state 
transparency there is in fact a reversal of the relation that we should expect to develop from 
the establishment of a regime of visibility. Rather than laying bare the workings of the 
state, empowering citizens to hold the state to account, making the state subject of the 
disciplinary gaze, the ideological object of transparency actively constructs the way in 
which the state is seen by citizens. In other words, the ideological effect of transparency 
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is not to make the state accountable, but is to shape the way in which spectators relate to 
and understand the activities of the state. Unlike the vicious brutality of the spectacle of 
the scaffold or the eerie and oppressive opacity of the mysterious bureaucracy, 
transparency works to attenuate and stultify the formation of radical, politicised and 
critical subjectivities – my sense of self as ruled. By encouraging us to think of ourselves 
as participating in our own rule, the spectacle of transparency dulls our sense of self as 
subjects of and subject to the authority of capitalist states. Transparency aims to make me 
think of myself as an ‘empowered citizen’, as an ‘auditor of the state’, or as an ‘informed 
member of society’, and in so doing it covers over and mystifies my sense of self as an 
isolated, vulnerable, governed subject. 
8.1.3. DEMOCRACY AND STATE TRANSPARENCY: PRODUCING A DEMOCRATIC 
APPEARANCE 
The third and final contribution of this thesis relates to the coupling of transparency and 
democracy. As professed by the state, the core idea of transparency is to deepen and 
enrich democracy by revealing or opening up the state to the view and scrutiny of the 
citizenry (see Cameron, 2010a; The Coalition: our programme for government, 2010). Certainly, 
the vast online, interconnected digital network of dashboards, data-hubs, and reports that 
display financial information, audit and performance rankings, ratings and scores that 
record and make visible the activities of the state appears to fulfil the promise of an open 
and transparent state. In other words, it appears as though citizens have all the 
information they need in order to hold the state to account. But it is this that is precisely 
the problem with transparency, its constitution is solely at the level of appearances and is 
decoupled from any reference to democratic practices. 
The problem of a mere appearance of transparency, a spectacle of transparency, has profound 
implications for democracy. Earlier in this thesis, I discussed Wendy Brown’s (2015, p. 
17) assertion that neoliberalism “is quietly undoing basic elements of democracy”. One 
of those ‘basic elements’ that is essential for the healthy functioning of democracy is a 
demos – a political body of the people who participate in their own rule. The ideal of the 
demos is that as a collective of individuals, as a collective of homo politicus, the people 
express their political sovereignty. Under neoliberalism, Brown contends that homo politicus 
is being vanquished and replaced by homo oeconomicus; she writes: 
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While homo politicus is obviously slimmed in modern liberal democracies, it is only 
through the ascendency of neoliberal reason that the citizen-subject converts from a 
political to an economic being and that the state is remade from one founded in 
juridical sovereignty to one modelled on a firm. 
(Brown, 2015, p. 108) 
In what way does transparency fit into this story? Recalling my earlier theorisation of 
neoliberalism, in which I argued that neoliberalism consists of an articulation of state, 
market and citizen that harnesses the state to stamp the market onto and seep the market 
into the citizen (section 2.2.4.), it would seem that transparency contributes to the 
interpellation of individuals not as homo politicus, but as homo oeconomicus. State rhetoric of 
how the “sunlight of transparency” (May, 2017) would create an ‘army of armchair 
auditors’ (Cameron, 2010b; Maude, 2010), whilst being somewhat spurious (insofar as this 
so-called army is impotent given that it has no weapons with which to influence or affect 
the entity they are ‘auditing’) epitomises the attempt to recast the demos as a body of 
individuals whose political vocabulary is eroded and replaced by an economic one in 
which the market language of audit replaces that of the political. Evaluated in a language 
of audit, social problems are appraised in terms of performance ratings and targets, of 
risks and compliance with processes and regulations, not in terms of class, ethics, morality, 
justice and equality. In transparency there is an attempt to replace a political lexicon with 
an economic one (Brown, 2006). 
To be clear, I am not suggesting that the audit and the figure of the auditor are intrinsically 
neoliberal. Such an argument would be deeply flawed, and overlooks the extent to which 
audit can and should fulfil an important social function in democracy (Power, 1999) and 
that audit can be saturated or infused with a range of values and norms other than the 
capitalist ones (Hoskin & Macve, 1988, p. 65; Mennicken, 2010, p. 334; Wacquant, 2012, 
p. 70). Rather, I claim that when the state presents itself in transparency to the demos as 
an object to be audited, this resets the relation between the state and the citizen as one in 
which the citizen approaches the state as if it were a firm, thus transposing a market model 
into the political realm of democracy. The relation between auditor and firm is not one 
which should be replicated between citizen and state. In the former, the auditor conducts 
a series of tests or checks on the firm. In the latter, the citizen, as a part of the demos, 
should contest the actions of the state in political struggle. 
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However, as I have suggested in the previous sections, this notion of the ‘citizen-as-
auditor’ holding the state to account through transparency is fallacious insofar as 
transparency addresses citizens as spectators of democracy who see a carefully cultivated 
self-portrait of the state. The maintenance of an appearance of democracy in absence of 
the essence or practices of democracy is an essential aspect in differentiating neoliberalism 
from other political-economic orders – especially fascism – to which neoliberalism is 
erroneously and imprecisely compared (for critique of the simple equation of 
neoliberalism with fascism, see Brown, 2005, 2006, 2019). As a dominant political 
formation, neoliberalism is distinct from fascism, socialism, communism, totalitarianism, 
and authoritarianism in that it does not display open contempt for liberal democracy and 
glorify or rely on a ‘strong state’ (McChesney, 1998). Rather, it preserves the formal rituals 
of liberal democracy (i.e. trips to the ballot-box once every few years) in order to project 
a democratic appearance whilst maintaining or expanding the material and symbolic 
forces of the state and perpetuating a myth of the ‘shrinking’ state or the ‘roll-back’ of the 
state. 
I claim that the spectacle of transparency is one of the ways in which this democratic 
appearance is constituted, where the demos appear to be empowered, where they appear to 
have all the information they need to participate in democracy, but in practice they are 
isolated and hypnotised by faceless self-portraits of the dominant state. Put in Debord’s 
(1988, p. 61) terms, the role of the spectacle of transparency “is to make domination more 
respectable, never to make it comprehensible.” Shadowing Benjamin’s (2007) remarks on 
the aestheticization of politics by fascism, we might say that in transparency we see the 
aestheticization of democracy, where democracy is reduced to a visually appealing, organised 
network of audit and performance ratings, rankings and reports, whilst the material 
practices of domination by the state remain. Therefore, I claim that transparency is a 
paradoxical (and deeply ideological) object. In transparency we find the state promising to 
lay bare or reveal its own workings in order to deepen and enrich democracy. Instead, I 
find a programme used to secure and reproduce the domination of the state, insulating it 
from radical critique by presenting itself in a mask of democracy. Thus, I propose that the 
interest of the state in transparency lies in constituting a democratic appearance, but not 
in producing democratic practice. As it is currently formed and defined, transparency 
serves to reproduce and sustain the existing structure of society and is thus an instrument 




An important limitation of this thesis relates to the focus on suicides in prisons. As 
discussed in the methodology chapter (see section 5.2.1), my selection of suicide in prison 
was motivated by a desire to negate a claim to transparency by investigating a particularly 
dark and opaque context, as transparency is of course associated with notions of ‘casting 
light on’ and making visible the unseen (Flyverbom, 2015; Tsoukas, 1997). As was set out 
in my theorising of the state (see section 3.2), in this thesis I proposed to study the state 
without resorting to reducing the state to being a wholly or essentially destructive or 
malevolent force or entity. Section 3.2.3, ‘The historical emergence of the welfare state’, 
is specifically formulated to address this by acknowledging the dual and contrasting 
potentials of the state as both a disciplining and violent force, but also as a protective and 
socialising one. I theorised this duality of the character of the state by introducing the 
notion of the state as a collection of fields (Bourdieu et al., 1994), and the idea of the ‘Left 
Hand and the Right Hand’ of the state (Bourdieu, 1998a; Wacquant, 2012). However, in 
selecting prisons and suicide within prisons as the empirical focus for this thesis, I focused 
on a specific matter of concern within a field of the state that is firmly situated within the 
‘Right Hand’ of the state, the wing of the state that I theorised as coercive, disciplinary 
and repressive. Therefore, it must be acknowledged that this empirical focus tilts my study 
towards an understanding of the state that does not consider its dual and contrasting 
character. This limitation is a product of the time-consuming process necessary to develop 
a detailed, in-depth understanding of a field of the state at the level required for sound 
and rigorous social science research. 
Another limitation that must be addressed relates to the digital archival method of the 
study (see section 5.3). In contrast to other, more established methods of research 
deployed in critical and interdisciplinary accounting – e.g. ethnographies, interviews, case 
studies – digital archival research represents a (relatively) recent development in research 
methods. In particular, in this thesis much of my data consisted of ‘screenshots’ of digital 
content, particularly in the form of data visualisations and virtual user interfaces. This 
imparted a limitation on my research as there are fewer methodological guidelines and 
examples of research in accounting that rely on data collected wholly from a digital source. 
Indeed, it has been acknowledged in accounting and in the related fields of organisational 
and management studies that there is a need for sound, methodological principles and 
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practices for researchers to apply in confronting the specific ontological and 
epistemological challenges associated with research in ‘cyberspace’ (Hewson & Laurent, 
2008; Jeacle & Carter, 2011; Mann & Stewart, 2000). While the lack of ‘readymade’ 
procedures for digital archival research proved a challenge for this study, I believe that 
pursuing this new style of research represents an important step in keeping pace with the 
evolution of accounting as it shifts into new spaces and takes up new forms, something 
that is essential if we are to continue to develop our understanding of an ever-changing 
accounting craft (Hopwood, 2007). 
8.3. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS 
A function of my methodological basis in critical theory is that I consider it essential that 
my research aims to develop knowledge that might shape and inform practice in the world 
beyond the lecture theatres of universities and the pages of academic journals (see Cooper, 
2002). Of course, it is vitally important that as academics we are able to have conversations 
about theory, methodology, knowledge, reality, and so on, but I believe it is equally 
important that we are capable of relaying our knowledge and understanding into terms 
that make it accessible and useful to those who want to listen and learn (Brown, 2018c). 
Therefore, in this section I ask: how might my research shape and inform the thoughts 
and actions of people today? 
The critical nature of my research means that it will be of particular interest to those 
individuals, collectives and movements in society whose interest rests not with preserving 
the status quo, but with bringing about social, political and economic change. First, I 
believe that my research is important for individual citizens. My research encourages 
citizens to view transparency critically, not to be charmed by its claim to ‘reveal the inner 
workings’ of the state, nor to become fixated with pursuing ‘what lies behind’ the glossy 
façade of transparency. My research encourages citizens to appreciate the way in which 
transparency strives to shape how we see the state. In other words, my research presents 
citizens with a compelling case that transparency is not a programme to reveal the unseen 
and make visible what was invisible, but one that aims to recast the terms of debate and 
discourse on social and political issues in economic and instrumental terms. At the level 
of everyday practice, my research therefore has the potential to influence and reshape how 
citizens use and engage with transparency, prompting citizens to ask not, ‘What am I seeing 
in transparency that was once hidden?, but instead, ‘How is the appearance presented by 
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transparency shaping the way I engage with and approach this organisation, department, 
issue, or problem?’. 
In a related sense, my research has implications for social and political collectives, whether 
these be in the form of political parties or social movements. In the past, such groups 
have used calls for transparency as an effective, productive and successful mechanism in 
their struggles for democracy and demands for accountability from those in power. As 
such, transparency remains an alluring and popular demand for those who want to affect 
change in society. An important implication of my research is to make the case that it is 
today in the interests of the state, and capitalist organisations alike, to produce extensive 
programmes of transparency. A commitment to transparency in its present state (where 
it has been reduced to an online, interconnected network of data hubs and dashboards 
displaying financial information and audit and performance ratings, rankings, and scores) 
sees the demands and concerns of collective groups routed through a sanitised channel 
in which their social and political concerns are addressed wholly at the level of 
appearances. My research suggests that such groups must reflect upon the powerful allure 
and temptation to campaign for more transparency as it is currently constituted. Such a 
course of action may serve, paradoxically, to reinforce and secure the existing social, 
political and economic order of neoliberalism by implicitly endorsing the idea that the 
inequalities and injustices of society might be fixed by the enactment of further disclosure 
and reporting initiatives. A potential alternative to calls for transparency exists in the form 
of leaks, which are likely to serve more radical and emancipatory political interests than 
do the manicured, stylised accounts produced by the state and capitalist organisations – 
accounts that are steeped in the “orthodox routines” of financial and corporate social 
responsibility reporting (see Andrew & Baker, 2019). 
A question that might also reasonably be asked at this point is this: ‘If state transparency 
is so alienating, ideological and mischievous, what do you propose instead?’ This is a justifiable 
question, the sort of which is often levelled at critical research. My response is two-fold. 
On the one hand, I agree and sympathise with calls for critical research to “involve an 
affirmative movement” whilst retaining its “negative” assault on the status quo (Spicer, 
Alvesson & Kärreman, 2009, p. 538). What, then, could such an “affirmative movement” 
mean in the context of this thesis on state transparency? My suggestion in this regard 
would be to practically confront what Debord (1967a, p. 13) refers to as the “alpha and 
236 
 
omega” of the spectacle: separation. A significant portion of my critique of state 
transparency is founded on the way in which the mediated, visual experience of 
‘cyberspace’ transparency sees citizens isolated, individualised, and confined to their 
armchair, apartment, or living room. We are separated from each other, and separated 
from the objects of transparency. This, I argued, acts to frustrate and dull a radical, critical, 
and political engagement with the issues represented in transparency. As such, a potential 
solution to this would be to democratise collective access to penal institutions. As a body 
of engaged citizens, a demos, this would offer an invaluable opportunity to see ‘behind 
closed doors’ in a material sense. Curiously, this is something that Amazon has recently 
begun to do in response to criticism and suspicion over the working conditions in its 
distribution warehouses.65 
On the other hand, the second part of my response to this question is to sound a note of 
caution with regard to the offering of local, particular solutions to the problems posed in 
critiques of accounting, accountability, transparency, management control systems, and 
so on. As earlier noted, a typical feature of critical theories is their insistence on viewing 
society as a totality (see section 4.2.2). As such, the offering of local, particular ‘solutions’ 
could be considered a reformist, conservative position as opposed to a radical, revolutionary 
one. We see such ‘solutions’ now being offered to the global climate crisis, for example, 
where technological procedures such as carbon ‘offsetting’ are deployed so that the 
iniquitous social, political, and economic order can be retained in its entirety (i.e. so that 
the over-productive, destructive, and profiteering relations of production can be 
maintained in the interests of the large capitalist corporations: automobile manufacturers, 
airlines, petrochemicals companies, and so on). Specifically in respect of state 
transparency on prisons, a radical position would mean not tinkering with forms or 
degrees of transparency (whilst keeping the material conditions of imprisonment as they 
are), but instead seeking to impose a new social order, one in which the use of prison and 
other ‘coercive’ state apparatuses is drastically reconceived (or abolished). 
A final note is needed here in order to more fully establish the importance of this thesis 
beyond academic circles. As Žižek (2011, p. 4) asks, is it not the case that so-called “high 
theory” (upon which I draw extensively in this thesis) is irrelevant for everyday “concrete 
 
65 See: https://www.aboutamazon.co.uk/amazon-fulfilment/tour-an-amazon-fulfilment-centre/. 
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political struggle? And of what help is studying great philosophical and social-theoretical 
texts in today’s struggle against the neoliberal model of globalization?” Žižek’s answer to 
this question he poses to himself is powerful, convincing and speaks to the core of why I 
believe it is productive and important to continue to develop our theoretical-philosophical 
capacities. Thus, he goes on to write that in arguing against the “anti-theoretical 
temptation” we should assert that it is precisely today that philosophical, critical and social-
theoretical texts are at their most useful, when “perhaps for the first time in the history 
of humankind, our daily experience (of biogenetics, ecology, cyberspace and Virtual 
Reality) compels all of us to confront basic philosophical issues of the nature of freedom 
and human identity, and so on” (2011, p. 4). 
8.4. FUTURE RESEARCH 
The line of enquiry I pursued in this thesis generates several potential avenues for future 
research, three of which I want to mention here. The first concerns a core theme and 
concern of this thesis, namely, to what extent transparency fulfils its promise to make 
visible the invisible, to cast light on organisations, and to ‘throw open the doors’ of the 
state and other organisations in society. It is on this last point that I am especially keen to 
direct my attention in future. I stressed in this thesis that the notion of ‘throwing open 
the doors’ of opaque, closed or secretive organisations and spaces is a powerful symbolic 
or rhetorical flourish. As I noted in the preceding section, an extremely interesting 
development in relation to this is the move by Amazon to offer guided tours of its 
warehouses in response to sustained criticism of notoriously harsh pay and conditions for 
workers (see Brady-Turner, 2019; Sainato, 2019). What is fascinating about this 
development is that it is in stark contrast to the established contemporary norms of 
corporate commitments to greater transparency, where these have come to mean 
publishing glossy corporate social responsibility reports or announcing new codes of 
corporate ethics or company values. In other words, Amazon is here offering what appears 
to be a ‘real’, directly lived, corporeal and sensory alternative to the ‘spectacular’, mediated, 
digital and visual transparency that we are now overwhelmed by. By opening its doors in 
a material rather than a rhetorical or symbolic sense, Amazon is challenging established 
conceptions of transparency. This is therefore a rich site to investigate, posing as it does 
serious questions about what ‘real’ transparency might be in both empirical and theoretical 
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terms. Of particular interest is how this move by Amazon should be considered by critical 
theory, concerned as it is with exposing regimes of control and domination. 
Another direction for future research could be to explore how we might work to avoid 
the production of ‘spectacular’ forms of transparency in future. In a similar sense to that 
implied by Puyou and Quattrone’s (2018) “search for socie-ties”, research might today 
explore and suggest new (and old) ways of account-giving and representation such that 
we steer clear of the isolating, alienating and individualising effects of spectacular 
transparency. In some respects, such an agenda sees us circling back to earlier works in 
the accounting literature (e.g. Roberts & Scapens, 1985), by questioning and examining 
the importance and implications of distant, mediated forms of accounting, accountability 
and transparency versus immediate, face-to-face ones. Arguably such a task has now 
become more relevant than ever before in our present ‘society of the spectacle’. 
A final potential avenue for future research would be to further develop the point raised 
in my analysis (see section 6.2.2) of how (public) accountability and transparency takes on 
the structure of a fetish, in Marx’s sense, displacing demands for social accountability and 
transparency onto material objects. As with the examples discussed in this thesis, so too 
public tragedies are often represented not as problems at the universal-social level, but at 
the particular-organisational, particular-individual, and so on. We have seen this recently, 
with discourse around and reporting of the disaster at Grenfell Tower focusing on 
flammable cladding, not positioning this horrifying event as part of a social totality in which 
the pursuit of profit usurps concern for public safety and protection. Examples of what I 
propose as ‘the fetish of accountability’ can be found in the literature too, with the inquiry 
into tragedy at Hillsborough football stadium in 1989 centring on the opening of a gate 
(Cooper & Lapsley, 2019), or likewise at the fatal Stockline industrial explosion in 
Glasgow in 2004, where a faulty pipe was the centre of attention for investigators (Cooper 
& Coulson, 2014). For me, developing these and other cases into a broader theory of 
public accountability and transparency as ‘fetishized’ represents a socially important and 
intellectually exciting future project. 
8.5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this thesis, I have positioned contemporary programmes of state transparency in 
relation to an unfolding history of how and if the state appears to its citizens. I have 
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proposed that we might learn much about the state from the specific form in which it 
appears. I began by introducing the notion of the transparent state, the state that proposes 
to ‘lay bare its inner workings’ and ‘throw open its doors’ to the scrutineering gaze of the 
citizen and I demonstrated that in this phenomenon we find a novel development in the 
relation between state and citizen in the liberal democratic form of government. I have 
investigated how it is that the accounting technologies that make up transparency can be 
said to fulfil the bold claims made, that state transparency will deepen democracy by 
producing an educated mass of informed and engaged citizens who might use the resource 
of transparency to hold the state to account and participate in how they are governed. In 
so doing, I have engaged with an ever-present theme in the critical accounting literature 
– how accounting is used by the powerful to govern in society. By placing transparency 
within an economy of the state, social order and politics, my study of transparency is 
differentiated from prior works in the literature, which have brought to light the epistemic 
(Macintosh & Quattrone, 2010; Puyou & Quattrone, 2018; Quattrone, 2016a; Tsoukas, 
1997), psychoanalytic (Roberts, 2009) and organisational (Roberts, 2018; Strathern, 2000) 
pitfalls and possibilities, and the effects and (unintended) consequences of transparency. 
Theorising transparency through a contemporary reading of ideology, as developed by 
Slavoj Žižek, and the notion of spectacle, advanced by Guy Debord, I have proposed that 
we might reflect not on what transparency hides nor on what lies behind the stylised, 
pristine visage of transparency, but rather what that very façade tells us about the state 
and the maintenance of a social order. Focusing on the empirical context of prisons and 
investigating how suicides in prisons are represented in transparency, I have made three 
main contribution to the accounting literature. First, I have argued that transparency is 
the art of government, an aesthetic object, not a calculative practice, and that transparency 
is a regime which seeks to govern by appearances and belief, not by numbers and 
calculation. Second, that transparency produces passive, isolated and hypnotised 
spectators, not empowered, participating and engaged citizens. In this sense, transparency 
dulls the formation of radial and political subjectivities, producing citizens who think of 
themselves not as governed, but as participating in their own rule. Third, that under 
neoliberalism transparency aestheticizes democracy, producing a democratic appearance, 
not democratic practice. 
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These findings are, I believe, of interest beyond the academy, illuminating as they do the 
extent to which programmes of transparency are used less to reveal ‘what goes on’ behind 
the closed doors of the state, and more to structure the way the state is seen by citizens, 
not as a politicised site of power and interest, contestation and struggle, but as a 
mechanism to be refined and optimised. Read in this way, transparency is an object of 
ideology par excellence as it deepens and sustains the rule and authority of the state by 
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